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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (5 Aug 68)

FOR OT RD 682112

21 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field
Force Vietnam, Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.
3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
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
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I FORCE V OPERATIONAL REPORT



ON LESSONS LEARNED

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OPERATIONAL REPORT
HEADQUARTERS I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING
30 April 1968

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96350

AVFA-GC-OT

15 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters IFFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. SECTION I - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

a. (C) General:

(1) During February, March and April 1968 United States and Free World Military Forces (FWMF) with 37 maneuver battalions (19 US and 18 ROK) supported by 24 artillery battalions and Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) with 28 maneuver battalions supported by six artillery battalions continued operations in the II Corps Tactical Zone (II CTZ); in the west along the Cambodian/Laotian/Republic of Vietnam (RVN) border in Darlac, Pleiku and Kontum Provinces, and along the east coast in Binh Dinh, Phu Bon, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Binh Thuan and Binh Thuan Provinces. As the quarter started, planned offensive operations within the II CTZ were altered by the enemies attacks, in violation of the Tet truce, on nine key population centers throughout the zone. Reaction forces in the II CTZ rapidly engaged the attacking VC/PA forces and subjected them to one of the most decisive military defeats in the history of the war. By mid-February after reducing the city blockades, combat operations had become primarily offensive in nature and oriented toward the location and destruction of enemy forces, interdiction of enemy infiltration routes and surveillance of the western border. On the east coast, cordon and search operations to destroy enemy forces and support revolutionary development were emphasized.

(2) Friendly losses for the period were 1,464 KIA and 4,974 MIA. Enemy losses were 11,404 KIA, 1,376 captured and 3,136 individual and 271 crew served weapons captured. Additionally, II CTZ accounted for 315 Hoi Chanhs.

b. (C) Intelligence:

(1) General: During the past quarter the organization and staff activities were changed in consonance with the IFFORCEV Intensified Reconnaissance Program, in that the G2 Air monitors all reconnaissance and surveillance activity, ground and air and an Asst G2 has been assigned responsibility for monitoring ground reconnaissance alone.

(2) Significant Sources, Agencies and Techniques:

(a) There were no major changes in sources, agencies or techniques noted during the reporting period.

(b) The shortage of linguists continued to detract from the overall intelligence effort of this headquarters.

(c) G2 Air:

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1. The Intensified Reconnaissance Program has necessitated a change in mission planning and surveillance target selection. Prior to the new program, infrared and photo targets were selected daily by the 225th SAC. Targets were selected from requests received from tactical units through G2 Air and from the monthly reconnaissance plan. Seldom was emphasis attached to a target area for reasons other than those related to priorities and dates no longer of value (DNLV). In order to better accomplish the new program, since 1 April 1968 selection of targets for daily flights is directed from the G2 Air Section at 1200 hours for the next 24 hour period. Additionally, this concept of tasking is more responsive to the needs of the units in the field.

2. The following is a summary of relative surveillance tasks accomplished during the quarter:

	<u>Mohawk</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
Photo	30.9%	69.1%
IR	87.5%	12.5%
SLAR	100.0%	0.0%

(d) 55th MI Detachment (Corps):

1. For the period 1 Feb through 30 Apr 68, the 55th MI Det received 471 missions and processed 364. In addition, 27 Dorsal Fin missions were received and processed. Twenty-six Special Photo Interpretation Reports were submitted which included 12 area studies, three trafficability studies, eight area studies in southeastern Laos and five mosaics. In addition to reports submitted, the 64th Engr Det (T) and Arty FSCE were furnished with master plates covering areas of G2 interest.

2. During the period 1 Feb 68 - 30 Apr 68, 215 individual weapons, 170 crew-served weapons, 8830 lbs of miscellaneous ammunition and 1150 lbs of uniforms, equipment and medical supplies were evacuated to MACVJ2 for technical intelligence examination. During the period, IPW teams screened and classified 931 detainees and, as a result of these interrogations, a total of 196 PIR's and IR's were prepared and distributed. Captured documents were screened and 50.05 feet of documents were forwarded to CDEC for further exploitation. IPW teams also translated 87 Korean language documents, nine courtesy translations and 165 Vietnamese language translations, for a total of 261 Allied translations.

(e) Detachment D, 1st MI Bn (ARS):

1. The Detachment has continued its assigned mission of interpretation, reproduction, and delivery of tactical imagery to field units. In support of these units, 295, 295 feet of photography were processed, resulting in 196,705 prints interpreted and 889 Imagery Interpretation reports prepared.

2. Two Tactical Exploitation Teams were dispatched in support of Long Range Patrol (LRP) operations during the reporting period. The first team consisted of one hand-held photographer who provided support in the An Khe area to Co E (LRP), 20th Inf for a period of nine days. No reproduction personnel were used for the operation because there was

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no location available to establish an adequate photographic lab. Re-production was accomplished at the detachment photo lab in Nha Trang. Exposed film was picked up at An Kh: by 1st MI Bn (ARS) delivery aircraft and taken to Nha Trang for developing and printing. Finished prints were delivered back to the team member the same way. Hand-held photographers were rotated during the period to gain maximum use of the valuable experience gained on an operation of this type. The second team consisted of one hand-held photographer and one reproduction specialist and provided support to LRP operations in the Ban Me Thuot area. Support for this was planned for a 14 day period but actually lasted only two days because the operation ended early. Processing and printing was done in the National Police headquarters in Ban Me Thuot utilizing their reproduction equipment.

3. Hand-held photography missions remained an important part of the detachment's overall operations. In addition to daily hand-held photography flights, two special projects were undertaken. The first of these projects was for the 64th Engr Det (T) and consisted of photographing highway bridges. The photographs are used as part of an engineer data file for each bridge and for bypass construction planning. During the project, unit hand-held photographers flew six missions totaling 29.95 hours and produced 1412 prints. The second special project comprised hand-held photography from artillery OPs throughout II CTZ to provide a 360 degree panorama from each outpost. The panorama photographs will be used as aids by observers in directing fire at night and to help familiarize new personnel with the position. A total of four missions totaling 25.66 hours and production of 2108 prints were completed during this project.

(f) Long Range Patrol (LRP) Company:

1. Training:

a. All platoons were completely trained in the previous quarter so that the only training conducted for unit members was that for 17 individuals who attended the MACV Recon School. The company did provide 12 personnel to train selected 4th Inf Div combat engineers in the techniques of rappelling from helicopters in order to construct LZ's.

b. A training program for ARVN LRP's has been started within IFFORCEV with the objective of improving the capabilities of ARVN units to conduct LRP operations. The ARVN LRP training course at Duc My, Khanh Hoa Province, has been suspended due to the greatly increased trainee load and US LRP units are temporarily assuming this training mission. On 22 Apr the 4th Inf Div commenced training 30 ARVN LRP students from the 24th Special Tactical Zone. Co E (LRP), 20th Inf is providing six man Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to the 22d and 23d Divisions to train selected personnel for LRP operations. The 23d Division is providing 50 LRP students for training at Ban Me Thuot and the 22d Division is training 40 ARVN LRP students at Da Duc near LZ English.

2. Operations:

a. During the quarter Co E (LRP), 20th Inf inserted 153 LRP's which resulted in 138 enemy sightings and 72 enemy KIA (BC) with a loss of only two LRP's members (KIA) and 21 wounded. The largest confirmed kill at any one time was 20 enemy which were part of a larger force, after which the LRP was successfully extracted with only two minor casualties.

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b. Integrated ARVN-US Liaison operations were begun in early April with excellent results. The 22d ARVN Div provided eleven Duc My LRP School graduates to work with the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) in the COCHISE AO. The 22d ARVN Div on 27 Apr provided 10 ARVN LRP personnel, three of which were Duc My graduates, to the Co E (LRP), 20th Inf platoon in support of the 4/503d Abn Inf at Phu Hiep. The 23d ARVN Div is scheduled to provide by 30 Apr, 18 Duc My LRP School graduates to the Co E (LRP), 20th Inf platoon operating in the 23d ARVN Div's area of interest. Upon termination of the LRP training being conducted by the 4th Inf Div for the 24th Special Tactical Zone LRP trainees, those trainees who successfully complete the course of instruction will be integrated into the LRP detachment of the three brigades of the 4th Div.

(g) The 64th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) processed and distributed 106,655 copies of Tactical Data Overprints of 105 map sheets, scale 1:50,000 and 40,500 copies of Terrain Analysis Overprints of 105 map sheets, scale 1:50,000. Of the 105 sheets, 36 were in the I CTZ and 69 were reprints in the II CTZ.

(3) Deviation from current intelligence doctrine: No change from previous quarter.

(4) Significant changes from previous reports: None.

(5) Enemy Order of Battle:

(a) Disposition of NVA, VC Main Forces and VC Local Forces is shown at Inclosure 1.

(b) Changes in OB holdings during the period:

1. Units accepted: K50 Trans Bn, NT5 Probable 500
209th NVA Regt, NT1 Confirmed 1800
36th Sapper Bn, Binh Dinh Confirmed 125
28th Sapper Bn, B3 Front Probable 150
401st LF Bn, Darlac Probable 110
406th Sapper Bn, Kontum Probable 75
610th LF Bn, Ninh Thuan Probable 280
2. Units dropped: K33 Arty Bn, 40th Arty Regt - Moved to III CTZ
10th NVA Division - Reportedly disbanded
Bien Hoa DKZ Bn - Lack of information
3. Changes in subordination: K101 Bn from 95B NVA Regt to B3 Front
17th Trans Bn from NT10 to NT1

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X200 Arty Bn from B3 Front to 40th
Arty Regt

95B NVA Regt from NT10 to B3 Front

(c) Enemy Losses During the Period: (DCH is 35% of KIA based on
MACV criteria)

Month	Unit	KIA	DCH	PW	HOI CHANHS	SA	C/S
Feb	US	1643	575	81		329	47
	ROK	459	161	49		179	22
	ARVN	3274	1146	510		805	42
	CIDG	515	180	11		73	2
	RF/PF	808	283	210		158	0
	Totals	6699	2345	861	114	1548	113
Mar	US	1214	425	48		351	64
	ROK	673	236	59		197	29
	ARVN	461	161	146		124	4
	CIDG	260	91	27		86	12
	RF/PF	310	109	18		65	2
	Totals	2918	1022	298	63	823	111
Apr	US	506	177	6		146	5
	ROK	774	272	131		381	37
	ARVN	257	88	19		72	0
	CIDG	113	40	22		61	1
	RF/PF	137	47	39		105	4
	Totals	1787	624	217	138	765	47

(d) Enemy strength in II CTZ as of 30 Apr 68:

NVA 20,640
VC (MR and LF) Regulars . . 7,836
Adm Services. 4,875
Guerrillas. 15,979
Infrastructure. 19,000
Total 68,330

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(6) Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities:

(a) Enemy Capabilities:

1. In the Western Highlands, the B3 Front continues its replacement and refitting activities, but nevertheless retains the capability to conduct coordinated attacks on relatively short notice against US/GVN forces and installations, employing multi-regimental forces supported by mortar, rocket artillery and AA artillery fire.

a. In Kontum Province, the enemy can attack the PSBs of the 4th Inf Div west of Poley Kleng CIDG Camp in up to regimental strength at any time, supported by the fires of probably two mixed artillery (82mm/120mm mortar, 120mm rocket) battalions and two AA (12.7mm, 14.5mm and 37mm) artillery battalions. Major attacks can be expected within the next ten days against Poley Kleng in multi-regimental strength with a secondary effort against Pen Het/Dak To installations in no more than two-battalion strength, supported by mortar, rocket and AA fires. Stand-off attacks by fire can be expected, as well as enemy efforts at interdiction of friendly LOCs, disruption of US and GVN pacification activities and small unit/sapper activities.

b. In Pleiku Province, the enemy can attack Pleiku City, Camp Enari, Camp Holloway, Plei Mrong CIDG Camp or Plei Djereng CIDG Camp with elements of up to three NVA, MF VC and LF VC battalions. By deploying the forces of the 1st NVA Div currently positioned in southwest Kontum Province, the enemy could launch an attack against Plei Djereng with regimental sized forces.

2. In the coastal provinces of Binh Dinh and Khanh Hoa, the enemy can attack the populated areas of those provinces in multi-battalion strength in conjunction with harassing and interdiction attacks by sapper and MF/LF units; in Phu Yen Province, the enemy has lost much of his combat effectiveness and therefore can attack urban areas in Tuy Hoa and Tuy An Districts only in multi-company strength.

3. In Binh Thuan and Lam Dong Provinces, attack in up to two battalion strength if augmented by district and guerrilla forces; in Tuyen Duc and Ninh Thuan Provinces, attack in battalion strength.

4. Continue disruption of the GVN nation-building effort.

5. Employ any combination of the above capabilities, carried out separately or in conjunction with each other.

(b) Enemy Vulnerabilities:

1. Enemy LOCs are extended and insecure with the exception of those traversing neutral countries or international waters, where some degree of security exists.

2. The enemy is generally short of medicine and proper medical treatment facilities.

3. The enemy's limited capability to engage in conventional warfare for extended periods makes him vulnerable to superior Allied firepower in any large-scale offensive.

4. Newly recruited and impressed VC personnel are relatively untrained and inexperienced. Some NVA units are short experienced leaders; additionally, some replacements have not had extensive training.

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5. As a result of harassment and terrorist activities, and the Tet Offensive, the populace fears the enemy and probably will provide the enemy support only under duress.

6. Low morale in some units is caused by one or more causes, e.g., Allied firepower, sickness and lack of food.

(7) Weather:

(a) Interior: The Northwest Monsoon was very weak during this quarter as the transition period began to affect the interior with occasional mild surges of the approaching Southwest Monsoon. Skies were generally fair during the morning and nighttime hours with ground fog forming in the high mountain valleys near sunrise. Occasional heavy fog in the Western Highlands hampered some aerial operations during the early morning hours. Skies generally became partly cloudy during the afternoon hours. Afternoon and early evening rain showers and isolated thunderstorm activity became frequent each week as the upper level southwest monsoonal flow intensified and began to gradually effect the interior sections of II Corps.

(b) Coastal: The Northeast Monsoon and the transition period remained unusually dry this quarter except for the later half of April when frequent heavy rains, rainshowers, and thundershowers fell throughout the entire coastal area as a series of rain bands during the early morning hours with ceilings 1500-2500 feet, but clouds broke up and skies generally became fair by 1100 hours. The coastal ridges were frequently obscured with low clouds between the hours of 0100 and 1600H. Isolated rain showers frequently occurred over the coastal ridges during the afternoon and early evening hours with some isolated thunderstorms activity in late March and April. Occasional early morning rainshowers affected the coastal stations, with most of the shower activity occurring north of Ninh Hoa.

(c) Effects on operations: There were a total of 164 TAC sorties and 16 trail dust missions cancelled due to weather. No other effects on operations are known.

(d) Detachment 31, 5th Weather Squadron has the mission of supporting IFFORCEV and USARV tactical units in II CTZ plus the Americal Division, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and Provisional Corps Vietnam in I CTZ. Support is being provided in the following manner:

1. IFFORCEV:
 - a. Staff Weather Officer (SWO)
 - b. Forecast Support Center for II CTZ
 - c. Climatological Support
2. 4th Infantry Division:
 - a. SWO and forecaster support at base camp
 - b. Observations at base camp
 - c. Observations at Brigade Tactical CPs
 - d. Climatological Support

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3. Dalat/Cam Ly Air Field:
 - a. Observations
 - b. Forecasts on as requested basis.
4. An Khe:
 - a. Observations
 - b. Forecasts on an as requested basis
5. LZ English:
 - a. Observations
 - b. Forecasts on an as requested basis.
6. Americal Division:
 - a. Forecaster support at Chu Lai
 - b. Observations at Brigade Tactical CPs
 - c. Climatological Support
7. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile):
 - a. SWO and forecast support at base camp
 - b. SWO and forecast support at Division Forward when operational
 - c. Observations at Brigade Tactical CPs and Division Forward CP when operational.
 - d. Climatological Support
8. Provisional Corps Vietnam:
 - a. SWO support
 - b. Climatological Support
 - c. Forecast Support Center for I CTZ
9. 3d Bn (abn) 506th Inf:
 - a. Observations
 - b. Forecasts on an as requested basis

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters IFFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 30 April 1968 AFS AFOL-65 (R1)c. (C) Operations and training activities.

(1) Plans: Based on guidance, intelligence and overall strategy, the G3 Plans Division formulated and published 2 operations orders, one contingency plan and six fragmentary orders during the reporting period. In addition, the combined Quarterly Review was conducted and monthly combined Commanders' Conference and weekly Special Operations Briefings were instituted. A major study addressing desires of IFFORCEV force disposition during the forthcoming SW monsoon season was conducted. It included 14 separate component studies.

(2) Operations Orders:

1. OPORD 201-68 (WALKER) was published on 5 February 1968. OPORD WALKER tasked a battalion task force of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) for tactical security of An Khe/Camp Radcliff and QL 19. In addition it tasked the battalion task force to conduct Reconnaissance in Force Operations to support Revolutionary Development within the AO.

2. OPORD 202-68 (COHASE-GREEN) was published on 24 March 1968. This order deployed the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. (-) from Binh Dinh to AO MACARTHUR and the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) to Binh Dinh Province from Nontum. The order directed the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) to conduct operations within the prescribed COCHISE AO.

(b) Contingency Plans. OPLAN 102-68 (MCCLAIN II) was published on 17 February 1968. The sensitivity of this particular plan exceeds the classification of this document and precludes further discussion.

(c) Frag Orders: The following Frag Orders show the increased reliance on special type operations in II CTZ. The combined Long Range Patrol (LRP)/Mobile Strike Force (MSF) hunter-killer team concept is a tactical innovation that is producing encouraging results. A brief synopsis of the orders follows:

1. Frag Order 7-68 was published on 9 March 1968. This order directed a LRP/MSF hunter killer team to seek out and destroy elements of the 95B NVA Regiment south of An Khe. The operation ended on 2 April.

2. Frag Order 12-68 published on 31 March 1968 employed one MSF company on a reconnaissance mission SW of Potei Kleng.

3. Frag Order 13-68 was published 2 April 1968. This operation employed 3 MSF companies in an AO south of Cheo Reo. The operation was a reconnaissance in force based out of Buon Blech and concluded on 23 April 1968.

4. Frag Order 14-68 published on 14 April employed two MSF companies in a reconnaissance in force operation north of Dak Pek. The operation is still in process.

5. Frag Order 15-68 published on 21 April 1968 is a reconnaissance in force operation currently being conducted in Lam Dong and Binh Thuan Provinces. The operation oriented against HQ elements of AR6 involves TF 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf reinforced by a platoon of E Co, 20th LRP and one MSF company.

(d) IFFORCEV Force Disposition Study. This study was conducted during March and examines the influence of the SW monsoon on the disposition of forces in II CTZ. In addition to the basic study are 14 component studies which examine the following subjects:

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Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

1. Enemy Situation.
2. Enemy Vulnerabilities.
3. Weather.
4. Intensified Reconnaissance Program.
5. Artillery Considerations.
6. PSYOP.
7. Logistics Considerations.
8. Engineer Operations.
9. Chemical Operations.
10. Combined Operations.
11. C&DG Camp Deployment.
12. Aviation Considerations.
13. USSF Camp Assessment.
14. LOC Security.

Many of the study findings have already been implemented and others are scheduled to be put into effect. The study will be distributed to the field in early May 1968.

(e) Other.

1. Combined Commanders' Meetings. A series of monthly meetings between CG, II Corps, CG, ROKFV-FC and CG, LFFORCEV was initiated during the period. This recent innovation in II C&Z has the salient advantage of enhancing the personal relationships of the commanders and their mutual understanding of each other's problems. The meetings first review the intelligence situation to focus on the enemy, secondly review the current friendly situation and future operational plans and finally agenda items selected by the commanders are discussed and resolved. During the reported period two of these meetings were conducted.

(1) Weekly Special Operations Briefings. Another innovation in HQ, LFFORCEV instituted during the period is the Special Operations Briefings. These briefings are given to the CG weekly to provide a total program review on special operations. The briefing reviews:

- (a) Past week operations and results of mobile strike force companies, camp strike force and OMEGA activities.
- (b) Current dispositions and planned operations.
- (c) Future priority areas for offensive operations.
- (d) Integration of special operations with the intensified reconnaissance program.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters IFFORC&V for Quarterly
Period Ending 30 April 1968 ACS CSFOL-65 (R1)

(2) Operational Activities.

(a) City battles during the Tet offensive.

1. In the early morning hours of 30 January, in violation of the declared Tet truce the enemy attacked key population centers throughout II CTZ. The purpose of this offensive against key urban areas and US, Free World and ARVN installations was to disrupt the solidarity between GVN and US/Free World Forces; to destroy allied units; to incite the civil population to demonstrate against the present government of the Republic of Vietnam in the form of a "General Uprising"; and to induce a universal clamor for a coalition government.

2. Qui Nhon City, Binh Dinh Province: Within II Corps, as the county-wide offensive began, elements of the 3d NVA Division attacked a major landing zone in Binh Dinh Province while local force elements and a sapper company attacked Qui Nhon, the Province Capital. The fighting in and around Qui Nhon lasted from 30 January to 5 February. During this period elements of the 50th Local Force Battalion and three sapper companies attacked allied installations and GVN offices in and around the city. Key targets were the Military Security Service (MSS) Headquarters, the 2d Railway Security Compound, radio station and Bach Dang Village. The enemy occupied all target areas despite their defense by RF/PP elements. The first reaction forces to contact the enemy were four RF platoons stationed in the Bach Dang area. The 405th Scout Company and 1st Battalion, 41st ARVN Regiment were also committed into the Bach Dang area. An RF/PP, National Police Force and Province Headquarters Task Force surrounded the enemy in the radio station and were reinforced by three companies of the 1st Regiment, Capital ROK Division. Two CIDG companies were committed against enemy forces controlling the railroad station. By 31 January all areas were secured. Results: Enemy casualties were 276 killed and 58 PW's, 162 small arms and 11 crew-served weapons captured. Additionally, 12 members of the infrastructure were killed and 31 captured.

3. Tuy Hoa City, Phu Yen Province: On (30-31 Jan) and 5-6 Feb) elements of the 5th Bn 95th NVA Regt were engaged in and near Tuy Hoa, key targets appear to have been C Btry of the 6th Bn 32d Arty, Binh Tin Hamlet, the Tuy Hoa North Airfield, and the Province Prison. By 0600 hours on the 30th, Co D, 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf and two companies of the 2d Bn, 28th ROK Regt attacked the enemy force that had been attacking C Btry, 6th Bn, 32d Arty, Tuy Hoa North Airfield and the prison. By 0730 hours 31 January, the enemy force was surrounded and destroyed in Binh Tin Hamlet. Two ARVN battalions of the 47th Regt and two RF companies attacked an enemy strong point in the center of Tuy Hoa on 5 February and reduced the strong point by 6 February. Results: Enemy casualties were: 316 killed and 104 PW's, 104 small arms and 10 crew-served weapons captured. Infrastructure losses are unknown.

4. Ninh Hoa City, Khanh Hoa Province: Elements of the 188 NVA Regt emerged in an aggressive role for the first time since their limited objective attacks around Ninh Hoa and Nha Trang in October and November. Elements of the 11th Co, 7th Bn, 188 NVA Regt and the M-71 LP Co attacked facilities in Ninh Hoa on 30 January. The main objective was the PP Training Center. Enemy forces attacking the RF/PP Training Center were caught between the cross fires of the MACV Compound and the Ninh Hoa Police Station. At 1200 hours on the 30th, seven companies of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 29th ROK Regt moved to blocking positions around the city and on the 31st closed their encirclement and had reestablished control. Though there were reports of sporadic contacts through 4 February, the heavier fighting terminated on 31 January. Results: Enemy casualties were: 45 killed and four PW's, 12 small arms and one crew-served weapon though no infrastructure members were killed, five members were captured.

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5. Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa Province: As the enemy proceeded with his systematic, coordinated city offensive, Nha Trang also in Khanh Hoa Province, was attacked on 30 January by elements of the 7th Bn 18B NVA Regt, the T-6 Recon Co, T89 Engr Co and the K90 and X91 Sapper Companies. These forces launched their attacks against the sector and province headquarters, the military and civil jails, the radio station, railroad station, and the Roberts Compound area. The enemy suffered heavy losses in their abortive attempt to take key objectives in the city. From 30 to 31 January, 15 SF, CIDG and Ranger Companies of the 5th SFG, the 272d LP Company; the 11th Co, 30th ROK Regt and US, ARVN and ROK Headquarters personnel attacked enemy strong points and by 1 February eliminated all but scattered pockets of resistance. Results: Enemy casualties were 274 KIA while 76 PW's 167 small arms and 21 crew-served weapons were captured. Eight infrastructure were killed and 109 suspects detained.

6. Phan Thiet City, Binh Thuan Province: For the first time in several months the 482d LF Bn and the 840th MF Bn launched a major attack in Binh Thuan Province. At 0315 on the 31st of January elements of the 482d and 840th launched an attack against Phan Thiet. Key targets included the MACV Compound and water point, Binh Thuan Sector headquarters, an ARVN Arty Plat, LZ Betty, the Province Prison, and points along the perimeter of the city. Though the heavier contacts terminated on the 4th, sporadic firing continued into the 10th of February. In many instances the enemy units reportedly concentrated in schools in the northern part of the city as well as in a large pagoda in the western part of Phan Thiet. The enemy felt certain that these structures would not be fired on. As the fighting in the city died out, it appeared the enemy was withdrawing back to his base areas. At 0630 on the 31st the first reaction forces to contact the enemy were four PF platoons; an RF platoon and a Province Reconnaissance Platoon all of the 2nd at Xuan Phong. From that time, the 3d Bn, 506th Inf and the 4th Bn, 44th ARVN Inf reinforced by the 3d Bn, 44th ARVN Inf; two SF Companies; three LF companies and 15 PF platoons drove the enemy out of most of the city and had secured the area by 9 February. On 18 February the enemy again attacked Phan Thiet and overran the prison, releasing 500 prisoners. By 23 February the enemy attack had been defeated and the city was under friendly control. Results: Enemy casualties were 1,256 killed, 48 PW's captured, 253 small arms and 88 crew-served weapons captured. The infrastructure suffered 60 killed or captured.

7. Ban Me Thuot, Darlac Province: The attack at Ban Me Thuot which began on 30 January and terminated 6 February, involved the three battalions of the 33d NVA Regt, the E301 LF Bn, and up to five provincial LF companies. The apparent key targets included the 23d Division Headquarters, the MACV Compound, both airfields, the Province Chief's house and the ARVN Military Compound, the RF/PF Training Center, and the Province Bank. Additionally two churches, missionary buildings and a leprosarium were destroyed. The initial attacks were met by the RF and PF companies and platoons performing their normal security operations. By noon of the 30th, the 23d Recon Company; the 8th ARVN Cav; and the three battalions of the 45th ARVN Regt were in contact. In the early hours of 1 February the 23d Ranger Battalion was deployed to the city and on 2 February the 1st Battalion, 503d ARVN Inf had reinforced the contact from Pleiku. Final search and clear operations were completed by these forces on 6 February. Results: Enemy casualties were 919 killed, 186 PW's, 161 small arms and ten crew-served weapons captured. Infrastructure losses were 25 captured.

8. Pleiku City, Pleiku Province: The attack on Pleiku City which commenced early on 30 January and terminated on 4 February involved the H-15 LF Bn, the 40th Sapper Bn and four district companies. Key targets were the Pleiku Sector headquarters, the MACV Compound, the 71st Evac

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hospital, the PC Camp, the New Pleiku and Camp Holloway airfields, the Province Chief's quarters, and the Montagnard Training Center. As the enemy attacked, elements of the 22d Ranger Bn and the 3d ARVN Cav moved to alert positions throughout the city. Co A, 1st Bn, 69th Armor deployed to the contact areas and reinforced ARVN forces as did two MSF companies and one RF and one PF company. Elements of the 4th Div Ranger Bn were airlifted SW of the city and moved into the city conducting a coordinated attack with two MSF companies on enemy strong points. By 3 February the joint US, ARVN task force had secured the city and clean up actions were begun. Results: Enemy casualties were 632 killed, 182 PW's, 179 small arms and 10 crew served weapons. Twenty-five infrastructure members were killed and 160 suspects detained.

9. Kontum City, Kontum Province: Kontum City was struck early on 30 January by three battalions of the 24th NVA Regt, the 304th IF Bn and the 406th Sapper Bn. Some of the heaviest fighting in the Tet Offensive occurred when the enemy forces attempted to take the MACV Compound, Post Office, Finance Office, Province Chief's Headquarters, the airfield and the 24th STZ Headquarters. The prisoner interrogation center and a church were destroyed. The initial enemy assault was met by two Montagnard Scout Companies (-); the 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf (-); two CIDG companies; and RF/PF forces. By noon it was apparent reinforcement was required and the 1st Bn, 22d Inf; D Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav; and C Company, 1st Bn, 69th Armor were formed into TF 22 and moved into the city. ARVN reinforced with the 3d Bn, 42d ARVN Inf and two scout companies. By 3-4 February friendly forces conducting search and clear operations were meeting light resistance and all action in the city ceased on the 4th. Results: enemy casualties were 1039 killed; 20 PW's, 206 small arms and 13 crew-served weapons were captured.

10. Though the city battles in the western highlands are over there are recurring indications in Kontum, Pleiku and Darlac provinces which suggest that enemy offensive action in these areas is again possible.

11. Dalat City, Tuyen Duc Province: The last major city to be struck was the autonomous city of Dalat. Elements of the 186th RF Bn reinforced by a part of the 145th RF Bn infiltrated the city and attacked at 0100 on 1 February. The initial attack was met by an RF platoon, armored car platoon and sector headquarters personnel. Two RF companies and the armored car platoon supported by gunships were the first reaction force to drive the enemy out of the center of the city on that day. On the 4th of February three CIDG companies reinforced the hard pressed regional forces and on 5 Feb the 23d Ranger Bn moved into the city. On 8 Feb the CV, 23d ARVN Div assumed control of all forces in Dalat and reinforced by the 11th ARVN Ranger Bn on 10 Feb attacked the enemy force and secured Dalat on 11 Feb. Results: Enemy casualties were 208 KIA, 8 PW's, 40 small arms and three crew-served weapons captured in twelve days of fighting. Infrastructure losses were 17 killed and 15 captured.

12. By 1 February, the enemy had committed forces against major population centers in nine of the twelve provinces in the Zone.

13. Results of the Tet offensive in the II CTZ were:

a. Enemy military losses: 5405 KIA, 704 PW's, 1327 small arms and 127 crew-served weapons captured.

b. Friendly military losses: 471 KIA, 1746 MIA, 71 vehicles damaged or destroyed, 49 aircraft damaged or destroyed.

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- c. Civilian casualties: 814 KIA, 2919 WIA.
- d. Homeless: 97,101.
- e. Homes destroyed: 10,282.
- f. Homes damaged: 4,028.
- g. Infrastructures: 63 KIA, 439 captured (however some were only suspects).

(b) Operation MCLAIN.

1. Operation MCLAIN (Inclosure 2) which commenced on 20 January 1968 was continued during the quarter by the 3d Battalion, 506th Airborne Brigade. Gorden and search operations and operations in support of Revolutionary Development in Binh Thuan Province were the principal missions assigned to the operations. During February 3d Bn 506th Abn Inf was the principal reaction force committed against VC/NVA forces attacking Phan Thiet City. On 1 Feb elements of B Co 3d Bn 506th Abn Inf ambushed an estimated ten VC vic AN761174 resulting in five VC KIA. Night hunter and gunships were credited with 20 VC KIA during the day's operations. On 2 Feb A and B Co 3d Bn 506th Inf maintained contact with enemy forces throughout the day resulting in three friendly KIA, nine friendly WIA and 13 enemy KIA. At 2300 hours, 2 Feb, 3d Bn 506th Abn Inf Command Post area began receiving small arms fire and 10-12 rounds of 60mm mortar. The aid station was hit resulting in two friendly WIA. In addition a CH-47 aircraft was damaged. On 3 Feb Night Hunter teams and gunships accounted for 29 enemy KIA. On 4 Feb C Company found five VC bodies in the Phan Thiet area during a sweep operation. Night Hunter teams and gunships accounted for 17 NV KIA. On 5 and 6 Feb there was heavy contact throughout the day in the vicinity AN802118, between A and C Companies, and an unknown size enemy force. The enemy employed mortars and small arms fire until contact broke at approximately 2200 hours. The contact resulted in two friendly KIA, 31 friendly WIA and 14 enemy KIA. On 8 Feb B Company engaged an enemy force vicinity AN810111 resulting in five enemy KIA. Night Hunter teams and gunships continued alert missions resulting in five enemy KIA. On 9 Feb the 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf in conjunction with elements of the 44th ARVN Regt continued offensive operations in the vicinity of AN8012, with artillery and TAC Air supporting. The day's operation resulted in 53 enemy KIA with no friendly losses. On 12 February C Company was airlifted to Bao Loc to conduct road clearing operations along QL 20 from Bao Loc to Dalat. On 13 Feb head hunter teams and gunships engaged 16 to 20 VC in the vicinity of AN923242, resulting in three enemy KIA. On 19 Feb 68, heavy contact was reported in the Phan Thiet area. C Company was airlifted from Phan Mang to Phan Thiet upon termination of their road clearing operation. A Company and Mobile Strike Force 26 made heavy contact with an unknown size enemy force vicinity AN818093. B Company engaged another force at AN835097, in the vicinity of the Province Hospital. Enemy elements in both locations were well dug-in. Artillery and TAC Air were called in as friendly forces consolidated their positions during the evening. Casualties for the day were 10 friendly KIA and 33 KIA. On 20 Feb the 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf continued their operations from Phan Thiet. Their attack was met with heavy resistance from well-entrenched enemy in vicinity of AN833094. During the day, 1SP 26 was replaced by 1SP 23 from Pleiku. Contact continued throughout the day resulting in three friendly KIA, 12 WIA and 39 enemy KIA. During 21 Feb there was light contact in the AO vicinity AN822086 and AN817086 with indications that the enemy had withdrawn from their positions leaving delaying forces behind.

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Results for the day were 18 enemy KIA, three small arms and four crew-served weapons captured. On 22 Feb, B and C Companies and MSF 23 continued sweep operations in vicinity of AN815105 and AN813082 along QL1 resulting in one friendly WIA and 18 enemy KIA. On 23 Feb C Company and MSF 23 moved into previously VC held positions and destroyed 33 bunkers. A Company and the Curahed Shock Force of the 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf conducted ambushes in vicinity of AN766120 and AN781079 resulting in two enemy KIA. Results for the day were six enemy KIA. On 25 Feb at 0120 hours, B and C Companies received sporadic attacks by an estimated reinforced enemy company, vicinity AN8108. The contact continued until 0450 hours, resulting in 25 enemy KIA, one PW and four small arms captured. At 2100 hours, LZ Betty, the Command Post airfield of the 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf received 10 to 15 rounds of unknown size mortar fire. The ARVN ammunition dump was destroyed, six US were wounded, four helicopters damaged, the airfield closed and all communications by telephone and radio-teletype disrupted. By 26 Feb, all communications had been restored and the airfield was operational. At 0330 hours on 29 Feb, B Company received small arms, 81mm rocket and mortar fire in the vicinity of AN809145. Contact continued until approximately 0800 hours. A sweep of the area resulted in five friendly WIA, four VC KIA and five small arms captured. No significant contact was made during the remainder of the month.

2. On 1 March 1968, elements of C and D Companies, 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf, and the 27th Engineer Battalion opened QL 1 from the III Corps boundary to Luong Son (Bil26383). During the day, Night Hunter teams and gunships accounted for four VC killed. On 2 Mar Night Hunter teams accounted for eight VC killed in the vicinity of AN871805. On 3 Mar QL 1 was opened from Song Mao to Phan Thiet and on 5 Mar from Phan Thiet to Thien Giao (AN869252). On 7 Mar a Long Range Patrol (LRP) engaged 17 VC vicinity AN792180. Artillery was employed resulting in three VC killed. On 8 Mar in the vicinity of 2T225187, C Company located an enemy base camp of approximately company size. The base camp area contained 15 bunkers with overhead cover, medical supplies, one-half ton of rice and small arms ammunition. On 10 Mar elements of A Company ambushed an unknown size enemy force who had children moving in front of them vicinity AN851292. Friendly elements waited until the children passed before engaging the enemy, resulting in one VC killed. On 13 Mar vicinity of AN852287, one platoon from B Company found a cache containing two tons of rice. On 16 Mar A Company located a rice cache at AN856284 containing 10 tons of rice. The rice was destroyed by CS gas. At 2000 hours, B Company ambushed 20 VC at AN801131, resulting in two friendly wounded and five VC killed. During the day, gunships from the battalion supported a Camp Strike Force (CSF) contact at AN857100, killing six VC. On 19 Mar vicinity 2T268082, B Company engaged 20 VC driving six oxcarts resulting in two VC killed and four empty oxcarts destroyed. On 21 Mar at approximately 1940 hours, a LRP engaged an estimated 30 VC at AN279059. Artillery, naval gunfire, tactical air, gunships and Spooky supported. The LRP was extracted and four enemy killed. On 24 March B Company located and destroyed eight bunkers vicinity of AN793142. At 1525 hours, B Company engaged an unknown number of VC at AN780155, resulting in one US wounded and one VC killed. At 1650 hours B Company engaged five VC at AN785155 resulting in two VC killed and two small arms captured. A logistics convoy departed from Phan Thiet to Phan Lang at 0750 hours; however, due to numerous cuts in the road, QL 1 was closed into Song Mao at 1600 hours. On 25 March, B Company engaged an estimated enemy platoon at AN770174. Artillery, gunships and tactical air were employed on enemy positions until contact broke at 2000 hours, resulting in one

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friendly killed and enemy casualties unknown. No significant contact was made during the remainder of the month.

3. On 2 Apr as 3d Bn 506th Abn Inf continued search operations vicinity ZT224273, C Co found an 81mm mortar, two Mausers, 13 Claymore mines and four rolls of communications wire. On 5 Apr vicinity AN861183, a two and one half ton truck from D Co, 27th Engr Bn struck a mine, resulting in three US WIA and total damage to the truck. On 8 April the Bn Command Post, along with A and B Co, 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf conducted an assault NE of Phan Thiet, vicinity LN135305 (Le Hong Phong) for the purpose of conducting operations in that location. C Co joined the battalion on 9 Apr. On 10 Apr at 1450 hours vicinity AN8413, the 886th and 654th LF Companies made contact with an estimated two VC companies. The 4th Troop of the 3th ARVN Armd Cav reinforced the contact. Friendly elements to blocking positions at 2100 hours. Results of the contacts were two ARVN KIA, 13 RF KIA, one US Advisor WIA, 21 ARVN WIA and six IF WIA, four RF WIA and five small arms lost. Enemy casualties were two KIA and two small arms captured. On 11 Apr vicinity AN903247, B Co located an enemy bunker complex and cache containing 23 bunkers with overhead cover, 300 pounds of rice and uniforms. On 13 April at 0920 hours, vicinity AN344160, the 4th Bn, 44th ARVN Regt made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in one ARVN KIA, five detainees, one ton of salt and 500 kilograms of rice captured. On 17 Apr vicinity BN088319, during search operations, A Co located an enemy bunker complex with seven large bunkers with overhead cover, one of which contained many bloody bandages and thought to have been used as a hospital area. On 18 April, the 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf began a shift in operations from the Le Hong Phong area NE of Phan Thiet to the NW. The battalion was augmented at 1800 hours by the arrival of one platoon of tanks from the 1st Bn, 69th Armor, 4th Inf Div. On 19 Apr, the 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf commenced operations north and NW of Phan Thiet while the 3d and 4th Bn, 44th ARVN Regt augmented with a US tank platoon continued operations north and NE of Phan Thiet. On 20 Apr vicinity ZT267245, while on a search operation, A Co found 19 VC bodies in graves, believed resulting from contacts during the Tet offensive in the Phan Thiet area. On 21 Apr vicinity AN746057, a reconnaissance team from the 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf engaged eight VC resulting in one US WIA and three VC KIA and two small arms captured. On 22 Apr, all elements of the 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf returned to Phan Thiet in preparation for operation against MR 6 on 25 Apr. On 23 Apr, one MSF company from Pleiku and one IAR platoon from Co E, 20th Inf arrived in Phan Thiet for operation on 25 Apr. On 25 Apr the 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf moved from their base camp SW of Phan Thiet to an operational area approximately 40km NW of Phan Thiet, vicinity AN7545. The battalion was reinforced by a MSF company from Pleiku and a CSF company from Luong Son. On 26 Apr, vicinity AN827187, an individual from the 4th Bn, 44th ARVN Regt detonated a mine resulting in two ARVN KIA and five WIA. At 1410 hours, same vicinity, another mine was blown resulting in 11 ARVN WIA. On 27 Apr vicinity AN783444, Company B found an enemy base camp area containing 35 bunkers with overhead cover. In addition to the bunker complex, a well-concealed cache was discovered in the vicinity containing two transistor radios, three electric switch boxes, eight field telephones, three head sets and other signal equipment. On 30 Apr vicinity AN778424, B Company found an enemy platoon size base camp containing three bodies killed by artillery.

4. The results for Operation MCLAIN for the quarter were: Friendly - 24 KIA, 206 WIA; Enemy - 506 KIA, 117 PW's, 70 small arms and 10 crew-served weapons captured. Cumulative results for the operation through 30 April 1968 are as follows: Friendly - 24 KIA, 218 WIA; Enemy - 552 KIA and 120 PW's, 87 small arms and 12 crew-served weapons captured.

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(c) Operation BOLLING.

1. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) began Operation BOLLING (Inclosure 2) on 19 September 1967 employing its 1st and 4th battalions, 503d Infantry (Airborne) and the 2d Squadron 8th Cavalry. The operation was designed to destroy enemy forces located in the high ground west of Tuy Hoa basin and was oriented against the 95th NVA Regiment.

2. Cordon and search operations continued in the BOLLING AO during the quarter meeting light sporadic contact. The 173d Abn Bde (Sep) (-), with one battalion (4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf) in conjunction with Clung Son CSF, conducted operations in the eastern portion of the BOLLING area of operations.

3. Effective 032300H February 1968 the BOLLING area of operations was changed to encompass an area generally bounded as follows: from R0650550, south to B:680350, east to B:880350, north to B:880400, east along the river to C:050400, north to C:080630, and west to B:950630 (the starting point). On 4 Feb, vicinity C:007572, an aerial observer sighted 13 enemy and drew ground fire. The helicopter returned the fire killing three enemy and causing two secondary explosions. On 5 February CSF elements observed five VC collecting rice vicinity B:9278. The VC were engaged and all were killed. On 6 Feb at 0315 hours, Company A, 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf engaged four VC outside their perimeter vicinity C:154478, killing one VC in a short firefight. At 061147H Feb, while conducting a sweep outside the perimeter, Company A found one wounded VC. Company C, 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf killed one VC and captured one pistol during operations on 6 Feb. At 070810H Feb, H. 173d Abn Bde (Sep) began deployment to the MACANHUA area of operations, closing at an Xhe by 1745 hours. At 2400 hours, the 4th Bn 503d Abn Inf became OPGO. to IFPFCULV. At 071140 Feb Co D, 16th Armor made contact with 10 VC in a village vicinity C:074412. A short firefight ensued and the VC broke contact. Results of the engagement were one VC KIA and one VC captured. Also, 7.5 tons of rice were found in the village and extracted to Phu Yen Province Headquarters for redistribution. On 8 Feb at 0315 hours, vicinity C:226346, an AB team and a PF platoon were attacked by an unknown number of enemy. The five minute engagement resulted in two LD and one PF KIA plus two PF WIA. One carbine and one M-1 rifle were lost. No enemy casualties were reported. On 11 February the 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf established a new fire support base (HAZORBACK) vicinity C:068464. Battery C, 3d Howitzer Battalion, 319th Artillery and Company D, 4th Battalion, 503d Airborne Infantry heli-lifted to the new fire support base. Fire support base 11 located vicinity C:124437 was closed at 111545 Feb. On 12 Feb, Co C, 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf conducted ambush operations resulting in two VC KIA. No friendly casualties were reported. On 16 Feb at 2140 hours fire support base HAZORBACK received 25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in two US wounded. On 19 Feb Co D, 16th Armor found a large bunker and tunnel complex vicinity C:066454. Chemical personnel from the 51st Chemical Detachment flushed the tunnels with CS gas without results. On 19 Feb one soldier from Co D, 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf became separated from his unit. The individual reported he engaged and killed six NVA vicinity BQ958505. As the man was attempting to rejoin his unit he was attacked by an estimated 20 NVA and wounded in the hand. He evaded the enemy and rejoined his unit, (enemy bodies were found). On 22 February, Co D, 16th Armor and an engineer demolitions team destroyed the tunnel and bunker complex found on 19 Feb. On 22 Feb Co D, 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf found two VC bodies vicinity BQ953593. On 27 Feb B and C Companies, 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf moved from fire support base HAZORBACK and established new fire support base 15 vicinity BQ955498.

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4. There were very few significant actions within the BOLLING AO during the month of March 1968. Elements of the 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf did participate in a significant operation in conjunction with the 47th ARVN Regt outside the AO. On 4 March, D Troop, 16th Armor linked up with elements of the 47th ARVN Regt and conducted a sweep of the battle area. Contact was moderate throughout the day. TAC Air, artillery, and gunships supported the operation. At 1900 hours D Troop, 16th Armor broke contact and withdrew into Tuy Hoa for the night. A sweep of the battle area was made on 5 Mar; however, contact was not reestablished. US losses as a result of the action: 5 KIA, 16 WIA, 2 MIA, 4 APC's, 8 .50 Cal machineguns, 11 M16 rifles, 3 M79 grenade launchers, 2 M60 machineguns and 5 radios destroyed. Enemy losses credited to US forces were 175 KIA, 5 detainees, 60 small arms and 17 crew-served weapons captured. At 121140h Mar vicinity CQ102988, an APC from D Troop, 16th Armor while on a routine convey mission, was damaged by a command detonated mine, wounding four personnel. Another APC in the column observed two VC trying to evade and engaged them with small arms fire, killing both VC before they could reach cover. On 16 Mar a soldier from A Co, 503d Abn Inf separated himself from the company. Attempts to stop him were unsuccessful. At 170820h vicinity CQ094452, an element from the 47th ARVN Regt found the soldier's body. At 1100 hours on 16 Mar, elements from Dong Tre CIDG Camp captured a VC who was watching a trail vicinity BQ944075. The PW gave the location of other VC in the area. At 162030h, the CIDG elements entered a village vicinity BQ955664 and attempted to capture a group of VC. The VC began a firefight that resulted in 12 VC KIA. The PW identified one of the VC as the VC Area Chief and another as the VC Area Police Chief. On 18 Mar, elements of Co A, 4th Bn 503d Abn Inf observed an estimated VC company vicinity CQ045446. Artillery, TAC Air Strikes, and gunships were employed on the enemy locations. A sweep of the area resulted in finding four VC KIA. At 181100h, a herbicide mission was flown against enemy rice crops by the 51st Chem Det. The areas covered by the herbicides are located within the following boundaries: BQ790660, BQ810660, BQ810630; and BQ800650, BQ8007200, BQ730720, BQ730680. On 20 March the 51st Chem Det conducted a defoliation mission in the Suoi Ca Valley vicinity CQ002458. At 221150h vicinity BQ 867445, an aerial observer sighted 10 armed VC herding approximately 125 cattle. Gunships were employed on the enemy location resulting in ten VC KIA and 58 cattle killed.

5. On the 2d of April, gunships supporting the 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf observed and killed three VC vicinity CQ993376. Co A, 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf engaged eight VC on 7 April, vicinity CQ053398, killing three VC and capturing two AK-47's and 13 magazines along with one wounded VC. No friendly casualties were sustained in the action. On the 11th of April C Co located an enemy training camp capable of holding four hundred personnel in the vicinity of BQ217456. Simulated Chicom grenades, simulated barbed wire made of vines, and several documents were found in the area. The 9th ROK Div conducted a five day operation in the NE portion of the AO from 16 April to 20 April without significant contact. On 27 Apr, Co D, 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf found three enemy bunkers, constructed with 12x12 timbers, large enough to hold 10 to 15 personnel each. The area around the bunkers was cultivated. The bunkers were destroyed and the cultivated area dug up.

6. Results for Operation BOLLING for the quarter were: Friendly - 15 KIA, 34 WIA; Enemy - 255 KIA 17 PW's, 43 small arms and 17 crew-served weapons captured. Cumulative results for the operation through 30 April are as follows: Friendly - 57 KIA, 215 WIA; Enemy - 625 KIA and 85 PW's, 202 small arms and 19 crew-served weapons captured.

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(d) Operation PERSHING II.

1. Operation PERSHING II (Inclosure 2) commenced on 20 January 1968 as a cordon and search operation in Binh Dinh Province by the 2d Brigade 1st Cavalry Division (AM). Maneuver battalions under the operational control of the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div were the 2d Bn, 7th Cav; 2d Bn, 8th Cav and 1st Bn, 50th Mech Inf. Early in the morning hours of 31 January 1968, LZ Crystal, vicinity BR894658 and the Phu My District Headquarters were attacked by an unknown size enemy force. Two companies of 1st Bn, 50th Mech Inf along with elements of the 41st ARVN Regiment and 1st Sqdn 9th Air (av responded). Fighting continued throughout the day and into the night. By 0300 hours 12 February the fighting had become sporadic and contact was broken at 1615 hours. Results: Friendly - 3 ARVN KIA, 9 ARVN WIA, 2 US WIA; Enemy - 90 KIA (62 ARVN, 28 US), 3 PW's (1 US, 2 ARVN), 35 small arms (26 US, 9 ARVN) and 2 crew served (1 US, 1 ARVN).

2. On 1 February, RD Team 47 was attacked by an unknown size enemy force vicinity BR918655. ARVN artillery supported and contact broke at 2145 hours. A sweep of the battle area at first light on 2 February resulted in the discovery of 22 enemy bodies and three small arms. There were no friendly casualties reported. On 3 February Co B, 1st Bn, 50th Mech Inf made contact with an estimated enemy company five kilometers SE of Phu My. Contact broke at 1400 hours. Results: Friendly - 1 KIA, 3 WIA; Enemy - 28 KIA, 18 PW's, 20 small arms and 3 crew-served weapons captured. Interrogation of a PW revealed the enemy unit to be the 3d Company, 95th Battalion, 20th VC Regiment. At 0900 hours, 12 February, the 1st Bn, 41st ARVN Regt made contact with an estimated enemy company vicinity BR953647. The 1st Cav Div (AM) sent one company, 1st Bn, 50th Mech Inf and Airborne Rocket Artillery to support. Contact broke at 1745 hours. Results: Friendly - 1 US KIA, 1 ARVN KIA, 2 US WIA, 3 ARVN WIA; Enemy - 91 KIA, 5 small arms and 2 crew-served weapons captured. Documents found indicate the enemy unit was part of the 93d Bn, 2d VC Regt. Also on 19 Feb at 1900 hours a security element from 2d Bn, 40th ARVN Regt began receiving small arms and automatic fire from an estimated two enemy battalions vicinity BR8896. The ARVN returned fire and the enemy fled. Results: Friendly - 1 KIA, 1 WIA, 1 M79 lost; Enemy - 11 KIA.

3. On 18 February, the 2d Bn, 5th Cav deployed to I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) and the 1st Bn, 35th Inf deployed from I CTZ to the PERSHING AO. On 19 and 20 February, the 2d Bn, 7th Cav deployed to I CTZ. Beginning on 27 Feb, the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div headquarters and 2d Bn, 8th Cav began deploying to I CTZ and closed their new location on 2 March. On 28 February, the 1st Bn, 14th Inf closed into the PERSHING AO and on 29 February the 3d Brigade, 4th Inf Div Headquarters closed at LZ English. At 1200 hours 25 February, Operation PERSHING II terminated and Operation PATRICK commenced under the control of the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div.

4. Results for Operation PERSHING II were: Friendly - 21 KIA, 164 WIA; Enemy - 614 KIA and 57 PW's, 133 small arms and 21 crew-served weapons captured.

(e) Operation PATRICK:

1. Operation PATRICK (Inclosure 2) commenced on 29 February as a cordon and search operation in Binh Dinh Province as the follow-on-operation to PERSHING II. The operation was conducted by the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div with the two organic battalions, the 1st Bn, 35th Inf and the 1st Bn, 35th Inf and the 1st Bn, 14th Inf and, in addition, the 1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech). Supporting the brigade in the operation was Troop C, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav, 4th Inf Div. During March, action in the

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AO was relatively light. Significant actions during the month took place on 2-3 March, 8-9 March and 23 March. Numerous smaller contacts took place during the period throughout the AO. On 26 March the 2d Bn, 35th Inf moved from I Corps Tactical Zone and closed into the MACARTHUR AO under operational control of the 173d Airborne Brigade. The 3d Battalion, 503 Airborne Infantry closed into the PATRICK AO on 27 March OPCON to the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. On 30 March the 1st Bn, 35th Inf moved from the PATRICK AO to the MACARTHUR AO and the 2d Bn, 503d Airborne Infantry moved to the PATRICK AO. This was the second phase of the move of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) into the PATRICK AO from MACARTHUR. The move was completed on 30 Mar and the PATRICK AO was renamed COCHISE-GREEN. Results of Operation PATRICK were: Friendly-18 KIA, 92 WIA; Enemy-235 KIA and 14 PW's, 42 small arms and 13 crew served weapons captured.

(f) Operation COCHISE-GREEN:

1. Operation COCHISE-GREEN commenced on 30 March 1968 in Binh Dinh Province as a follow-on to Operation PATRICK conducted by the 3d Brigade, 4th Inf Div. Operation COCHISE-GREEN was initiated by the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) by a relief in place with the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div. Initially the 173d commenced operations with the 2d Bn, 503d Abn Inf; 3d Bn, 503d Abn Inf; 1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech); 1st Bn, 14th Inf, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div; Troop C, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav, 4th Inf Div.

2. On 31 March 1968 HQ, 173d Abn Bde (Sep) assumed operational control (OPCON) of the 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf operating in the BOLLING Area of Operation in Phu Yen Province and the 1st Bn, 503d Inf conducting security operations in the WALKER TAOR in western Binh Dinh Province. Conducting operations in Binh Dinh Province in coordination with the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) are the 40th and 41st ARVN Inf Regts. On 3 April the 2d Bn, 41st ARVN Regt and elements of the 3d ARVN Armored Cav Sqdn made contact with an unknown size enemy force 3 km west of Phu My (BR868684). Results of the action were 6 ARVN wounded. Enemy losses were 34 killed, 2 prisoners, 9 small arms, 1 machine gun and two B-40 rocket launchers captured. On 6 April the 4th Bn, 41st ARVN Regt made contact with two enemy platoons 6 km's south of Phu My (BR864643). Additional enemy forces were contacted and the 2d Bn, 41st ARVN Regt reinforced the contact and both battalions assaulted the enemy position. Results of the action were 11 ARVN killed, 19 ARVN wounded. Enemy losses were 60 killed, 14 small arms and 6 crew-served weapons captured. On 6 April the 1st Bn, 14th Inf moved to LZ English in preparation for its move to Kontum City in the MACARTHUR AO. The 3d Bn, 503d Abn Inf assumed the responsibility for the 1st Bn, 14th Inf's AO. Trp C, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav departed for the MACARTHUR AO on 7 April by way of An Khe from LZ English. On 8 April the 1st Bn, 14th Inf departed the COCHISE AO. On 8 April LZ Laramie was closed out by the 173d Abn Bde (Sep). Also on 8 April Co C (-) and 1 plt from Co B, 1st Bn, 69th Armor closed into LZ Uplift from the MACARTHUR AO. The headquarters of 1st Bn, 69th Armor will remain in the WALKER TAOR at Camp Edcliffe. On 11 April the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) commenced a two US Bn and one ARVN Bn operation in the Soui Ca Valley with the 2d Bn, 503d Abn Inf, the 1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech) and the 2d Bn, 41st ARVN Inf Regt. Co D, 2d Bn, 503d Abn Inf found a bunker complex on the first day vicinity BR808667. In the complex were 50 rounds of 82mm mortar ammo and 16 rounds of 57mm Recoilless Rifle ammo. On 14 April the operation was terminated and the 1st Bn, 503d Abn Inf, from TAOR WALKER, OPCON to the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) in COCHISE; the 2d Bn, 503d Abn Inf, the 3d Bn, 503d Abn Inf, and CIDG forces from Vinh Than and Ha Tay Camp commenced operation VELVET HAMMER in the southern portion

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of the Kon River Valley north of Vinh Tan and the high ground to the east. The 1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech), secured the major LZ's and bridges in the COCHISE AO during this operation. On 18 April Co C, 1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech) uncovered a rice cache of 14 tons 5km's east of LZ Uplift. Co A, 2d Bn, 503d Abn Inf located a cave containing a number of rooms vicinity BK752651. In the cave was found a printing press, beds, tables and chairs, 50 pounds of documents, 300 pounds of clothes, and food stuffs. The documents were historical records of the 3d NVA Division. On 20 April in conjunction with the Capitol ROK Inf Div operation MAENG HO 11 north of Qui Nhon, Co A, 1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech) and Co G, 1st Bn, 69th Armor moved to the ROK operational area to support the 1st ROK Regt and the 26th ROK Regt. Elements of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep), the 41st ARVN Regt and RF/PF units commenced screening and blocking operations north of MAENG HO 11 in the southern Phu My Valley and Mui Mieu mountains in coordination with the ROK operation. On 22 April Co G, 1st Bn, 50th Inf (Mech) found 74 tons of rice 7km's north of LZ Uplift. The rice was distributed to needy families through the GVN Phu My District Chief. On 24 April CIDG elements from the Vinh Tanh Camp made contact with an enemy plt 15 km's north of the camp. Three VC were killed in the action. Captured were 10 rounds of 120mm mortar ammo, 34 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar ammo, 30 rounds of B-40 rocket ammo and mines, firing devices, booby traps and small arms ammunition. On 27 April the northern boundary of the COCHISE AO was changed eliminating all areas north of the I/II Corps political boundary except the Duc Pho District area south of the BS east-west 22 grid line from the I/II Corps boundary east to the South China Sea. The screening operation in conjunction with the ROK operation MAENG HO 11 terminated on 27 April. On 28 April after experiencing only light contact operation VILVET HAMMER terminated. Contact during the month of April was generally light and scattered despite intensive search and reconnaissance in force operations conducted by US and ARVN forces within the COCHISE AO.

3. Results for operation COCHISE-GREEN are: Friendly - 16 KIA, 82 WIA; Enemy: 77 KIA and 10 PW's, 37 small arms and 1 crew served weapon captured.

(g) Operation MACARTHUR.

1. Operation MACARTHUR (Inclosure 2) began on 12 October 1967 as a cordon and search and border surveillance operation conducted by the 4th Infantry Division in Kontum, Pleiku and Darlac Provinces. During February significant ground contacts were made in the AO however the enemy for the most part continued in their tactics of conducting stand off mortar and rocket attacks on US and ARVN installations and positions. In early February contacts were made with relatively large size enemy forces (company or battalion); however, contacts involving that size enemy force decreased in the latter part of the month. Fire support bases at Ben Het and Dak To continued to receive mortar attacks during the month. On 2 Feb D Troop, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav, on sweep operations of the contact site of 30 Jan in the vicinity of ZUL25245, located 64 enemy bodies and 15 small arms. The 1st Bn, 503d Abn Inf deployed from TAOI JULIAN in the MACARTHUR AO to an area SW of Ban Me Thuot for operations in that location. The battalion was deployed in response to enemy activity and intelligence reports indicating that enemy elements were operating in that vicinity. Contact was made on 4 February by elements of the 1st Bn, 503d Abn Inf with an unknown size enemy force resulting in three NVA killed and one captured.

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On sweep operations following the contact 10 NVA bodies were found presumably killed by air strikes employed during the contact. In the northern portion of the AO, Co B, 3d Bn, 8th Inf located an extensive enemy base area which contained 10 bunkers dug into a hill side. One of the bunkers was approximately 6' x 6' and extended into another 6' x 6' room. The complex had steps out into the entrance and was reportedly located from XB970128 to YB973177 (approximately 3,000 meters in length). The area had been used for storage of ammunition and heavy equipment. On 5 Feb B Co, 2d Bn, 8th Inf conducted a search operation in the vicinity of ZAO95389 and located 19 enemy bodies and captured one wounded NVA. Three AK47's, one RPG, one carbine, 57 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, and two rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition were also captured. On 4 Feb MSF Co 22 was deployed to Ban Me Thuot to join the 1st Bn 503d Abn Inf and MSF Co 27 in cordon and search operations in that location. On 5 Feb, after four days of heavy fighting in Kontum City, the 4th Inf Div elements in Kontum City, Task Force 22, consisting of 1st Bn, 22d Inf, D Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Air Cav, C Co, 1st Bn, 69th Armor plus A and B Companies. 1st Bn, 12th Inf attacked key enemy withdrawal routes and strong points outside the city of Kontum. During the battle within Kontum City, 31 Jan to 4 Feb TF 22 handed the NVA/VC a stinging defeat by killing over 600 enemy while suffering only 2 KIA and 17 WIA in the Task Force. A strong contact was made in the vicinity of AR797917 NE of Kontum on 5 Feb when C Co, 1st Bn, 22d Inf engaged an estimated enemy battalion. Gunships supported friendly elements in the eight hours of action. A and B Troops, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav reinforced the friendly elements in the fight which broke at 2030 losses are unknown. To reinforce friendly elements in Kontum three CLIG companies, one each from Dak To, Dan Seang, and Mang Buk, were deployed to Kontum on 5 Feb. Company A, 1st Bn, 22d Inf followed-up the actions of 5 Feb by making contact on 6 Feb at 1035 hours with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of AR802433, the site of contact on 5 Feb. The enemy force was well dug in with strongly fortified positions and heavy contact continued throughout the afternoon hours. The contact broke at approximately 1615 hours with four US killed, 15 wounded, and one MIA. Enemy losses were unknown immediately following the action; however, in subsequent sweep operations 51 enemy bodies were located on the battlefield.

2. Southwest of Ban Me Thuot the 1st Bn, 503d Abn Inf again made contact with five NVA on 7 Feb at 1210 hours. Company D engaged the enemy force with small arms and automatic weapons killing two NVA and capturing one other along with one AK47, one machinegun, and one B40 rocket launcher. During a subsequent fire fight immediately following an additional three NVA were killed and two small arms weapons captured. Operation SULTAN, employing elements of the DELTA force from the B-52 SF Det from Nha Trang in the vicinity of the Plei Trap Valley in western MACARTHUR, officially terminated on 25 January 1968. Two LRP platoons from Co E, 20th Inf were placed OPCON to the 4th Inf Div for employment in the area of the Plei Trap Valley and the Delta Force was officially released from the SULTAN mission. TF 22, employed NE of Kontum on search and destroy operations following the significant actions in the vicinity of Kontum City during the latter part of January, returned to Dak To on 11 Feb and was placed OPCON to the 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div.

3. On 14 Feb, OMEGA elements were provided to IFFORCEV and were employed in the MACARTHUR AO in an area within the operational area of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep). The HQ, 173d Abn Bde (Sep) and the 2d Bn, 503d Abn Inf from TAOR JULIAN in the MACARTHUR AO displaced to an area

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SW of Ban Ma Thuot on 14 Feb joining the 1st Bn, 503d Inf. The MACARTHUR AO was changed accordingly in the southern portion of MACARTHUR to allow for operations by the brigade. Company B, 1st Bn, 12th Inf located an enemy base area and bunker complex consisting of 32 bunkers, 10 of which possessed overhead cover, in the vicinity of YB9702078. Located at the complex were sixty 82mm mortar rounds, twenty four 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 200 blasting caps, 16 boxes of booby traps, 27 detonating devices and five one quarter pound blocks of Tri-Nitro Toluene. The 1st Bn, 8th Inf and elements of the 2d Bn, 42d ARVN Regt commenced combined operations NE of Tan Canh on 16 Feb with extensive patrolling and search operations in the vicinity of ZB105257. B Troop, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav located a firing position in the vicinity of ZAC26685 on 21 Feb which was oriented towards Floi Mrong and which had been fired from within a two day period when found. Co B, 3d Bn, 8th Inf located two 122mm rocket firing positions on 22 Feb which were oriented towards Dak To and Kontum.

4. After a successful combat assault in the area of Zal73770, Troop A, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav made contact with an unknown size enemy force on 23 Feb. Ganships, artillery and air strikes were employed against the enemy and results of the six hour contact were 24 NVA killed and six PW's captured. No friendly losses were taken in the contact. On 23 Feb the 1st Bn, 503d Abn Inf with the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) Headquarters moved to the Ban Ma Thuot East Airfield and displaced on 24 Feb to the Kontum Airfield for operations in that area. On 26 Feb two companies of the 3d Bn, 12th Inf made a significant contact with enemy elements and killed 21 NVA and captured five AK-47's, two light machineguns, one carbine and two SKS weapons. Friendly losses were one killed and nine wounded in the action. On the same date, the 2d Bn, 503d Abn Inf moved from the MACARTHUR AO to the WALKER TAOR and replaced the 3d Bn, 503d Abn Bde for operations in that location on 27 Feb. The MACARTHUR AO was changed on 27 Feb by eliminating the southern portion which had been the operational area for the 173d Abn Bde (Sep). An IFFORCEV LRP Team #77, ambushed an enemy force of 25 to 30 enemy on the 28th of February killed twenty without friendly loss.

5. During March, actions in the MACARTHUR AO increased in the number of both stand-off attacks by fire and ground attacks by comparatively large size enemy forces on both US positions as well as US and ARVN installations. Significant contacts between NVA units and US combat elements in the western highlands indicated that the enemy appeared to be conducting large scale probes and tests of tactical defense in the MACARTHUR area. On 1 Mar B Co, 3d Bn, 12th Inf located a large enemy bunker complex consisting of 70 bunkers and an extensive mess area. Each bunker was 15 feet deep with overhead cover; the mess area included one bunker with six stoves, 200 pounds of rice, and some freshly made bread. Seven NVA bodies were located outside the complex which were believed killed by action in that area on 29 Feb. The complex was located in the vicinity of YB8230. In response to intelligence information pertaining to the suspected movement of elements of the 33d NVA Regt in the Ban Ma Thuot area, a task force was formed by the 4th Inf Div with the 1st Bn, 12th Inf as the nucleus and moved to the vicinity of the Mowal Plantation (AQ866222) on 2 Mar. The TF included B Co, 1st Bn, 69th Armor (-) and a LRP platoon for employment in the proposed operational area. Prior to the move of the battalion, however, contact was made by B Co, 1st Bn, 12th Inf with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of YB827299. The enemy occupied fortified positions and put up strong resistance; air strikes and artillery were employed to defeat the enemy. The contact broke resulting in two US personnel killed and eight US personnel wounded. Enemy losses were 12

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killed, one Simonov semiautomatic carbine, rocket launcher and one Degtyarev Squad light machinegun were captured in the action. On 3 Mar B Co, 2nd Bn, 8th Inf made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of ZA0770 (20 km SW of Kontum). The enemy force employed small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 rockets against the friendly force and artillery was employed by Co B. A sweep of the contact site after the action had broken resulted in finding 15 enemy killed as a result of the contact. Two Simonov semi-automatic carbines, five Kalashnikov assault rifles and one Soviet antitank grenade launcher (FRG-2) and some documents were captured. On the same date Co D, 1st Bn, 503d Abn Inf made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of AR054976 (nine km NE of the city of Kontum). The results of this action were six US killed and 11 wounded. Enemy losses in this action are unknown. Elements of 3d Bn, 45th ARVN Regt made contact on 4 Mar, in the MACARTHUR AO (vicinity of AP 894955, 5 km NE of the city of Ban Me Thuot). The contact with the enemy resulted in four ARVN killed, two ARVN wounded with enemy losses totalling 88 NVA killed, four captured, and one 60mm mortar, four light machineguns, and 24 small arms captured.

6. The 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav located an enemy base area on 7 Mar while conducting search operations in the vicinity of ZAL40553 (22 km south of the city of Kontum). The bunker complex contained 50 bunkers and 3,000 pounds of rice; the rice was evacuated. On the same day, elements of Troop E, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav made contact with an unknown size enemy force in the vicinity of ZA210715 (19 km south of Kontum City). Results of the contact were one US killed and 16 US wounded. Sixteen NVA were killed and five Kalashnikov assault rifles along with miscellaneous small arms ammunition and individual enemy equipment was captured. The 3d Bn, 8th Inf was placed under the OPCON of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) on 7 Mar for operations in their area of operations. An ammunition vehicle (a full tracked M548) organic to A Btry, 3d Bn, 6th Arty, while moving in convoy to a location in the vicinity of ZL185335 (18 km SW of Pleiku City) on 9 Mar, caught fire and burned with the ammunition on board exploding during the fire. The vehicle along with 80 rounds of 155mm high explosive ammunition, 63 rounds of 105mm white-phosphorous ammunition, and other assorted rounds were destroyed. Four hundred point detonating fuses also were lost. No injuries were sustained by personnel of the convoy. On the same day a forward air controller, operating in the vicinity of YE728058 (23 km SW of Dak To), observed an estimated five enemy vehicles. Air strikes were employed; three vehicles were destroyed and one was reportedly damaged. On 18 March, elements of the 1st Bn, 22d Inf located two tons of rice in the vicinity of ZA211719 (7 km south of Kontum City). The rice was evacuated to MACV Headquarters in Kontum. Co C, 1st Bn, 503d Abn Inf, while on search operations in the area of ZA041988 (16 km west of Kontum City) located one 60mm mortar and 35 dead NVA who had been killed by air strikes during previous contacts in that area. On the same date, the 4th Inf Div formed a special reconnaissance task force with the 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav and elements of the 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav. The force was employed on an intensified reconnaissance and surveillance effort in the areas immediately east and west of Pleiku City. On 18 March elements of the 2d Bn, 45th ARVN Regt made contact with enemy elements in the vicinity of ZV204119 (9 km NE of Ban Me Thuot). The battalion received approximately 200 rounds of mixed 60mm and 82mm mortar fire; the action resulted in 27 friendly killed, 31 wounded, three missing and 23 weapons lost. Two portable radio communications sets (series ten) were also lost in the encounter. Enemy losses in the contact were 15 killed, one PW and three small arms captured.

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7. On 20 Mar, elements of the 1st Bn, 12th Inf made a significant contact with NVA elements in the vicinity of ZV 227187 (8 km NW of Ban Mo Thuot). The four hour action resulted in seven US killed and 23 wounded. Eighteen NVA were killed and two were captured. On the following day in sweep operations over the area of contact, 14 additional enemy bodies were found and 18 small arms were located along with one 60mm mortar. An ammunition cache consisting of twenty-four 120mm mortar rounds; fifty 122mm mortar rockets and twenty-six 122mm rocket round warheads were located on 21 Mar in the vicinity of ZB 029004 (6 km NW of Ploi Kleng). On 22 Mar LRP #14, operating in the vicinity of YA 848935, became surrounded by enemy forces and attempted to evade to no avail. Extraction was called and a brief fire fight occurred and five NVA killed. The 3d Bn, 503d Abn Inf was moved from the MACARTHUR AO to the PATRICK AO on 27 March. On the same day elements of the 2d Bn, 35th Inf deployed to the II CTZ from the I CTZ for operations in the MACARTHUR AO. At 1540 hours 28 Mar the recon platoon from the 1st Bn, 22d Inf and CSF elements from the Ploi Mrong Camp made contact with an unknown size force in the vicinity of ZA 016717. Results of this action were one CSF wounded and one carbine lost. Enemy losses were seven NVA killed; three pistols, one AK-47 and 25 R-JO rocket rounds and eight mines captured. Elements of the CIDG based at the Duc Lap Camp made contact on 29 Mar with an estimated 400 NVA. The friendly force ambushed the NVA column which resulted in one CSF killed, seven wounded. Twenty NVA personnel were killed, five AK-47's and one SKS captured. The action occurred in the vicinity of XU 937867 (28 km SW of Ban Mo Thuot). The 1st Bn, 503d Abn Inf airlifted from Kontum to An Kho on 29 Mar and prepared to assume the responsibility for the WALKER TAOR. On 30 Mar the HQ, 173d Abn Bde (Sop) assumed the responsibility for the newly named COCHISE GREEN operation. The 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div took over the area within MACARTHUR previously occupied by the 173d Abn Bde (Sop).

8. On 1 Apr the 4th Inf Div was deployed in the MACARTHUR AO as follows: The 1st Bde consisting of the 1st Bn, 8th Inf and the 3d Bn, 12th Inf vicinity of Dak To; the 2d Bde consisting of the 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav, 1st Bn, 69th Armor, and 1st Bn, 22d Inf in Ploiku Province; the 3d Bde consisting of the 2d Bn, 8th Inf, 3d Bn, 8th Inf, 1st Bn, 35th Inf, 2d Bn, 35th Inf and 1st Bn, 12th Inf in Darlac Province north of Ban Mo Thuot. On 2 Apr, the 1st Bn, 22d Inf moved to Kontum and joined the 3d Bde and on 3 Apr, the 1st Bn, 8th Inf and 3d Bn, 8th Inf exchanged places with the 1st Bn moving to Ploi Kleng joining the 3d Bde and the 3d Bn joining the 1st Bde at Dak To. Also on 3 Apr, the 2d Bn, 8th Inf moved to Ploi Mrong joining the 2d Bde. On 8 Apr, the 1st Bn, 11th Inf arrived at Ploi Kleng from Binh Dinh Province and joined the 3d Bde while on 9 Apr the 1st Bn, 69th Armor moved to Binh Dinh Province under the operational control of the 173d Abn Bde (Sop). On 22 Apr, the 1st Bn, 12th Inf moved to Ploi Kleng and joined the 3d Bde and the 4th Inf Div terminated operations in Darlac Province returning that portion of the MACARTHUR AO below the YV, ZV, AQ 80 east-west grid line to II Corps.

9. The fire support base at YA 936913, approximately 10 km west of Ploi Kleng was subjected to stand-off mortar attacks on thirteen different days during April resulting in 2 US KIA, and 31 US MIA. On 5 Apr, Co A, 1st Bn, 35th Inf made contact with an enemy force occupying defensive positions in bunkers 2 km NE of the fire support base. The contact which began during the early morning hours continued throughout the day with Companies C and D, 1st Bn, 35th Inf reinforcing Co A

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at approximately 1200 hours. Contact broke at 1800 hours when all three companies withdrew to their fire support base for the night. Results were: Friendly - 7 KIA, 22 MIA; Enemy - 48 KIA. On 15 Apr, approximately 2 km north of the fire support base, Co C, 1st Bn, 35th Inf on a search operation came under a heavy volume of mortar, small arms, and automatic weapons fire from an estimated enemy battalion. TAC Air strikes and artillery supported and Co D, 1st Bn, 35th Inf along with one platoon from Co A, 1st Bn, 35th Inf joined the action. Contact continued until 1530 hours when all elements returned to their fire support base. Results were: Friendly - 8 KIA, 48 MIA; Enemy - unknown. While conducting sweep operations around the fire support base, elements of the 1st and 2d Bn, 35th Inf found 63 NVA bodies, 15 small arms, and 3 crew served weapons believed to be a result of these two contacts. During 25 to 28 Apr, elements of the 1st Bn, 22d Inf encountered almost continuous mortar, B-40 rocket and recoilless rifle fire from NVA forces in the northern Plain Trap Valley while conducting reconnaissance in force operations vicinity YA 844891, approximately 19 km west of Polci Klong. TAC Air and artillery, and one troop from the 7th Sqdn, 17th Air Cav supported the contacts. Results of the four day action were: Friendly - 13 KIA, 117 MIA. Enemy - 18 KIA. On 29 Apr, Co B, 1st Bn, 14th Inf operating 10 km west of Polci Klong vicinity YA 828908, began receiving B-40 rocket, mortar, and small arms fire during the early morning hours. At first light the enemy fire ceased and the company moved out on a sweep through the area. When the sweep was completed the company had found 45 NVA bodies, 7 small arms and 1 crew served weapon. Friendly losses were 2 KIA, 20 MIA.

10. Results for MACARTHUR for the quarter were: Friendly --216 KIA, 1280 MIA, 8 PW's; Enemy 1668 KIA and 59 PW's, 464 small arms and 39 crew-served weapons captured. Cumulative results for MACARTHUR were: Friendly - 595 KIA, 2856 MIA, 8 MIA; Enemy - 3,752 KIA and 137 PW's 846 small arms and 151 crew-served weapons captured.

(h) Operations within the WALKER TAOR

1. Security operations in the WALKER TAOR continued during the quarter resulting in light contacts being made primarily along Highway 19. On 6 Feb 68 Camp Radcliffe received approximately 100 rounds of 60 and 82mm enemy mortar rounds resulting in friendly losses of: 1 KIA, 24 MIA and 22 aircraft damaged. During March the major friendly losses were again attributed to B-40 rocket and mortar attacks. On 10 April at 0730 hours an IF patrol and an Engineer FOD team were preparing to destroy a mine on Highway 19 (vic BR 332462) when the mine detonated. Small arms fire was immediately received. As friendly forces took the enemy under fire the enemy broke contact. The enemy again attacked at 0850 hours and this time A Co, 1st Bn, 50th Inf and A Co, 1st Bn, 60th Armor were deployed to the area and contact lasted until 1245 hours resulting in friendly losses of 1 KIA, 13 MIA and enemy losses were 43 KIA and 4 PW's.

2. Results for operations in the WALKER TAOR for the quarter were: Friendly: 9 KIA, 100 MIA; enemy: 66 KIA and 6 PW's and 23 small arms captured. Cumulative results for the WALKER TAOR are friendly: 15 KIA, 112 MIA; Enemy: 79 KIA and 7 PW's and 27 small arms captured.

(3) Organization and Training Activities:

(a) All units that are assigned, attached or under operational control of this headquarters as of 30 April 1968 are listed at Incl 3.

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(b) The command relationship of major US, ARVN and FVMAF units within II CTZ is at Incl 4.

(c) The following units were assigned, attached or became OPCON to IFFORCEV during the period.

1. 13th Military History Det, assigned by USARV GO 496, 2 Feb 68.
2. 5th Public Information Det, 11th Public Information Det and 167th Signal Co (Radio Relay), assigned by USARV GO 640, 12 Feb 68.
3. 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div, OPCON by MACV msg (S) MACOC 12 0500Z, 171835Z Feb 68, Unit Deployment (U). The Brigade returned to 4th Inf Div control on 30 Mar.
4. 6th Bn (155mm) (T) 84th Arty, assigned by USARV GO 1126, 15 Mar 68.

(d) The following units were reassigned from IFFORCEV during the period:

1. 3d Bn (8in) (SP) 18th Arty, assigned to Americal Div by USARV GO 640, 12 Feb 68.
2. 184th Chemical Flt, 26th Chemical Det and 191st Military Intelligence Det, assigned to 1st Cav Div (AM) by USARV GO 713, 15 Feb 68.

(e) Manpower Authorizations: Infantry battalions of airborne/airmobile units and artillery 105mm howitzer units were reorganized under standardized MTOE effective 24 Feb and 1 Apr 68 respectively. These MTOE were recommended during USARV Phase I Standardization Conference in Aug 67 and submitted to DA.

(f) Research and Development (R&D) activities: Requests for information on various R&D items from USARV and ACTIV were monitored by this headquarters. No ENSURE requests were received from OPCON units.

(g) Trainings:

1. Commencing 1 January 1968, the frequency of training inspections for all assigned and attached units, less artillery groups and battalions, was changed from quarterly to semi-annually. Nine units were inspected during the quarter. All were rated satisfactory.

2. Functional training requirements for overseas commands have in the past been programmed based upon normal personnel requisitions. During this quarter units were required to identify their specific school requirements for all of FY 69. The list was submitted to USARV on 16 Mar 68, well in advance of the greatest majority of FY 69 personnel requisitions. The consolidated listings are designed to enable COMARV service schools to better develop schedules of classes in consonance with the needs of the commands for trained replacement personnel. Individual units will follow-up their previously submitted requirements with specific course identification on personnel requisitions. If in-country diversions are held to a minimum, this system should provide the units with a higher percentage of school trained replacements.

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3. During the period 22-25 Apr 68 a five man COMNAV Liaison Team visited Headquarters IFFORCEV and OICOM units. The purpose of the visit was to determine, through conference and interviews, the adequacy of service school training in preparing personnel for assignment to RVN, HQ COMNAV, USASCS, USAMPS, USATS and USAES were represented on the team. Observations made during the visit should contribute positively to the conduct of individual and unit replacement training in CONUS.

(4) Chemical

(a) General:

1. Herbicide operations during this reporting period have been limited to defoliation missions due to the emphasis placed on increasing observation in critical areas and road-opening operations.

2. Riot control agents (RCA) continue in short supply. As personnel become more familiar with RCA munitions, more effective means of employment are being utilized.

3. There is an increase in the use of personnel detectors as a positive means of detecting enemy locations.

(b) Herbicide Operations:

1. The results of US Air Force, C-123 herbicide missions are as follows:

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>NO. OF SORTIES</u>	<u>HECTARES DEFOLIATED</u>
Binh Din	21	2211
Darlac	23	2715
Khanh Hoa	12	1401
Kontum	20	2193
Lam Dong	9	1083
Phu Yen	4	438
Pleiku	38	4449
Quang Duc	61	6798

2. The results of US Army, UH-1 and CH-47 herbicide missions are as follows:

a. HQ, IFFORCEV: The Chemical Division flew eight UH-1 and two CH-47 helicopter sorties to defoliate areas along Highway 21 in Khanh Hoa Province.

b. The 4th Inf Div flew eleven CH-47 helicopter sorties to improve observation in areas southwest of Dak To. One UH-1 helicopter sortie was flown to defoliate the II Corps Headquarters perimeter. One ground based spray mission was completed, using the Power Driven Decontaminating Apparatus (PDDA) to defoliate along Highway 19 west of the Mang Yang Pass.

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c. The 173d Abn Bde flew two UH-1 helicopter sorties to destroy rice seedling beds in Phu Yen Province and seven UH-1 sorties to defoliate the Camp Radcliff perimeter.

d. II Corps flew thirty two UH-1 helicopter sorties in support of defoliation operations requested by ROK Forces.

e. ROKFV flew seven OH-47 defoliation spray missions against the Cu Mong Pass in Binh Dinh Province.

(e) Riot Control Agent (RCA) Operations (Friendly):

1. The 4th Inf Div reported the expenditure of the following CS munitions:

a. Twenty three E-158 CS canister clusters were employed as LZ preparations. On one occasion, this method followed immediately by Mark 82 bombs and napalm resulted in three "NVA forward observers" KIA on the LZ. Four E-158 were employed against a suspected enemy location and followed by artillery and ground assault with negative results.

b. Bulk CS (20,200 lbs) was employed to contaminate the NVA road network in Kontum at two choke points; against an enemy rocket site from which ground fire had been received; to contaminate suspected enemy locations and to restrict the use of terrain and fording sites along the Dak Kyunh River.

c. Four E-8 tactical CS launchers were employed against a suspected ambush site with negative results. One E-8 was employed by A Co, 1st Bn, 69th Armor prior to a ground assault by friendly infantry against a well fortified enemy position causing the enemy to leave the position and disperse. The E-8 is utilized primarily as a defensive weapon and is placed around perimeters and can be mounted on convoy vehicles.

d. CS projectiles for the 4.2" mortar were evaluated by the 4th Inf Div. The concept of employment was to initially cover the entire target area with agent CS, then to allow time for the agent to take effect, prepare the target with maximum conventional fire available and conduct a ground combat assault. On one occasion, an enemy fortified position has resisted for four days, but was finally overrun in one day by ground force rapidly exploiting preparatory fires consisting of a mixture of CS, WP and HE munitions. There were no friendly casualties during the attack.

2. The 173d Abn Bde (Sep) reported the expenditure of the following CS munitions:

a. Four E158 CS canister clusters were employed against a cave complex and followed by artillery with unknown results.

b. Bulk CS (1110 lbs) was employed to contaminate a portion of a suspected base area, to restrict the use of bunkers and to contaminate tunnels prior to destruction.

c. Five E-8 tactical CS launchers were employed by D Co, 4th Bn, 503d Abn Inf in a combat assault against a well emplaced enemy at Tuy Hoa during the Tet Offensive. A dense cloud of CS covered the target area for approximately 20 seconds during which time the friendly troops were able to advance to the outer edge of the objective with little

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enemy resistance. Approximately 30 enemy ran from the village into an open field and were taken under fire by supporting gunships. Results were 30 enemy KIA.

2. The 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf, 101st Abn Div employed 1600 lbs of bulk CS to restrict the use of terrain within a known enemy base area. The results of the employment are unknown.

(d) Riot Control Agent (RCA) Operations (Enemy): On 23 March 1968, via G-024761 to CH 020770 an estimated NVA battalion size force employed chemical agent "believed to be CS" against C Co, 1st Bn 50th Inf. On 25 March 1968, 21 kilometers northwest of Kontum City, an enemy force, probably an element of the 24th NVA Regiment, attacked an OF manned by an AF Company. A mortar attack was followed by a ground assault. Among the 82mm mortar rounds were some which contained "persistent riot control agent (CR)." Contact terminated after two hours with no friendly casualties. Enemy losses were unknown. A document captured on 9 March 1968, 25 kilometers southwest of Kontum City, revealed that chemical munitions had been issued to elements of the 24th NVA Regiment.

(e) Personnel Detectors:

1. The 4th Inf Div, operating in the MACARTHUR AO, flew 63 APD missions. On one occasion a MIKE FORCE Company was inserted based on the heavy readings and made contact with an estimated enemy Bn. All other readings were given to the G-2 for evaluation.

2. The 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div, while operating in the PATRICK AO flew two APD missions. On 17 March 1968 an artillery FO in an OH-6A aircraft accompanied the mission and adjusted fire on the location of the reported readings. Results were four secondary explosions.

3. The 173d Abn Bde, operating BOLLING, WALKER, COCHRAN and MACARTHUR AO during this reporting period, flew 56 APD and 77 MPD missions. In most instances, the results of the mission were used to plan H & I fires. On three occasions, Combat Skyzspots were flown in response to heavy readings. On two occasions the sensor aircraft received heavy ground fire which was suppressed by the accompanying gunships. On 27 April 1968 the sensor aircraft was downed by unknown causes, resulting in three US injured (none seriously). The UH-1 was a total loss but the APD was extracted and operational after minor repairs.

4. The 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf, 101st Abn Div flew seven APD and six MPD missions after receiving the detectors and trained operators in April. In all instances, gunships and H & I fires are employed against the locations of the heavy readings. Two APD and two MPD missions were flown in support of MACV Advisory Team 38 (Lam Dong Province) at the request of the PSA. Readings were given to the S-2 Advisor.

5. Subsequent to the Tet Offensive in Nha Trang, the S-2, 5th SFGA requested MPD support to assist in locating the enemy withdrawing from the city. Two IFFORCEV MPD were loaned to the 5th SFGA and an operator was obtained on TDY from the 4th Inf Div. Between 3 and 12 February 68, five significant heavy readings were reported, one of which was of long duration. Sixty six 105mm artillery rounds were expended and two gunships strafed the area. No assessment was made due to the heavy canopy.

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(f) Summary:

1. Herbicide Operations:

a. There were 128 C-123 defoliation sorties flown resulting in an estimated 21,288 hectares of forested area defoliated.

b. Units OPCON to IFFORCEV are continuing to use UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters to spray small areas not conducive to attack by C-123 aircraft.

2. Riot Control Agent Operations:

a. Munitions containing CS are being employed in both offensive and defensive operations.

b. The enemy employed RCA against an RF Company demonstrating that VC/NVA forces have an RCA employment capability.

3. Personnel Detectors: The AFD and MPD operating within the II CTZ are a continuing source of reliable information concerning enemy locations.

(5) Psychological Operations:

(a) GVN, US and RVN forces conducted active PSYOP aimed at both friendly and enemy target audiences in II CTZ from 1 Feb to 30 Apr 68. In II CTZ operations 532 million leaflets were disseminated of which 41 million were printed locally by the 8th PSYOP Bn. In addition 1,524 hours of aerial loudspeaker time were directed against targets in the enemy areas.

(b) Early in February, as the failures of the enemy Tet attacks became clear, the 8th PSYOP Bn was directed by CG, IFFORCEV to commence a special saturation PSYOP campaign to exploit new vulnerabilities. Leaflets stressed the enemy's desecration of Tet, the failure of popular support for a "general uprising" and unfulfilled promises of enemy leadership. This effort was coordinated by a PSYOP Tactical Operation Center which was established at CORUS, IFFORCEV to channel media requests to the PSYOP Bn and expedite dissemination after printing. The Tet response also featured extensive use of UH-1B helicopters rigged with 1,000 watt loudspeakers by Binh Thuan and Phu Yen Provinces.

(c) Radio Pleiku continued to broadcast according to the Yellow-bird plan on 1500 kc until it was severely damaged by a well planned sapper attack on 24 March. This station had also commenced broadcasting in Feb to the populace in the highlands on 1540 kc. Feedback on the distribution on the single frequency "mini-radios" indicates that many of them had been picked up by the potential target audience. Since the attack, a 400w Radio Set AN/GMC-26D from the 54th Sig Bn has been used to keep the broadcasts on the air pending the arrival of a replacement Radio Transmitting Set AN/TMT-22.

(d) Support.

1. The major PSYOP support agencies in II CTZ were the 8th PSYOP Bn, the 9th Air Command Sqdn (ACS), the 2d Coastal Zone "Junk and Swift Boat" fleet, the RVKFV Cn/PSYOP Co, the 20th ARVN POLWAL Bn and the 114th VNAF Liaison Sqdn.

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2. For examples of leaflets printed by the 8th PSYOP Bn during the period see:

- a. Incl 5 - A Hoi Chanh's personal appeal.
- b. Incl 6 - A Fire power leaflet.
- c. Incl 7 - A public health poster.

3. The 8th PSYOP Bn supported a number of requests for printing periodic newssheets and newsletters. These requests range from a small tabloid of straight international and national news for drop on suspected enemy positions to newssheets devoted to RF/PF and Chieu Hoi activities. At the same time requests for propaganda leaflets have declined. These developments stem from a number of factors: awareness of a news vacuum in the countryside; increased emphasis of face to face contact rather than the mass dissemination of impersonal media; the degree to which many suspected enemy areas have already been completely saturated by leafleting and the effectiveness of the newssheet in building confidence in crucial GVN programs. This emphasis appeared to be the most effective propaganda approach during this period.

4. Multi-national coordination of PSYOP has been improved with the information of a working committee consisting of PSYOP and Chieu Hoi representatives of II Corps, IOKFV-FC and IFFOACEV. This has led to better operations at the II Corps Propaganda Support Center manned by representatives of II Corps HQ and the 8th PSYOP Bn.

(6) G3 Air Operations

(a) The number of sorties flown daily varied from 35 to 102 with a mean of 68.9 per day for the period 1 February through 30 April 1968. The most frequent missions were:

1. Direct support of friendly forces in contact.
2. Preparation fires on landing zones and objective areas.
3. Harassment and interdiction of enemy base areas, assembly areas and infiltration routes.
4. Landing zone construction.

(b) During the period, approximately 7.3% of the missions flown for IFFOACEV were combat Skyspot and 1.7% of sorties flown were in support of major operations during the reporting period as indicated below:

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>SORTIES</u>	<u>SORTIES</u> <u>DAY</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
MACARTHUR	3072	34.1	126 KBA (confirmed), 115 KBA (estimated), 145 secondary explosions, 38 secondary fires, 38 military structures destroyed, 17 military structures damaged, 93 bunkers destroyed, 144 bunkers damaged, 17 anti-aircraft positions destroyed, 4 anti-aircraft positions damaged, 6 automatic weapons destroyed, 6 mortar positions destroyed, 15 foxholes destroyed, 3 caves destroyed, 2 tunnels destroyed,

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			13 spider holes destroyed, 10 bridges destroyed, 3 bridges damaged, 35 road-cuts, 3 trucks destroyed, 2 trucks damaged, 2 barges destroyed, 5 sampans destroyed, 160 trenches uncovered, 20 trenches destroyed, 1 observation tower destroyed, 1 elephant KBA, 1 armored personnel carrier destroyed.
9TH LOK	1030	11.6	23 KBA (confirmed), 15 KBA (estimated), 12 secondary explosions, 42 secondary fires, 320 military structures destroyed, 257 military structures damaged, 133 bunkers destroyed, 41 bunkers damaged, 2 automatic weapons destroyed, 13 tunnels destroyed, 25 caves destroyed, 3 caves uncovered, 2 mills destroyed, 2 rafts damaged, 4 grass fires, 4 pack animals KBA.
CAP ROK	722	7.9	26 KBA (confirmed), 12 secondary explosions, 60 secondary fires, 341 military structures destroyed, 317 military structures damaged, 71 bunkers destroyed, 42 bunkers damaged, 42 pack animals KBA, 1 cave destroyed, 1 bridge destroyed, 1 bridge damaged, 4 sampans damaged, 3 sampans destroyed, 6 grass fires, 150 meters of trench uncovered.
MCLAIN	540	5.9	3 KBA (confirmed), 11 KBA (estimated), 19 secondary explosions, 39 secondary fires, 201 military structures destroyed, 188 military structures damaged, 37 bunkers destroyed, 4 bunkers damaged.
COCHISE	250	2.7	3 KBA (confirmed), 2 secondary explosions, 8 secondary explosions, 11 military structures destroyed, 3 military structures damaged, 26 bunkers destroyed, 3 bunkers damaged, 1 tunnel destroyed.
WALKER	117	1.3	2 secondary explosions, 5 military structures destroyed, 45 bunkers destroyed, 2 bunkers damaged.
BOLLING	192	2.1	3 KBA (confirmed), 29 KBA (estimated), 13 secondary explosions, 15 secondary fires, 23 military structures destroyed, 3 military structures damaged, 23 bunkers destroyed.
DANIEL BOONE	12	.1	27 KBA (estimated), 12 military structures destroyed, 4 military structures damaged, 1 secondary explosion.

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GRID 336 4.7 1 secondary explosion, 109 military structures destroyed, 91 military structures damaged, 21 bunkers destroyed, 1 bunker complex damaged, 32 secondary fires, 2 caves destroyed, 4 trenches destroyed, 1 trail complex destroyed, 2 sampans destroyed, 1 sampan damaged.

(d) B-52 Support: There were 672 B-52 Sorties flown during the quarter, compared to 451 Sorties last quarter, in support of ground operations and on suspected enemy concentrations as indicated below:

DATE	NAME	CODE NAME	SORTIES	OPERATIONS
021035Z Feb	HA 11-2	Q-91	3	9TH ROK
040500Z Feb	HA 2-1	Y-70	9	MACARTHUR
061142Z Feb	HA 322	V-18	3	MACARTHUR
110936Z Feb	HA 2-3	V-42	6	MACARTHUR
101355Z Feb	2AL-08N	V-34	9	MACARTHUR
120611Z Feb	HA 328	V-8	6	MACARTHUR
121719Z Feb	HA 324	V-87	3	MACARTHUR
121926Z Feb	2AL-08N	V-40	3	MACARTHUR
140545Z Feb	HA 331	V-49	3	MACARTHUR
151908Z Feb	HA 329	V-72	3	MACARTHUR
153310Z Feb	HA 334	V-35	3	MACARTHUR
161450Z Feb	HA 333	V-01	2	MACARTHUR
162216Z Feb	HA 336	V-54	3	MACARTHUR
170712Z Feb	HA 336	V-54	3	MACARTHUR
171445Z Feb	HA 332	V-18	3	MACARTHUR
171744Z Feb	HA 332	V-18	3	MACARTHUR
172043Z Feb	HA 330	V-86	3	MACARTHUR
180545Z Feb	HA 330	V-66	3	MACARTHUR
180704Z Feb	HA 334	V-35	3	MACARTHUR
180855Z Feb	HA 332	V-18	3	MACARTHUR
181204Z Feb	HA 332	V-18	3	MACARTHUR
182105Z Feb	HA 337	V-66	3	MACARTHUR
190003Z Feb	HA 337	V-66	3	MACARTHUR

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190425Z Feb	HA 331	V-49	3	MACARTHUR
191624Z Feb	HA 334	V-35	3	MACARTHUR
191920Z Feb	HA 334	V-35	3	MACARTHUR
192222Z Feb	HA 334	V-35	3	MACARTHUR
200120Z Feb	HA 334	V-35	3	MACARTHUR
200855Z Feb	HA 333	V-01	3	MACARTHUR
211620Z Feb	HA 340	W-86	3	MACARTHUR
220432Z Feb	HA 342	W-82	3	MACARTHUR
221926Z Feb	HA 340	W-86	3	MACARTHUR
222358Z Feb	HA 344	W-34	3	MACARTHUR
230139Z Feb	HA 340	W-86	3	MACARTHUR
230559Z Feb	HA 344	W-34	3	MACARTHUR
231416Z Feb	HA 350	X-77	3	MACARTHUR
241805Z Feb	HA 361	Y-27	3	MACARTHUR
242049Z Feb	HA 362	Y-69	3	MACARTHUR
250628Z Feb	HA 361	Y-21	3	MACARTHUR
251100Z Feb	HA 357	Y-75	3	MACARTHUR
251305Z Feb	HA 357	Y-75	6	MACARTHUR
251918Z Feb	2AL-10	Y-23	6	MACARTHUR
260625Z Feb	HA 350	X-77	3	MACARTHUR
260835Z Feb	HA 347	X-27	3	MACARTHUR
261432Z Feb	HA 347	X-27	1	MACARTHUR
261844Z Feb	2AL-12	Y-18	3	MACARTHUR
270910Z Feb	2AL-11	Y-31	3	MACARTHUR
280049Z Feb	2AL-12	Y-18	3	MACARTHUR
281320Z Feb	HA 2-5	Y-17	6	MACARTHUR
282051Z Feb	BF 2-2	Y-20	3	MACARTHUR
290023Z Feb	2AL 12	Y-18	3	MACARTHUR
290641Z Feb	2AL-12	Y-18	3	MACARTHUR
021529Z Mar	HA 350	X-77	3	MACARTHUR

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031320Z Mar	HA 2-10	A-89	6	MACARTHUR
031449Z Mar	HA 350	X-77	1	MACARTHUR
040249Z Mar	HA 361	Y-21	3	MACARTHUR
051430Z Mar	HA 362	Y-69	3	MACARTHUR
061256Z Mar	HA 2-9	A-13	6	MACARTHUR
061442Z Mar	HA 365	A-64	6	MACARTHUR
070246Z Mar	HA 366	A-93	3	MACARTHUR
071238Z Mar	HA 2-16	A-67	6	MACARTHUR
081220Z Mar	HA 363	A-11	3	MACARTHUR
082121Z Mar	HA 366	A-93	3	MACARTHUR
090020Z Mar	HA 364	A-40	3	MACARTHUR
092114Z Mar	HA 366	A-93	3	MACARTHUR
101129Z Mar	HA 370	A-83	3	MACARTHUR
101842Z Mar	2A-25	A-57	6	II CORPS
110817Z Mar	HA 374	A-70	3	MACARTHUR
111846Z Mar	GA 07-3	B-54	6	PATRICK
112340Z Mar	HA 371	A-90	3	MACARTHUR
121426Z Mar	HA 831	B-74	6	MACARTHUR
121933Z Mar	CH 3-1	B-08	3	MOLAIN
122010Z Mar	2A1-26	A-18	3	II CORPS
131743Z Mar	HA-11	B-80	6	MACARTHUR
141921Z Mar	HA 3-5	B-96	6	MACARTHUR
150315Z Mar	2AL-31	B-07	3	II CORPS
151917Z Mar	2AL-27	B-76	3	II CORPS
161810Z Mar	2AL-32	B-34	3	II CORPS
171008Z Mar	HA 3-10	B-81	6	MACARTHUR
171541Z Mar	HA 3-9	B-90	6	MACARTHUR
172249Z Mar	HA 380	B-38	3	MACARTHUR
181008Z Mar	2AL-28	B-60	3	II CORPS
181150Z Mar	2AL-34	B-30	3	II CORPS

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181045Z Mar	AL 23-1	C-77	3	II CORPS
181610Z Mar	HA 3-8	C-08	6	MACARTHUR
181913Z Mar	2AL-31	D-07	3	II CORPS
191132Z Mar	HA 3-17	C-61	6	MACARTHUR
191637Z Mar	HA 385	C-13	6	MACARTHUR
192326Z Mar	HA 387	C-93	3	MACARTHUR
201221Z Mar	HA 386	C-78	6	MACARTHUR
201616Z Mar	HA 387	C-93	3	MACARTHUR
221429Z Mar	HA 3-21	C-92	6	MACARTHUR
230241Z Mar	HA 388	C-65	3	MACARTHUR
231539Z Mar	HA 3-7	C-17	6	MACARTHUR
241615Z Mar	HA 387	C-93	3	MACARTHUR
242034Z Mar	HA 391	C-23	3	MACARTHUR
250210Z Mar	HA 391	C-23	3	MACARTHUR
251450Z Mar	HA 388	C-65	3	MACARTHUR
270321Z Mar	HA 391	C-23	3	MACARTHUR
271457Z Mar	HA 3-24	D-100	6	MACARTHUR
281625Z Mar	HA 3-10	C-74	6	MACARTHUR
282315Z Mar	HA 392	C-04	3	MACARTHUR
290530Z Mar	HA 392	C-04	3	MACARTHUR
291734Z Mar	HA 3-20	C-15	6	MACARTHUR
292010Z Mar	HA 393	C-25	3	MACARTHUR
300020Z Mar	HA 393	C-25	1	MACARTHUR
311202Z Mar	HA 389	C-33	3	MACARTHUR
011014Z Apr	HA 393	C-25	3	MACARTHUR
012220Z Apr	HA 390	C-55	3	MACARTHUR
031619Z Apr	HA 4-1	E-99	6	MACARTHUR
041011Z Apr	HA 3-23	E-46	6	MACARTHUR
041625Z Apr	2AL-26	A-10	3	II CORPS
041814Z Apr	HA 3-25	D-62	1	MACARTHUR

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041526Z Apr	HA 3-27	E-61	3	MACARTHUR
052007Z Apr	HA 4-5	E-49	6	MACARTHUR
052209Z Apr	HA 4-2	E-33	6	MACARTHUR
050133Z Apr	HA 4-3	E-35	6	MACARTHUR
050345Z Apr	HA 4-4	E-59	6	MACARTHUR
060621Z Apr	HA 3-26	E-70	6	MACARTHUR
062337Z Apr	HA 3-25	D-62	3	MACARTHUR
080539Z Apr	HA 3-25	D-62	3	MACARTHUR
081148Z Apr	HA 3-25	D-62	6	MACARTHUR
091011Z Apr	AL 24-1	E-22	6	II COMPS
091221Z Apr	AL 24-2	E-41	3	II COMPS
091242Z Apr	AL 25-2	E-41	3	II COMPS
091538Z Apr	HA 402	E-66	6	MACARTHUR
091740Z Apr	HA 402	E-66	6	MACARTHUR
091930Z Apr	HA 403	F-02	6	MACARTHUR
092135Z Apr	HA 4-3	E-62	6	MACARTHUR
100630Z Apr	HA 4-6	G-53	3	MACARTHUR
101509Z Apr	HA 4-20	F-25	6	MACARTHUR
101709Z Apr	IA 4-3	F-03	3	COCHISE
101928Z Apr	2AL-47	F-33	6	II COMPS
102124Z Apr	HA 4-15	F-69	6	MACARTHUR
102345Z Apr	2AL-26	A-18	6	II COMPS
101730Z Apr	2AL-27	A-76	3	II COMPS
110558Z Apr	2AL-27	A-76	6	II COMPS
111237Z Apr	HA 4-17	F-83	6	MACARTHUR
111441Z Apr	HA 4-19	F-35	6	MACARTHUR
111554Z Apr	HA 4-16	F-54	6	MACARTHUR
112025Z Apr	HA 4-13	E-50	3	MACARTHUR
120244Z Apr	HA 4-14	F-02	6	MACARTHUR
120824Z Apr	HA 4-11	F-100	3	MACARTHUR

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121630Z Apr	HA 4-21	F-14	6	MACARTHUR
121955Z Apr	HA 4-22	F-93	6	MACARTHUR
130050Z Apr	HA 4-10	F-20	6	MACARTHUR
131113Z Apr	HA 4-10	F-21	3	MACARTHUR
131125Z Apr	HA 4-9	F-23	6	MACARTHUR
140714Z Apr	HA 4-6	F-72	6	MACARTHUR
150603Z Apr	HA 4-1	F-06	1	MACARTHUR
151818Z Apr	DA 21-1	F-04	3	9TH ROK
160612Z Apr	HA 3-23	D-20	3	MACARTHUR
162355Z Apr	HA 404	F-34	6	MACARTHUR
190539Z Apr	HA 410	F-65	3	MACARTHUR
201517Z Apr	HA 405	F-16	3	MACARTHUR
211702Z Apr	HA 4-12	F-44	6	MACARTHUR
220219Z Apr	HA 4-37	G-27	6	MACARTHUR
220434Z Apr	HA 4-33	G-53	6	MACARTHUR
230615Z Apr	HA 400	L-53	6	MACARTHUR
232320Z Apr	HA 415	F-17	2	MACARTHUR
240500Z Apr	HA 415	F-17	3	MACARTHUR
240740Z Apr	HA 415	F-17	3	MACARTHUR
241642Z Apr	HA 415	F-17	3	MACARTHUR
261512Z Apr	HA 4-54	H-64	3	MACARTHUR
261719Z Apr	HA 4-55	H-46	6	MACARTHUR
261900Z Apr	HA 4-56	H-30	6	MACARTHUR
291000Z Apr	HA 410	F-65	3	MACARTHUR
291645Z Apr	HA 4-51	H-07	6	MACARTHUR
291645Z Apr	HA 4-52	H-09	6	MACARTHUR
301315Z Apr	HA 4-65	H-44	6	MACARTHUR
302033Z Apr	HA 4-59	H-11	6	MACARTHUR
302221Z Apr	HA 4-57	H-18	6	MACARTHUR

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(7) Army Aviation Operations.

(a) The major objectives in employing the tactical aviation assets available to IFFONCEV are:

1. Provide air mobility to combat elements of Free World Forces in II CTZ.

2. Support the aerial reconnaissance and surveillance program.

(b) Resources available from 17th Cbn Avn Gp:

1. Assault Helicopter Assets:

COMPANY	BN	CAB SUPPORT MISSION
57th AHC	52d CAB	GS Highlands, Prairie Fire & Omega, 4th Inf Div & RVN
119th AHC	52d CAB	
170th AHC	52d CAB	
189th AHC	52d CAB	
185th AHC	52d CAB	
61st AHC	10th CAB	GS Coastal, 3/506th, Recon, Special Forces, 173d Abn Bde (Sep)
92d AHC	10th CAB	
192d AHC	10th CAB	
281st AHC	10th CAB	GS Coastal, WHRID, ORID
40th AHC	26th CAB	
129th AHC	16th CAB	
335th AHC	26th CAB	
134th AHC(-)	26th CAB	

2. Assault Support Helicopter Assets:

179th ASHC	52d CAB	DS 4th Inf Div
243d ASHC	10th CAB	GS Coastal
180th ASHC	26th CAB	GS Coastal
196th ASHC	10th CAB	GS Coastal

3. Heavy Helicopter Assets (Crane):

355th HHC (-)	52d CAB	GS II CTZ
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4. The 133d, 185th, 203d and 219th Reconnaissance Airplane Companies support the V. Program and provide GS support throughout II CTZ.

5. The 225th Surveillance Airplane Company is employed throughout the II CTZ in a surveillance role.

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(c) Major Accomplishments:

1. Airmobile assets were provided to the following US operations for the period indicated:

OPERATION	SUPPORTED UNIT	DURATION
BOLLING	173d Abn Bde (Sep)	1 Feb - 30 Apr
COCHISE	173d Abn Bde (Sep)	30 Mar - 30 Apr
MCCARTHY	4th Inf Div	1 Feb - 30 Apr
MOLAIN	3/506th Abn Inf Bn	1 Feb - 30 Apr
PATLICK	3d Bde 4th Inf Div	1 Feb - 30 Mar
WALKER	173d Abn Bde (Sep)	1 Feb - 30 Apr

2. The daily ROKA support was provided by the 40th and 129th AHC's and the 180th and 196th ASCHs. Additional support was provided, on a mission basis, for the following major ROKA operations:

OPERATION	SUPPORTED UNIT	DURATION
HAE SAN JIN #2	CHID	3 Feb - 16 Feb
MUNG HO #10	CHID	17 Feb - 27 Feb
TUCK SOO JON KA #2	WHILD	17 Feb - 27 Feb
ROCK KAN POCK	WHILD	5 Mar - 6 Mar
CHOU KA #3	WHILD	14 Mar - 27 Mar
PAK GI #11	WHILD	23 Mar - 3 Apr
TUCK KA KAN LE #6	WHILD	6 Apr - 7 Apr
TUCK KA KAN LE #7	WHILD	16 Apr - 30 Apr
MUNG HO #11	CHID	20 Apr - 27 Apr

3. Airmobile assets were provided to the following units or agencies on a recurring basis:

MACV
IFFORCEV Arty
Press Camp (Qui Nhon & Pleiku)
HQ 5th SFGA
CO B 5th SFGA
18th Engr Bde

4. Airmobile assets were provided to the following special operations directed by MACV:

DELTA
OMEGA
PRAIRIE FIRE
RECONDO
NSA II CORPS

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5. Airmobile assets were provided to the following units or agencies on a general support, mission basis status:

I FFORCEV G3	MACV ENGRS	13th Engr Bde
I FFORCEV G4	MACV Navy Adv	20th Engr Bn
I FFORCEV SSD	US Navy Spt P4C	24th Engr Bn
I FFORCEV-Cben	MACV Adv Tn #39	29th Engr Bn
I FFORCEV Protocol	ALVN Engr Tng Ctr	596th Engr Co
COMUS-PSYOPS	Cam Ranh City Sec HQ	566th Engr Bn
54th Sig Bn	MACV HAI - Udorn (USAF)	563th Clearing (MSC)
6th PSYOPS Bn	Orb Sup Cnd	69th Maint Bn
LDC - Nha Trang	Qui Nhon Sup Cnd	540th Trans Bn
21st Sig Gp	Phan Rang Sub Area Cnd	339th Tan Co
B Co 20th Inf (LDP)	394th Air Div (USAF)	11 ALC (ARVN)
100th Log Cnd (LDC)	AST-3 (USAF)	V ALC (ARVN)
Americal Div (I CTZ)	PA & E	

6. Airmobile assets were provided the following units on a tactical emergency basis (T.C E):

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT SUPPORTED</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>
1 Feb	Sa Dalat	2 guns
1 Feb	Tuyen Duc Province	6 slicks 2 guns
2 Feb	B/5th SPGA (Ben Het)	
3 Feb	CRID	10 slicks 2 guns
4 Feb	71st Arty	1 slick
6 Feb	CRID	6 slicks
26 Feb	5th SPGA	5 slicks
27 Feb	5th SPGA	5 slicks 2 guns
4 Mar	4th Bn 503d Abn Inf	5 slicks 2 guns
19 Mar	B/5th SPGA	
25 Mar	DEA Corps	
28 Mar	MACV Adv Tn #39	2 guns
29 Mar	MACV Adv Tn #39	2 guns
3 Apr	I FFORCEV Arty	2 bombs
3 Apr	4th Inf Div	1 crane
5 Apr	WHHID	8 slicks
7 Apr	4th Inf Div	1 crane
14 Apr	WHHID	2 guns
18 Apr	OMBL	5 slicks 2 guns
26 Apr	LDC - Nha Trang	1 slick 2 guns

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7. On 26 Feb 68, the 355th Heavy Helicopter Company (-) became operational. It is attached to the 52d CAG, Pleiku, and provide crane support throughout II CTZ on a mission basis.

8. On 9 Apr 68, an idea to use O-1 aircraft for "people sniffer" (Manpack Detector) missions was generated. This office took steps, in conjunction with IFFORCEV Arty, to determine the feasibility. This method is discussed in Section II and would greatly relieve requirements for helicopters to perform this mission.

(d) Major Problem Areas:

1. Due to the Tet Offensive, 29 Jan 68 through 3 Feb 68, a heavy flying commitment was placed on gunships. This, combined with enemy attacks on airfields, caused a serious slump in gunship availability. This problem was accentuated by the fact that 17th CAG has a requirement for 13 gunships over and above those normally available. The 17th CAG was, on an average, 13 gunships under strength during this period.

2. On 3 Feb 68, the normal commitment for an AHC was reduced to 12 mission ready slicks and 5 mission ready guns daily. This adjustment was in line with the policy of an AHC maintaining 60% of its assigned aircraft mission ready.

3. A program to reduce helicopter flying time by 30% was initiated on 17 Apr 68 because of the critical shortage of T53-13 turbine engines (UH1H helicopter).

c. (C) Logistical Activities:

(1) The primary US logistical effort during the period was devoted to Operations MCARTHUR, BOLLING, WALKER, MCLAIN and FLASHING (subsequently renamed COCHISE).

(2) The major logistical problem which developed during the period resulted from the Tet Offensive. This enemy offensive generated severe logistical problems in the ARVN forces and was particularly devastating to the civilian populace. To alleviate these hardships Operation RECOVERY, designed to put the country back on its feet, was initiated. In cooperation with COMUS 7,081.6 short tons of supplies were provided. The supplies were distributed by class as follows:

Class I	Class II & IV	Class V	Total
2216.7	4556.9	200.0	7001.6

(3) On 25 February 1968 the ARVN ammunition storage area at Phan Thiet was destroyed by enemy action. 300 short tons of ammunition were lost. Intensified resupply of Class V both US and ALC prevented curtailment of combat operations.

(4) ACoF3, G4 continued to monitor the materiel and supply posture of units assigned, attached and under operational control (O:CON) to this headquarters. The stock status and scheduled resupply of the following FSA's was monitored daily:

(a) FSA English, in support of Operation FLASHING (subsequently renamed COCHISE).

(b) FSA Dak To, in support of Operation MCARTHUR.

(c) FSA Phan Thiet, in support of Operation MCLAIN. In addition logistical support to TP 1st Bn 12th Inf at Ban Me Thout was monitored to insure prompt and adequate resupply by air LOC.

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(5) During the reporting period the G4 staff identified problems and initiated remedial action intended to improve the logistical support systems of Army of Vietnam (ARVN), Regional Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces within II Corps Tactical Zone. Examples of these actions include:

(a) Continued assistance to ROK Forces, Vietnam in their efforts to obtain real estate in the Nha Trang area for base development. Construction requested has been approved by USARV and forwarded to MACV for funding.

(b) Visits to provinces to discuss and assist in resolution of administrative and logistical problems. Each A & DSL C within the II Corps Tactical Zone was visited by representatives of II Corps, DSA, II Corps, ALC, and G4, IFFORCEV. These composite team visits have provided more understanding of problem areas and will allow more rapid solution of province problems.

(c) Close monitoring of RF/PF and ARVN logistical posture and infusion of US logistical assets where appropriate and critically needed.

(d) Monitor camp conversion from Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) to RF units.

(e) Restore availability of barrier materials within II Corps Tactical Zone to a more responsive level.

(6) Supply: There are no existing shortages of supplies and equipment which significantly impair the operational capability of this command. However, shortages of water trailers, water pumps, motor supplies (Cal-Hydrate), M43 tanks, AN/AV-25 radios, 15KW tactical generators and aircraft cargo slings/nets cause concern and should be alleviated as soon as possible.

(a) Emphasis placed on turn-in of unneeded TOE/MTOE equipment resulted in the reporting of 74 line items and supply action on 267 separate items ranging from field cook sets to 2 1/2 ton trucks.

(b) Due to heavy drawdowns of ammunition during the Tet Offensive and continued heavy contact, several items were placed under Available Supply Rate (ASR) control during the reporting period. Of the items under ASR control, 175mm HE continues to require stringent monitoring. The ASR for this item dropped from 24 rds/wpn/day to 21 rds/wpn/day on 24 March, and a further reduction to 20 rds/wpn/day was required, effective 24 Apr 68. Presently there are 26 items under ASR control. Two of the items, 60mm Illum and 60mm HE, are not authorized for IFFORCEV units based on a recent determination by DA that 60mm Mortars are no longer authorized within US Army units (exception to this is Special Forces Group). The following items are under ASR control:

1. A165 7.62mm Ball, Linked, f/airgun
2. B562 40mm HE, M406
3. C251 81mm Illum
4. C256 81mm HE w/fuze
5. C445 105mm HE

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6. C449 105mm Illum
7. C454 105mm WP
8. C700 4.2" Illum
9. D572 175mm HE
10. D675 8" Propelling Charge, GA
11. F497 TAC CS Cluster, E150
12. G809 Grenade, Hand, frag, M26
13. G914 Grenade, Hand, Offensive
14. G945 Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Yellow
15. G955 Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Violet
16. H490 2.75" Rocket, HE
17. H555 Rocket, 60mm HE, AT (LAW)
18. K143 Mine, AP, M18 (Claymore)
19. K764 Chl Agent, CS-1 (Auk)
20. L307 Signal, Hand Held, White Star Cluster
21. L312 Signal, Hand Held, White Star Parachute
22. L407 Flare, Aircraft, Parachute, MK24
23. M023 Charge, Demolition, C-4
24. N311 Fuze, FD, M572 (For 175mm HE)

(c) Close monitoring of equipment for MATS personnel is being accomplished as these teams are being phased into the II Corps Tactical Zone.

(7) Services: Nothing significant to report.

(8) Transportation

(a) Highway QL-21 was opened during February and March 1968, for the resupply of Ban Me Thuot by US Convoys from Cam Ranh Bay and ARVN convoys from Nha Trang. A total of 8,539 short tons of mixed classes of supplies were moved during these periods. Highway QL-1 from LZ English to Duc Pho was upgraded from Amber to Green on 6 Apr 68. Highway QL-11 from Phan Rang to Dalat was upgraded from Amber to Green on 14 Apr 68. Both of these roads remain open and in a green condition.

(b) The tempo of daily aircraft operations throughout II Corps tactical zone has decreased from the record high of the previous quarter. The daily averages of emergency airlift for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 compared with daily averages of the previous quarter are as follows:

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<u>Quarter</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>	<u>Passengers</u>
November 1967 - January 1968	243	293
February - April 1968	82	127

(c) Increased use of QL-1 south from Phan Rang to Phan Thiet occurred during the latter part of the quarter. Three convoys carrying 1677 short tons of supply were moved over this road in order to reduce dependence on the sea LOC. Increased use of this road is anticipated for the next quarter.

c. (C) Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.

(1) General:

(a) The beginning of the reporting period, 1 Feb 1968, was the second day of wide spread VC/NVA attacks against population centers throughout the II CTZ. Initial attacks were fought off by committing allied and GVN forces, which in many instances included GVN pacification assets such as the National Police, the RF/PP, and RD Cadre Groups. When the population failed to rally to the VC cause, and defense blunted the enemy's attacks, inflicting substantial casualties, subsequent enemy operations against the population centers seemed to founder and be considerably less effective.

(b) Heaviest attacks were launched initially at the highland population centers of Kontum and Ban Me Thuot. Attacks continued through mid-February against other cities such as Dalat and Phan Thiet. Concern for the safety of the cities resulted initially in a partial withdrawal of major pacification assets from the countryside to the population centers. The RDC Cadre Groups, TS&D Teams, and Territorial Forces generally fared well and were for the most part untouched. Exceptions were noted in the provinces of Ninh Thuan and Binh Dinh. By mid-March most of these elements were back in their assigned hamlets.

(c) GVN Revolutionary Development and Pacification programs were initially thought to be set back one to two months in some provinces, and perhaps as much as six months in certain districts. The efforts of the GVN and the US/FN advisory and assistance agencies were largely preoccupied, during the period mid-February through mid-April, with re-establishing security in the countryside and recovery in the cities. Though more recent assessments of the actual status of these GVN programs indicates that earlier estimates of set-back may have been overly pessimistic, emphasis of the US advisory and assistance activities has remained with the objectives of: completing recovery operations, securing the countryside and re-establishing GVN authority there, stepping up the attack on the VCI, and revitalizing the revolutionary and nation building effort. At the end of the reporting period, the GVN pacification activities and the economy in the II CTZ have for the most part achieved a pre-Tet level. Complete recovery and resumption of all phases of pacification can be expected in the next quarter.

(2) Planning, Programming and Reporting:

(a) Initial CORDS planning action during the reporting period was the development of the II CTZ Action Program for CY 68, which implemented the Pacification Guidelines for 1968 issued by MACCORDS in January. This document provided guidance and goals to be achieved by the US advisory and assistance effort in support of the GVN revolutionary development and pacification programs in the II CTZ for

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1968. Planning and programming in execution of the II CTZ Combined Campaign Plan, developed in the previous reporting period, enjoyed only moderate emphasis as a result of the VC/NVA Tet attacks and the subsequent preoccupation with recovery. After Tet, emphasis was directed at programs and actions designed to assist II Corps in reconstruction, re-establishment of control over the countryside, and minimizing disruptions to the RD and pacification programs. Specific attention was given to GVN Project Recovery, Show the Flag Operations and revision of the 1968 RD Program.

(b) The II CTZ Recovery Plan was designed to establish priorities for physical reconstruction of public buildings, private structures and public utilities either destroyed or damaged during VC/NVA Tet attacks, and to indicate what type material, manpower and advisory resources were to be required from CORDS, US military and/or other FWF to assist in reconstruction. The actual reconstruction was primarily a GVN directed and funded effort. The CORDS, USAID, US military and FWF assistance was limited to providing commodity support required in the reconstruction process, primarily cement, tin roofing and rubber and to providing the loan/use of heavy equipment, transportation and advisory personnel when these resources were requested by II CTZ province chiefs.

(c) The coordination of US and FWF assistance to II Corps and other GVN agencies during the period of emergency was effected through the CORDS Operation Center (COC), established at HQ IFFORCEV on 1 February. This agency was formed within the assets available to the ACoS, CORDS, Plans, Programs and Evaluation Division, and operated on a 24 hour basis. The primary function of the COC was to provide one point of contact to handle emergency requests for logistical, medical and similar support required for recovery operations in the field (II CTZ provinces). An additional function of the COC was to receive routine and spot reports on recovery and pacification status throughout the II CTZ. A situation board was maintained to reflect current data relative to civilians killed and wounded, homes destroyed, and refugees. Operations of the COC were terminated 1 March.

(d) In regard to "Show the Flag" Operations, the US-FWF advisory and assistance efforts were designed to encourage GVN governmental agencies and armed forces to implement programs at the province and district levels to reoccupy contested areas, gain the confidence of the populace, regain the initiative, re-establish security and resume revolutionary development and pacification programs contained in the Combined Campaign Plan. GVN operations conducted in support of this effort ran the gamut of security operations by the ARVN, NPFF and RF/FF, destruction of the VCI, conduct of psychological operations, revivication of RD Cadre operations and the re-emergence of government administrative organizations. The execution phase of this plan to regain the initiative began 1 April and is expected to run through 31 May.

(e) In April, the advisory staff at the provinces and at DEPCORDS/IFFORCEV (at the request of MACV, DEPCORDS) prepared a detailed province-by province review and evaluation of changes being proposed in the II Corps provincial RD plans for 1968. The coordination of the recommendations submitted in this report are the subject of presently continuing actions with the respective province chiefs and advisory staffs concerned.

(f) Urban area defense has become a matter of prime concern as the result of lessons learned during the Tet VC/NVA attacks against population centers. Joint reviews with appropriate GVN counterparts are being conducted which will emphasize the role of the National

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Police in urban security and establish guidelines for the provision of military assistance in the event it is required. COMUSMACV has further directed that efforts in this area be contingency oriented.

(g) The MACCORDS reporting system continued to operate throughout the period to provide the necessary data needed for the evaluation and management of CORDS advisory and assistance activities. However, extensive effort was expended at all advisory levels, district, through province and CORDS/IFFORCEV, to provide MACCORDS. Saigon, with additional detailed assessments on the status of pacification and recovery in the II CTZ. These additional requirements included submissions of weekly situation reports and numerous one-time assessments on various aspects of pacification or recovery.

(3) RF/PF Organizations: On 29 March 1968, the RF/PF advisory division displaced from Pleiku, where it was a section of the II Corps advisory staff, to join CORDS/IFFORCEV in Nha Trang. This move, as was expected, has resulted in the division being more responsive to the requirements of the Senior Advisor, II CTZ, and being able to coordinate more closely with the other CORDS divisions. However, the advisory function of the division has been impaired by the separation from VN counterparts and advisory staff sections at II Corps headquarters in Pleiku. RF/PF administrative, personnel and logistical matters which were previously handled by the G1 and G4 advisors of USN, II Corps, in coordination with the RF/PF section. An expansion of the division is being considered to provide locally the required advisory services. In conjunction with this expansion, it is also planned to station an RF/PF liaison officer at the II Corps headquarters in Pleiku, who will act in an advisory capacity as an alter ego of the Senior RF/PF Advisor located at Nha Trang.

(4) Refugees:

(a) For the first time in the history of the program, the Refugee Advisory Team in II CTZ had to deal with large numbers of urban refugees. The need to cope with persons made homeless as a result of the Tet attacks created many new situations.

(b) The immediate problem was to provide food, clothing, and shelter for the victimized. Obviously since such a situation has not been faced before, normal channels of supply and transportation were soon stretched to the limit. Under these circumstances it became necessary to call on the military for transport as well as supplies such as tentage, mosquito nets, 55 gallon drums, blankets, lumber, canned foods, etc. The experience gained in dealing with countless military units has proven invaluable for continuing refugee operations.

(c) The most valuable lesson learned was that the provinces must be prepared to deal on a contingency basis with large numbers of dispossessed people. Today the provinces have accumulated stocks of PL 480 foodstuffs, tentage, clothing and blankets, to better cope with any future influx of refugees.

(d) Subsequent processing of the refugees also provided a valuable lesson. After the immediate needs of the refugees had been met, it became necessary to extend to them the aid needed to re-establish themselves. It quickly became evident that one of the main problems was to insure timely distribution of funds to the provinces for relief payments. In many cases the recovery program was hampered by absence of funds and rarely were additional funds available on a timely basis.

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(15) Liaison. During the period of this report a detailed evaluation of liaison officer employment was conducted. The nature of the missions of IFFORCEV Artillery units requires liaison be established with a large number of varied types of agencies to include US, ARVN and ROK maneuver and artillery forces; SF/CIDG camps; sector and subsector headquarters; and installation defense commands. Although only 17 liaison officers are TOE authorized within IFFORCEV Artillery it was necessary to establish liaison with 34 agencies in order to insure effective fire support. Duties of these liaison officers range from clearance of artillery fires to fire support coordination.

(16) Training for Newly Assigned Lieutenants. Forward Observer and Fire Direction Officer Training Courses conducted respectively by 41st Arty Gp at An Khe and 52d Arty Gp at Pleiku have been in operation since January 1968. Both courses have undergone several modifications during this ORLL period in efforts to improve the quality of instruction presented and to better accomplish the mission of orienting newly arrived lieutenants in II CTZ to insure safe transition into combat operations. During this reporting period there was 125 Forward Observer School graduates and 89 graduates from the Fire Direction Officer Training course.

(17) Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE).

(a) In order to assist units in II CTZ that do not possess an extensive targeting capability, FSCE increased targeting efforts beginning in February. Over one thousand targets were developed during the month including 301 Hangfire targets. Special analyses were completed for the Vinh Than Valley area, Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa, 18th NVA Regt, the Pleiku area, 3d NVA Div and 95th NVA Regt. A greater use of CIGV targeting information was begun and the first results of this effort were passed to units in the field during February.

(b) In February the FSCE assumed responsibility for targeting ARC Light strikes which had been handled previously by the IFFORCEV G2. All records, administration and follow up responsibility was also transferred to FSCE.

(c) The second in a series of fire support coordination meetings was held on 13 February in the FSCE. Representatives of FSCE, Army Aviation, DASC A and G3 Air attended. Results included a recommendation that staff visits to subordinate units be conducted to identify individual coordination problems.

(d) Although the number of Hangfire targets diminished, there were over one thousand targets developed and passed for firing during March.

(e) Staff visits were conducted at 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div in AO PATRICK on 2 and 4 March 1968 for the purpose of explaining targeting procedures and assisting with coordination problems the unit encountered after assuming responsibility for the new AO.

(f) Special analyses were completed on the 5th NVA Div, 95 B Regt, 1st NVA Div, and 32d and 33d NVA Regts during March 1968.

(g) Artillery and ARC Light coordination and the rules of engagement against watercraft received emphasis during March 1968. An IFFORCEV regulation on rules of engagement against watercraft was published in April and an IFFORCEV regulation covering artillery and ARC Light coordination was drafted and initial staffing completed during April.

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(2) Personnel strengths of assigned, attached and OPCON units are at Incl 9.

(3) Personnel Management:

(a) Personnel strengths of assigned and attached units have been satisfactory throughout the reporting period. A problem still exists in obtaining qualified radar personnel for HMB, 8th Bn (TA), 26th Arty. This problem has been reported to USARV and that headquarters has given this command priority fill in MOS 17E (Radar Crewman). The 6th Bn, 84th Arty arrived on 23 Mar 68 at full strength. The infusion plan of this battalion with other artillery battalions within IFFORCEV is being coordinated and formulated with HQ, IFFORCEV Arty. The infusion program of the 4th Bn, 60th Arty is progressing smoothly with cooperation from the 108th Arty Gp and the II IFFORCEV Arty. Some enlisted MOS imbalances still exist as a result of the measures taken to alleviate previous artillery shortages. As on-the-job training progresses these imbalances are being overcome. The current imbalances exist in MOS's 16D, 11E, 11H and 93F.

(b) IFFORCEV was levied for 40 officers for in-country reassignments during the period. Twenty four company grade officers were reassigned to the AF/PF Advisory program. The remaining officers, most of them field grade, were provided to the Army Elm, III MAF and the Prov Corps Vietnam.

(c) Lack of timely receipt of reassignment instructions for rotating personnel continues to be a problem. Many instructions are not received until just prior to departure. This has a detrimental effect on morale and presents a hold baggage shipping problem.

(4) Civilian personnel management:

(a) Coordination was maintained between area civilian personnel officers and all levels of command. During the period USARV issued an IFFORCEV TDA authorizing 190 civilian spaces. Previously, 284 spaces were authorized by bulk allocation. This reduction in the civilian work forces created a serious impact; therefore, requests for necessary changes to the IFFORCEV TDA issued by USARV are being forwarded in Section II TDA format with complete justification.

(b) A new regulation for direct and daily hires and a new regulation on control of overtime payments are being prepared for publication in May 1968. These regulations consolidated several USARV regulations and will assist in achieving improved reporting procedures and control for local national hire.

(c) The AIK allocation for 1st Qtr CY 68 was 2,055,200 \$VN, or 69.2% of the amount requested. The AIK allocation for the 2d Qtr CY 68 was 2,350,000 \$VN or 69.3% of the amount requested.

(5) During this quarter the processing of awards and decorations for ROK and ARVN personnel started an upward trend. Two ROK and five ARVN recommendations were forwarded to USARV during this period. Twenty one ROK awards were being processed as of 30 Apr 68. There also has been an increase in recommendations for unit awards. Three Presidential Unit Citations, (1st Bde, 4th Inf Div; 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div; 173d Abn Bde (Sep)), one valorous unit citation (Co B, 15th MAB Bn, 1st Cav Div), and four Meritorious Unit Citations (6th Bn, 14th Arty; 8th Engr Bn, 1st Cav Div; 1st Bn, 30th Arty; 228th ARVN Bn, 1st Cav Div) have been forwarded to USARV. Two Valorous Unit Citations (E Trp, 17th Cav; 1st Bn, 12th Inf, 4th Inf Div) and three Meritorious

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Unit Citations (11th PID; 54th Sq; Bn; Btry E, 82d Arty; 1st Cav Div) were approved during the quarter. Awards and decorations during the quarter are at Incl 10.

(6) On 1 Feb 68 promotion authority for senior enlisted personnel was delegated as follows: To grade E7, CG IFFORCEV Arty and CO's 41st and 52d Arty Gps; to grade E8, CG IFFORCEV Arty. Promotion to grade E9 for all units assigned or attached to IFFORCEV, and to grades E7 and E8 for IFFORCEV units not assigned or attached to IFFORCEV Arty was retained by CG, IFFORCEV. The delegation was announced in IFFORCEV Reg 600-200 which also outlines the standards to be followed by all promotion boards. The delegation of authority has reduced the time enlisted personnel are required to be away from their units for the purpose of appearing before a promotion board. Promotion allocations made are at Incl 11.

(7) The 43d Army Postal Unit initiated a program of inspection of all parcel post packages with a metal detector on 31 March 1968. All suspicious packages are opened. Prohibited items discovered are impounded and a letter sent to the CO of the individual attempting to mail the prohibited items advising him of the offense. As a result of this program the number of prohibited items discovered decreased from 37 during the first week to none during the fifth week.

(8) Chaplain Activities:

(a) The II CTZ has 130 US Military Chaplains: 116 US Army (90 Protestants, 25 Catholic, 1 Jewish) and 14 US Air Force (9 Protestants, 5 Catholic). This is a significant drop from last quarters report. This is due in part to a high casualty rate plus the movement of units and chaplains out of the II Corps Area.

(b) Protestant services in IFFORCEV assigned, attached and OPCON units and in combat support and combat support and service support units were adequate. Services for advisory teams on a regular basis is difficult. Chaplains assigned to advisory teams depend on neighboring units to render services and counseling when necessary. Due to Holy Week and Easter Sunrise services there was an increase in attendance at religious services.

(c) Catholic services in assigned, attached and OPCON units have been adequate. Catholic Chaplains, although in short supply, increased their activity during Lenten and Easter season and saw a tremendous increase in attendance at mass and communion.

(d) Jewish services have been adequate. Services are conducted by the Jewish Chaplain in nine locations once a month and in Nha Trang every week on the Sabbath. Lay leaders conduct weekly Jewish services at nine locations. Coordination is no problem. One Jewish Chaplain assigned to this headquarters had responsibility in the II CTZ for all Jewish personnel during this period.

(e) The following services are scheduled in Nha Trang:

1. Sunday: 20 Protestant, 13 Catholic, 1 Lutheran, 2 Episcopalian, 1 Pentecostal, 1 Christian Science and 1 Latter Day Saints.

2. Friday evening: Jewish Sabbath Service.

3. Daily: Two Catholic services.

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Services are conducted at the following locations:

HQ IFFORCEV	17th Avn Gp	5th Special Forces Gp
54th Sig Bn	HQ NTSAC	US Air Force Base
459th Sig Bn	8th Field Hospital	Harbor Defense Site
D Btry 4th Bn 71st Arty	Beach Chapel	

(9) Special Services: Several isolated IFFORCEV Arty units with approved forms for admission motion picture units have no projectors and have been unable to draw any. It is understood that additional projectors have been ordered for shipment to RVN however, delivery has not been timely enough for supply to equal demand.

(10) Exchange Services: Exchange services during the period continued to be adequate. A command letter was distributed to assigned, attached and OrCON units during the period requesting full support of the exchange Service and continued command attention to insure the exchange system is responsive to the needs of the command. Stocks of stereo components and systems are inadequate.

(11) Welfare Services:

(a) The GI staff continued to exercise staff supervision over the operation and administration of all nonappropriated fund activities within assigned and attached units. These activities include unit funds, sundry funds and open messes.

(b) At the end of the reporting period, three officers' open messes, one NCO/EM open mess and eight sundry funds operated as clubs were operational within the command.

(c) Approval was granted during the period for the establishment of an additional NCO/EM sundry fund by HHC, 54th Sig Bn.

(d) New unit fund accounting procedures were implemented in IFFORCEV units on 1 April. IFFORCEV Regulation 230-21 was published to amplify USARV Regulation 230-21 and establish command policies and procedures in regard to unit funds. The regulation specifically established policy regarding inspections and audits of unit funds.

(12) Utilization of M&M quotas for assigned and attached units as shown at Incl 12.

(13) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) Combined Patrolling: Throughout II CTZ combined US/MOK/VN patrolling continues with area support military police providing 52 patrols in major population areas and tactical unit military police providing 11 patrols near base camps. Restrictions placed upon the circulation of individuals in cities, towns and hamlets during the period immediately after the Tet Offensive reduced the necessity for combined patrols and freed police personnel for other duties. As the restrictions were eased and curfews curtailed, the working hours of the patrols were adjusted to coincide with peak traffic hours; it is during this time that illegal goods are moved freely under the cover of crowds of people and vehicles. An increase in the quantity of blackmarket goods confiscated was noted and attributed to the strict and conscientious enforcement of curfews by the VN military and National Police.

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(b) Effect of VN Presidential Decree upon US Forces Personnel: President Nguyen Van Thieu, in a widely publicized speech given shortly after Tet, called upon the people of Vietnam to accept a "life of austerity" during the "critical period of our national history." In keeping with this spirit the president issued a decree permanently closing all bars, snack bars and dance halls within the republic. Enforcement of the decree by National Police was instantaneous. In an anticipatory move to prevent US forces personnel from being enticed into establishments opened in violation of the decree, this HQ prepared a zone coordinator letter requesting II CTZ US unit commanders at all levels to disseminate information of restrictions to members of their command. To date no significant problems of US personnel patronizing bars, dance halls or snack bars have been encountered.

(14) Prisoners of War: Visits by International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): On 8 March 1968, the ICRC visited the Phu Tai PW Camp and inspected that facility for compliance with the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of PW (GPW). The following recommendations were made by the committee:

- (a) A new latrine should be built.
- (b) Toilet paper should be available for use by PW.
- (c) Human waste should be burned rather than buried.
- (d) A copy of the GPW should be permanently posted inside the camp. At the urging of the US MP Advisor, immediate corrective action of the above deficiencies was initiated by the RVNAF camp commander. On 26 March 1968, the ICRC visited the 4th Inf Div PW collecting point at Camp Enari and the RVNAF Pleiku PW Camp. There were no deficiencies noted at either of these locations; ICRC comments were favorable.

(e) Reorganization of the Phu Tai PW Camp: Future JGS plans call for the conversion of the Phu Tai PW Camp into an all female PW facility. When converted, the Phu Tai PW Camp will continue to receive a limited number of male PW from tactical unit collecting points on a pipeline basis. At present the camp has a population of 992 PW, 416 of which are females. To attain the goal of an all female facility large scale movements of PW to the RVNAF central PW Camp on Phu Quoc Island will be necessary and are programmed.

(f) PW Relocation: COMUSMACV has expressed desires to reduce the population of mainland PW camps to a maximum of 600 PW each. To reduce the mainland camp population to an acceptable level, Phu Quoc Island PW Camp facilities must be expanded to accommodate 20,000 PW. Presently the Phu Quoc Island PW camp has population of 8,363. Several problem areas which may hamper the timely completion of the facility are the lack of adequate water and the fact that enemy troops still operate on Phu Quoc, thereby creating a security hazard. In an effort to reduce II CTZ camps to the in-camp population level desired by COMUSMACV, 965 PW were transferred to Phu Quoc PW camp (800 from Phu Tai, 165 from Pleiku).

(15) Serious Incident Report Statistics:

(a) Self Inflicted Wounds: Serious Incident Reports received by FM, IFFORCEV, during the reporting period revealed a high number (thirty-one) of self-inflicted injuries resulting from gunshot wounds. In many cases determination as to whether or not the injury was intentional could not be made from available information. A great many of

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these injuries were clearly attributable to carelessness or gross neglect on the part of the individual soldier, i.e., carrying a round in the chamber, failure to clear weapon when entering a secure area, or foolish horseplay with a firearm. Additionally, four suicides were reported in II CTZ. (Figures based upon available data).

(b) Indiscriminate, Malicious and Careless Discharging of firearms: During the period 26 Jan - 25 Apr 68, there were 41 reported incidents of indiscriminate, malicious or careless discharging of firearms (not including self inflicted wounds) in II CTZ which resulted in the death of 5 US soldiers and 4 VN civilians, the injury of 23 US soldiers and 8 VN civilians, and several incidents of damage to VN property or livestock. Monthly totals from the 26th of the preceding month to the 25th of the reporting month of April (Feb: 16 incidents; Mar: 16 incidents; Apr: 9 incidents). Efforts to reduce the rate of occurrence of these incidents include widespread dissemination of the causes and recommended actions to be taken by commanders at all levels. Increased convoy discipline and military police vigilance along II CTZ roadways has aided in the reduction of damage to VN property and livestock by weapons indiscriminately or maliciously fired from passing vehicles. Education and enforcement efforts continue to be directed toward this problem.

(16) Safety and Accident Prevention:

(a) Both the motor vehicle accident and military injury rates rose above the previous quarter rates, and each was above the established expectancy ceiling. Statistical data, by unit, are shown at Inclosure 13.

(b) The primary problem areas continued to be accidents involving the operation of Army motor vehicles and the mishandling of firearms. Of the 73 accidents reported during the 3d quarter, FY 68, 39 or 53% resulted from Army motor vehicle operation. Eleven injuries resulted from the mishandling of hand and shoulder held weapons.

(c) During the quarter, two zone coordination letters were distributed to all FVMAF within II CTZ. The letters forwarded command information and character guidance outlines and colored bilingual posters. A total of 2500 letters and 40,000 posters, directed toward the prevention of Army motor vehicle accidents involving Vietnamese, were distributed.

(d) IFFORCEV Safety Newsletter Number 2 was published in February. This quarterly publication provided assigned and attached unit commanders and safety officers with information pertaining to safety program objectives, injury and motor vehicle accident rates, safety administration and problem areas. The newsletter provided example cases of accidents involving the mishandling of firearms and improper use of flammable liquids.

(17) Medical.

(a) The only significant change in medical coverage was the move of the 17th Field Hospital from Saigon to An Khe in Mar 68.

(b) The 43d Medical Group has provided excellent coverage to TP 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf at Phan Thiet and to Ban Me Thuot units by providing medical platoons from the 568th Clearing Company.

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(c) The general health of the command was excellent during the quarter. There were no cases of venereal disease or malaria reported. The daily noneffectiveness rate was extremely low, with 1004 and .80 per 1000 troop strength, in February and March.

(18) Personnel Orientation. The second bimonthly Orientation Briefing for Senior Personnel Residing in the Nha Trang Area was conducted on 16 March. The briefing has proved successful in providing a basic orientation on the missions and functions of the various US units located in the Nha Trang area.

g. (C) Artillery:

(1) During the period 1 Feb 68 through 30 Apr 68 IFFORCEV Arty continued to support US, FVMAF, ARVN, SF, RF, PF and CIDG forces in II CTZ.

(2) IFFORCEV Arty units, totaling two artillery groups, eleven battalions, four separate batteries, and six detachments supported all major operations in II CTZ to include Operations BOLLENG, MCLAIN, McARTHUR and PERSHING (PATRICK/COCHISE). ROK forces in the 9th and CRID areas of responsibility were supported during Operations MAENG HO 10 and MAENG HO 11. ARVN forces were supported in operations conducted by units of the 22d and 23d ARVN Division, 24th STZ and provincial defense units.

(3) Selected Munitions. Selected munitions were released for employment in Kontum, Darlac and Pleiku Provinces by COMUSMACV in mid February 1968. Training of artillery units was accomplished by a US Army Artillery and Missile School team headed by BG John J. Kenney, Assistant Commandant USAFMS. Since receipt of the munitions in II CTZ three missions have been fired. The 4th Inf Div Arty fired on an active rocket location near Camp Enari, the 1st Bn, 92d Arty fired in defense of a 4th Inf Div fire base west of Polesi Klong. All missions were conducted using unobserved fire techniques and the effectiveness of fire could not be judged. Lack of suitable targets accounts for the sparse use of selected munitions in II CTZ to date.

(4) Arty support for Task Force 1st Bn, 12th Inf. During the period 4 Mar - 20 Apr 68, Btry B, 5th Bn, 16th Arty, Btry C, 3d Bn, 6th Arty and Btry C, 7th Bn, 15th Arty, displaced to Ban Me Thuot to support operations of 1st Bn, 12th Inf in that area. Liaison was established with 23d ARVN Division and fire support coordination was provided by 3d Bn, 6th Arty. Btry C, 7th Bn, 15th Arty subsequently converted two of its 8 inch Howitzers to 175mm Guns to provide greater range capability and to support concurrently Special Forces operations in the Ban Me Thuot area. Upon termination of the operation, heavy artillery coverage was maintained by the replacement of Btry C, 7th Bn, 15th Arty by Btry B, 5th Bn, 22d Arty.

(5) Associate Battery Program.

(a) Established on 14 March 1968, the IFFORCEV/ARVN Associate Battery Program was developed to augment existing advisory programs, improve the effectiveness of ARVN forces and develop further the channels for better coordination of fire support and mutual understanding. US divisional and force artillery units sponsor selected ARVN artillery units in their vicinity. The program provides a responsive US headquarters from which the ARVN units can request technical assistance and aid in such areas as maintenance and training. Additionally, the personal relationships developed between associate units will provide a vehicle for the exchange of information and ideas.

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(6) With the problems of Vietnamese artillerymen in mind, the specific objectives of the Associate Battery Program are to:

1. Establish close liaison between associate units.
2. Integrate US, ROK and ARVN artillery fires whenever possible.
3. Establish communications between associate units.
4. Coordinate mutual gathering and exchange of timely target information.
5. Assist in training as requested.
6. Provide for maintenance and technical support within capabilities.

(c) Although in its infancy, progress made thus far has been truly encouraging. Initial coordination and liaison visits with appropriate MACV advisors and associate ARVN artillerymen have been completed. Detailed assistance programs have been assigned and implemented and initial reports indicate program goals will be attained.

(6) Arrival of Artillery Battalion. The 6th Bn, 84th Arty (155 mm Towed) arrived in country on 24 March 1968 at the port of Qui Nhon. The battalion was met by CG, IFFORCEV and CG, IFFORCEV Arty. CG IFFORCEV delivered the welcoming address. The battalion motor marched to its base camp at Camp Radcliff where an intensive in-country orientation and training program was conducted 25 March through 7 April 1968. Attached to IFFORCEV Arty with further attachment to 11st Arty Op, the battalion was first employed tactically on 8 April 1968 in COCHISE AO. See paragraph 1g(9) below for details.

(7) Survey. During the ORLL reporting period survey control was extended from the vicinity of Pleiku to approximately 20 km north of Ban Me Thuot. Change 2 to the II CTZ Artillery Trig List was published and distributed on 1 April 1968 adding 64 stations.

(8) Combined Artillery Conference. A Combined Artillery Conference was chaired by the artillery officer on 4 April at Camp Radcliff, An Khe. Attendees included senior US, ROK and ARVN artillery commanders and staff officers. The purpose of the seminar was to discuss artillery employment in II CTZ and to present for discussion and refinement a mobile artillery task force concept (see para 1g(9) below). This artillery conference proved invaluable as a sounding board for artillery employment philosophies and did much to strengthen relationships among ARVN, ROK and US senior artillerymen.

(9) Mobile Artillery Task Force. Because of the great size of II CTZ and the wide dispersion of maneuver elements, force artillery battalions have had to be employed to cover large areas, often resulting in the firing batteries or a single battalion being dispersed over distances of 100 miles or more. With arrival of 6th Bn, 84th Arty (155mm towed) on 24 March 1968 the opportunity to employ and demonstrate the effectiveness of massed mobile artillery was apparent. Addressed at the Combined Artillery Conference of 4 April (para 1g(8) above), this concept involves employment of the battalion intact, and augmented by additional artillery assets as available. The mobile artillery task force is then employed anywhere in the II CTZ in support of maneuver unit operations where needed. The battalion may be described as an artillery reaction force, able to move on short notice to support major contacts as well as planned operations. The battalion was employed initially on 8 April 1968 in support of Operation

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VELVET HAMMER, a 173d Abn Bde (Sep) operation in the COCHISE AO. Subsequently, the battalion moved to the Qui Nhon area and supported the CRID operation MAENG HO 11 during the period 11-29 April 1968. Initial successes of this battalion are encouraging and verify the validity of the mobile artillery task force concept.

(10) Calibration Program. The USARV calibration team calibrated ROK and US artillery units in the 9th ROK and CRID areas of operations and in the MOLAIN AO during the period 8-22 April 1968. The number of tubes calibrated in each major unit is:

	<u>105mm</u>	<u>155mm</u>	<u>6"</u>	<u>175mm</u>
9th ROK Div Arty	54	18	0	0
CAP ROK Div Arty	54	18	0	0
IFFORCEV Arty	18	4	8	8
2d Bn 320th Arty	5	0	0	0

(11) Relocation of 5th Bn, 27th Arty. In order to expand US artillery coverage in the four southern provinces of II CTZ, the 5th Bn, (105mm Towed) 27th Arty was deployed from the vicinity of Phu Hiep to Phan Thiet on 13 April 1968. Currently, the firing batteries are located in Binh Thuan, Tuyen Duc and Khanh Hoa Provinces. Assigned a general support mission, the battalion has been tasked to establish liaison with and offer assistance to ARVN artillery and maneuver units, CIDG camps and TF 3d Bn, 506th Inf. One firing battery is in direct support of the ARVN 2d Ranger Gp.

(12) Assistance to SF/CIDG Camps.

(a) Recent visits to Special Forces/CIDG camps in II CTZ have shown the need for improved coordination with supporting artillery. To correct the situation, CG, IFFORCEV established a program on 13 April 1968 designed to improve artillery support to SF/CIDG operations. Under this program artillery units maintain close liaison with assigned camps and provide advice and assistance in the following areas:

1. Defensive fire planning to include pre-firing defensive concentrations by organic and/or supporting artillery.
2. Artillery support for SF/CIDG operations within the T.O.R.
3. Maintenance for CIDG howitzers and training of crews.
4. Training for Special Forces personnel in observer and fire direction procedures.
5. Communications, ammunition, survey and expendable supply support within capabilities.

(b) Although too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this new program, it is expected to result in more responsive fire support for SF/CIDG operations and technical, maintenance and training assistance for CIDG howitzer crews and fire direction centers.

(13) Intelligence Workshop/Seminar.

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(a) The first IFFORCEV Artillery Intelligence Workshop/Seminar was conducted on 16 April 1968 at the 6th Bn, 32d Arty. The purpose of the conference was to provide guidance and recommendations for improvement of intelligence operations of all artillery units with IFFORCEV, and to provide an open forum for discussion of problems encountered at various levels within artillery units. Attendees included intelligence representatives from all artillery units with IFFORCEV. Guest panelists from the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV), USARV, IFFORCEV, II Corps, and 4th Inf Div conducted discussions and presented briefings in four workshops, each of which was attended on a rotating schedule by groups of intelligence representatives.

(b) Availability of aerial reconnaissance systems and application of results of aerial reconnaissance to targeting procedures at battalion level were addressed in one workshop by representatives of IFFORCEV G2 Air and II Corps G2 Air. Techniques of collecting, recording, evaluating and applying targeting data at artillery group/battalion level were discussed in a second workshop by representatives of CICV, IFFORCEV Arty, II Corps and 4th Inf Div Arty. A demonstration of targeting procedures employed by CICV also was presented to all groups in the second workshop. During the third workshop, surveillance representatives from USARV, IFFORCEV Arty and 4th Inf Div G2 Air discussed surveillance capabilities available to all artillery units, demonstrated recommended utilization of maps, overlays and aerial photographs in surveillance planning and execution and reemphasized the importance of productive surveillance efforts. In the fourth workshop, three representatives from CICV explained the mission and operations of the Intelligence Center and outlined in detail what support is available to all units and methods to be used in requesting CICV data. A briefing on enemy order of battle in II CTZ was also presented during this workshop.

(c) At the conclusion of the four workshops a general seminar session was held. Attended by all panelists and intelligence representatives, highlights of the days discussion were reviewed, and final recommendations, based on ideas generated throughout the day, were presented.

(d) Due to the enthusiasm generated, ideas exchanged and difficulties resolved during the Workshop/Seminar, similar conferences will be conducted quarterly.

(14) Meteorological Computability Studies. Because of the wide dispersion of artillery in the II CTZ and limited meteorological assets, employment of metro sections requires close monitoring. During the GRLL reporting period meteorological computability studies were conducted in order to insure metro stations are employed efficiently and providing widest possible coverage. These studies revealed:

(a) Meteorological conditions between Tuy Hoa and Ninh Hoa are comparable, thereby releasing one metro station for employment elsewhere.

(b) Computability in the Bong Son/Phu Cat area resulting in the employment of only one metro station at LZ English. Previously there were stations at both Bong Son and Phu Cat.

(c) An improved metro coverage plan for the western portion of II CTZ employing metro sections at Oasis, Soui Doi, Kontum and Dak To. As a result, complete coverage is available throughout the Central Highlands and Highway 19E to include the Mang Yang Pass.

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(15) Liaison. During the period of this report a detailed evaluation of liaison officer employment was conducted. The nature of the missions of IFFORCEV Artillery units requires liaison be established with a large number of varied types of agencies to include US, ARVN and ROK maneuver and artillery forces; SF/CIDG camps; sector and subsector headquarters; and installation defense commands. Although only 17 liaison officers are TOE authorized within IFFORCEV Artillery it was necessary to establish liaison with 34 agencies in order to insure effective fire support. Duties of these liaison officers range from clearance of artillery fires to fire support coordination.

(16) Training for Newly Assigned Lieutenants. Forward Observer and Fire Direction Officer Training Courses conducted respectively by 41st Arty Gp at An Khe and 52d Arty Gp at Pleiku have been in operation since January 1968. Both courses have undergone several modifications during this ORLL period in efforts to improve the quality of instruction presented and to better accomplish the mission of orienting newly arrived lieutenants in II CTZ to insure safe transition into combat operations. During this reporting period there was 125 Forward Observer School graduates and 89 graduates from the Fire Direction Officer Training course.

(17) Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE).

(a) In order to assist units in II CTZ that do not possess an extensive targeting capability, FSCE increased targeting efforts beginning in February. Over one thousand targets were developed during the month including 301 Hangfire targets. Special analyses were completed for the Vinh Thanh Valley area, Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa, 18th NVA Regt, the Pleiku area, 3d NVA Div and 95th NVA Regt. A greater use of CICV targeting information was begun and the first results of this effort were passed to units in the field during February.

(b) In February the FSCE assumed responsibility for targeting ARC Light strikes which had been handled previously by the IFFORCEV G2. All records, administration and follow up responsibility was also transferred to FSCE.

(c) The second in a series of fire support coordination meetings was held on 13 February in the FSCE. Representatives of FSCE, Army Aviation, DASC A and G3 Air attended. Results included a recommendation that staff visits to subordinate units be conducted to identify individual coordination problems.

(d) Although the number of Hangfire targets diminished, there were over one thousand targets developed and passed for firing during March.

(e) Staff visits were conducted at 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div in AO PATRICK on 2 and 4 March 1968 for the purpose of explaining targeting procedures and assisting with coordination problems the unit encountered after assuming responsibility for the new AO.

(f) Special analyses were completed on the 5th NVA Div, 95 B Regt, 1st NVA Div, and 32d and 33d NVA Regts during March 1968.

(g) Artillery and ARC Light coordination and the rules of engagement against watercraft received emphasis during March 1968. An IFFORCEV regulation on rules of engagement against watercraft was published in April and an IFFORCEV regulation covering artillery and ARC Light coordination was drafted and initial staffing completed during April.

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(h) A study group consisting of the AFSC, G3 Air and a G2 representative, visited MACV for the purpose of discussing recent changes in ARC Light procedures. As a result of increased emphasis in ARC Light strikes and the requirement for follow up information, the AFSC and G3 Air visited 3d Bn, 506th Inf, 4th Div and 173d Abn Bde (Sep) in April 1968. These coordination visits centered on identifying programs and providing information on ARC Light policies and procedures. Additional visits are planned with both ROK Divisions.

(18) Ammunition Expenditure Analysis.

(a) Since the SITREP format was changed on 25 December 1967 to classify ammunition expenditures according to more meaningful categories, a large amount of useful data has been gathered. The system developed to record and analyze this data is:

1. Number of rounds and mission fired by each battery in each target category are extracted daily from the SITREP's, recorded and added to previous expenditures.

2. The total number of percentages of rounds and missions fired in each target category are tabulated weekly by battalion, AO and caliber.

3. An analysis is made to the weekly cumulative data in which expenditures are compared with those of previous weeks and also with the level of activity in the area concerned.

(b) The weekly analysis have proven to be a useful management tool in many areas.

1. Command emphasis has been applied to improve the method of expenditures of particular units. As a result, a significant shift has been noticed in expenditure from the interdiction category to the more profitable target categories, such as confirmed and acquired.

2. Data obtained has been useful in determining the requirements for repositioning of artillery units.

3. The analysis provides information upon which recommendations on allocation of artillery ammunition is based.

(c) Artillery units down to battery level are being encouraged to make an analysis of their expenditures much the same as has been done at this headquarters. As a guide, a copy of one weeks ammunition analysis was reproduced and distributed to all major US artillery headquarters, battalions and batteries in II CTZ.

(19) Artillery Strength. The following table reflects artillery tube strength by caliber for US, ARVN and FVMAF Artillery units in II CTZ at the end of the quarter.

	<u>105mm</u>	<u>155mm</u>	<u>8 inch</u>	<u>175mm</u>
US Divisional	79	18	4	0
ROK Divisional	108	36	0	0
US Force Artillery	72	40	20	28
ARVN Artillery	87	42	0	0
Special Forces	<u>19</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	365	136	24	28

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters IFFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 30 April 1968 MOS CSFON-65 (H1)(20) Ammunition Statistics for US Artillery in II CTZ for the
Reporting Quarter.

(a) Expenditure by Target Category:

TARGET CATEGORY	FEBRUARY ROUNDS/MISSIONS	MARCH ROUNDS/MISSIONS	APRIL ROUNDS/MISSIONS
CONFIRMED	53,296/ 1,519	45,095/ 998	24,580/ 719
ACQUIRED	49,149/ 5,418	29,614/ 4,425	37,427/ 4,353
COUNTERBATTERY	11,075/ 765	8,083/ 334	6,572/ 253
PREPARATION	24,570/ 881	22,571/ 826	29,864/ 1,834
INTERDICTION	106,628/30,706	80,269/28,373	64,940/25,132
SPECIAL PURPOSE	27,148/ 2,881	31,575/ 4,023	25,872/ 3,675
OTHERS	10,099/ 1,590	6,735/ 672	3,463/ 414
TOTAL	281,965/43,760	223,942/39,657	192,718/36,380

(b) Expenditures by Caliber:

MONTH	CALIBER	ROUNDS EXPENDED	% OF TOTAL	ROUNDS/TUBE/DAY
FEB	105	185,426	66%	44
	155	53,255	19%	38
	8"	27,586	10%	40
	175	15,298	5%	19
	SUB TOTAL	281,965	100%	39*
MAR	105	145,722	65%	34
	155	40,072	18%	28
	8"	18,835	8%	13
	175	19,313	9%	26
	SUB TOTAL	223,942	100%	30
APR	105	126,641	66%	29
	155	36,978	19%	21
	8"	17,340	9%	24
	175	11,758	6%	14
	SUB TOTAL	192,718	100%	25*
TOTAL		698,625		

*Pro-rated Average

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(21) Organization US Artillery Units of I Field Force Vietnam at
the End of the Reporting Period Were:

(a) Non-divisional.

IFFORCEV Artillery

5th Battalion, 27th Artillery (105mm T)

6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (175/8 inch SP)

4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AWSP)

Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight)

Battery E, 41st Artillery (MG)

Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion,
26th Artillery

77th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

237th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

241st Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

242d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

243d Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

244th Field Artillery Detachment (Radar)

41st Artillery Group

7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm T)

7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175/8 inch SP)

2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (105mm T/155mm T Prov)

6th Battalion, 84th Artillery (155mm T)

52d Artillery Group

3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105mm SP)

6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)

5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175mm/8 inch SP)

1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm T)

(b) Divisional.

4th Infantry Division Artillery

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105mm T)

5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm/8 inch SP)

6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105mm T)

4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105mm T)

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1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

Battery B (Provisional), 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery (105mm T)

173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)

3d Battalion, 319th Artillery (105mm T)

h. (C) Signal Operations: The maintenance of command control facilities for HQ IFFONCEV and support of combat communication requirements which are beyond the capabilities of subordinate commands continue to be the major activities of the Signal Section.

(1) The first few weeks of this quarter saw the Signal Section deeply involved in the detailed planning for movement of a Corps headquarters into a remote tactical location. A signal complex was designed and SOI and SSI were prepared. Traffic and terrain studies were conducted and plans were completed to provide command and control communications to four division size elements. Equipment was assembled and extensive training for signal personnel was conducted by the 54th Signal Battalion.

(2) The 54th Sig Bn provided communications support for Operations HOLLING, COCHISE GREEN, KLUWATH FALLS, McARTHUR, McLAIN, PATRICK and FISHING. In addition to the normal support provided for IFFONCEV operations, the 54th provided support for 10K and Special Forces operations. Additional equipment was committed to nonmission tasks with the installation of a AN/GRC-26 radio in support of 8th Psy Ops in at Pleiku when its radio station was destroyed by enemy action.

(3) While IFFONCEV suffered no major communications loss during the Tet offensive and no significant communications outages, minor incidents did occur. A SEAWIS Communications System structure was destroyed at Phan Thiet. Communications to the 3d Bn, 506th Abn Inf were disrupted but quickly restored. Additionally, a combat loss was sustained by the 54th Sig Bn at Phan Thiet when their AN/GRC-26 positioned in the vicinity of an ammunition storage area was destroyed by secondary explosions. Administrative communications facilities that fell briefly under enemy control such as those within the Khanh Hoa Sector Headquarters, required detailed inspection to preclude clandestine exploitation or delayed sabotage. In the first few days following Tet, routine installation and restorations and police of wire and cable lines in the Nha Trang area was deferred and then performed under armed escort because of sporadic sniper fire.

(4) Another step in the Time Phased Implementation Plan (TPIP) for Telephone Service in Southeast Asia was accomplished in March with the activation of the 2000 line Nha Trang Air Force Dial Central Office. Concurrently, a subscriber survey of the headquarters tactical switchboard was conducted with the view of discontinuing those local telephones installed to supplement the limited area telephone service in Nha Trang. Dial phones replaced many of these Typhoon numbers and a program of graded telephone service was also inaugurated. While dial service is not intended to replace the headquarters tactical switchboard, its availability greatly enhances the tactical integrity of the Typhoon switchboard in its primary role of providing direct and responsive communications between HQ IFFONCEV and subordinate units.

(5) During this reporting period extensive studies in the employment of new Army Area Communications System equipments were conducted in coordination with the 21st Sig G. A feasibility study of consolidated frequency allocation and control for the new AN/GRC-50 radio was

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prepared. School quotas were obtained and utilized to assure familiarity with the equipment upon arrival in the command. Liaison visits were conducted with III MAF to determine the characteristics and capabilities of the AN/TRC-97D tactical troposcatter equipment. Radio engineering and planning was conducted to determine the employment of the AN/TRC-97D. Data relating to calculation and associated technical considerations was catalogued for future reference.

1. (C) Engineers:

(1) The majority of the effort of the engineer section during the reporting period was devoted to planning, coordination and supervision of the engineer combat support provided by the 18th Engineer Brigade units in support of IFFORCEV, 5th SFGA, KOKFV and AAVN operations. The organic engineer units, 4th Engr Bn (C) and the 173d Engr Co (Abn), of the units under operational control of IFFORCEV were fully committed in support of their parent organizations throughout the period. Their activities were monitored by the engineer section. Tactical operations supported during the period were DOLLING, MCLEAN, DAZZLEM, FEMSHING I & II, PATRICK, WALKER, FLOQUIDA, COCHISE-GREEN and MACARTHUR. Specific engineer combat support effort expended by units in support of current and future tactical operations is discussed in the following paragraphs.

(2) Support of Tactical Operations.

(a) Operations DAZZLEM and FEMSHING I & II. The 45th Engr Gp was in general support of these operations prior to its deployment to I CTZ. Support included upgrading and maintenance of roads, repair of airfields and general engineer support.

(b) Operation MACARTHUR. The 937th Engr Gp is in general support of this operation. During this period the majority of engineer effort was utilized in upgrading and maintenance of LOC's, repair of airfields and bases to withstand the 1968 SW Monsoon.

(c) Operations WALKER and COCHISE-GREEN. The 35th Engr Gp is in general support of these operations. Support includes upgrading and maintenance of roads and airfields, applications of dust palliatives and general engineer support.

(3) Airfield Upgrading and/or Repair.

(a) Ban Elech (19004597). The 20th Engr Bn (C) completed upgrading this field from T-17 membrane to MBAL matting on 18 Feb 68. The field is rated as Type II C-130.

(b) Poley Kleng (24034933). The 70th Engr Bn (C) completed upgrading this field from T-17 membrane to MBAL matting on 22 Feb 68. The field is rated as Type II C-130.

(c) Ban Hot (19085251). The 299th Engr Bn (C) completed construction of this Type II C-7A airfield on 31 Jan 68. Engineer equipment assistance is currently being furnished for bunker and camp construction.

(d) Tiou Atar (AV022625). The 20th Engr Bn (C) furnished engineer support to the 5th SFGA in support of Operation FLOQUIDA by constructing a Type II C-7A airfield and assisting in the construction of a CIDG Camp at Tiou Atar. This project was completed on 3 Apr 68.

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(e) Palat Can Ly (LP 142001). The 87th Engr Bn (Const) completed construction of a new 4500 ft, Type II C-130 runway on 29 Apr 68.

(f) Ban Don (ZV 032268). The 20th Engr Bn (C) began upgrading this airfield to Type II C-130 on 22 Feb 68 by extending the clear zones and constructing a new five C-130 capable parking apron with two access taxiways. Current EDS is 15 May 68.

(g) Chao Koo (HQ 233818). The 70th Engr Bn (C) began repairing the old runway on 27 Feb 68 to carry limited all-weather, Type II C-123 traffic. This work was completed on 22 Apr 68. The ARVN 6th Engr Const Gp moved a work party to Chao Koo and began repairing the failed sections of the new runway on 3 Apr 68. Upon completion of these repairs the new runway will be reopened to limited Type II C-130 traffic.

(h) Dak To II (ZD 013217). The 299th Engr Bn (C) began repairs to this airfield in Mar 68. During the period prior to the '68 SW Monsoon the unit will patch the failed sections of the runway, construct an all-weather taxiway from the runway to the middle of the parking apron and improve the existing drainage system. During the period 4-19 Feb 68, Dak To I was repaired to carry C-123 traffic during dry weather.

(i) Dak Pak (YF 952603). The 299th Engr Bn (C) commenced repairs on 22 Mar 68 to Dak Pak airfield. Repairs will eliminate the existing safety hazard caused by excessive loose surface stones on the runway. Automobile engineer equipment from the automobile set located at Qui Nhon was borrowed to accomplish this project. Current EDS is 15 May 68.

(j) T-17 Membrane Repairs. Repair teams were employed at Duc Lap and Phu Tuc airfields for periods in excess of one week during the reporting period repairing failed factory seams, rips and tears in the T-17 membrane.

(k) Pled Djereng (YK 8654). The 20th Engr Bn (C) repaired approximately 2500 sq. ft. of runway that was showing signs of failure by removing the MX-19 matting, filling and compacting the subgrade and replacing the deformed sections of matting.

(l) Future Airfield Repair. The following fields are scheduled for repair or upgrading during the next three month period.

1. English (LS 875013). The extremely heavy C-130 traffic at English airfield during the period Dec 67 to Feb 68 caused serious MQAL matting and subgrade failures, which reduced the field classification from Type II C-130 to Type I C-130. USAFV approval has been given to rehabilitating the field by replacing the MQAL surfacing with an asphaltic concrete surface. A tentative EDS for this project is June 68.

2. Dong La Thin (CP 0329). The runway is closed to all fixed wing traffic due to failures of PSR surfacing and subgrade. IFFORCEV has submitted a request to USAFV for approval to rehabilitate this field by construction of a 3000 ft asphaltic concrete runway over the present site. Tentative EDS is 15 May 68.

(4) Land Clearing Operations. The 35th Land Clearing Platoon continued under OCON of IFFORCEV. During the past three months approximately 11,700 acres have been cleared by the Land Clearing Platoon, 937th Engr Gp and the 4th Engr Bn along routes 19, 21, 14, 1,

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72, and 511 and along combat trails within the MACARTHUR AO. The following routes were cleared during this period or are being cleared at present:

- (a) QL-1. Cleared from Phan Thiet to Phan Rang.
- (b) QL-143. Cleared from junction with Rte 60 south to AQ 8080.
- (c) QL-21. One Rome Flow section is now clearing from Lan Me Thuot eastward to the Darlac Province border. At present the section of road from IQ 0407 to IQ 3117 has been completed.
- (d) QL-19. Two Rome Flow sections are now widening the cleared areas on both sides of the road to 250m from Soui Doi to An Khe. At present the section of road from LR 2450 to LR 3645 has been completed.
- (e) Route 7B. Cleared from junction with QL-14 eastward to LR 0102.
- (f) QL-14N. Organic Rome Flows from the 337th Engr Gp widened the cleared areas outward to 300m from ZA 1963 to ZA 2066 to eliminate enemy ambush sites.
- (g) Route 511. Organic Rome flows from the 4th Engr Bn cleared 100m along both sides of the road from Potei Kleng to Kontum.
- (h) Combat Trail. Organic Rome Flows from the 4th Engr Bn cleared a combat trail from ZA 003369 to ZA 139392.
- (i) Route Upgrading. The IFFORCEV objective has been to open roads first to CL-10 to permit movement of troops and supplies, then improve to CL-31 to permit movement of fuel tankers and self-propelled artillery and finally to upgrade to MACV standard, which is an all-weather, 24 ft wide roadway with permanent bridges of CL-35, two-way and CL-50, one-way. The following route upgrading was initiated or completed during this period:
 - (a) QL-143: Phu Nhon (AQ 8700) south to AQ 8654 rehabilitated.
 - (b) QL-14N and Rte 512: Pleiky (ZA 2954) to Dak To (ZL 0122) initiated upgrading toward CL-50, one lane, all-weather.
 - (c) Route 512: Dak To (ZL 0122) to Lan Hat (YL 6725) initiated upgrading toward CL-50, one lane, limited all-weather.
 - (d) QL-1: Long Son (LR 8593) to Due Pho (LS 8038) initiated upgrading toward MACV standard.
 - (e) Rte 7B: Tuy Hoa (CQ 2044) to Phu Tuc (IQ 5060) initiated upgrading to open the route to CL-18, one-lane, limited all-weather.
 - (f) QL-19N: DIST pavement completed from junction with QL-14 west to Edap Enang (ZB 033222).
- (6) Paving Operations: Paving and upgrading to MACV standards were completed on QL-19 from vic Soui Doi (BR 0351) over the Mang Giang Pass (BR 2350) on QL-19 from An Khe to BR 4245 on QL- from Phu My (BR 9067) to BR 8987 and on QL-1, vic Phu Hiep, from CQ 1937 to CQ 2035.
- (7) 18th Engr Bde Support within I CTZ.
 - (a) During the period the 18th Engr Bde deployed a significant

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portion of its assets to I CIZ as the 45th Engr Gp Hq, 14th Engr Bn (C), 35th Engr Bn (C), one light equipment company, one Bailey Bridge Co and one earth moving platoon from the 539th Engr Bn (Construction moved northward). The 35th Engr Gp Hq relocated from Cam Ranh Bay to Qui Nhon and assumed the area responsibilities of the 45th Engr Gp in addition to their previous area.

(C) The deployment of these assets resulted in the following reorganization of the 13th Engr Dde:

45th Engr Gp (I CIZ)

14th Engr Bn (C)

35th Engr Bn (C)

39th Engr Bn (C)

35th Engr Gp (Qui Nhon)

19th Engr Bn (C)

87th Engr Bn (C)

84th Engr Bn (C)

577th Engr Bn (C)

539th Engr Bn (C)

864th Engr Bn (C)

937th Engr Gp (Pleiku) - No change

(C) Miscellaneous Projects.

(a) Kontum FAC facilities. During the Tet period, the existing FAC aircraft area adjacent to the Kontum airfield was severely damaged. Following a decision to relocate these facilities to a new location at the airfield, the 299th Engr Bn (C) began construction of a parking apron, taxiway and 18 revetments during Mar 68. Current EDC is 20 May 68.

(b) Heavy Artillery Fire Bases. Construction of heavy artillery fire bases in the Central Highlands was commenced in Apr 68 by units of the 937th Engr Gp. During the period preceding the 68 SW Monsoon, 175mm/8 inch, all weather artillery bases will be constructed at Dak To, Kontum, Plei Djereng, Oasis, Soui Dai and Lan Me Thuot. The 20th Engr Bn (C) completed the firebase at Plei Djereng on 29 Apr 68.

(c) Long Son Causeway. The 35th Engr Gp constructed a causeway bridge across the Lai Giang River at Long Son in Apr 68 to provide two way, CL-50 traffic employing the railroad bridge and the new causeway.

j. (U) Information Office.

(1) Representatives of the Information Office provided publicity coverage for numerous award and promotion ceremonies as well as for special events during this period, including:

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(a) Change of command of I Field Force Vietnam on 1 March with Major General William R. Peers taking over from Lieutenant General William L. Rosson. (See Inclosure 14)

(b) Presentation of awards by MG W. R. Peers to individuals of the 272d Military Police Company, 18 March.

(c) Presentation of the Meritorious Unit Citation to the Special Security Detachment, I Field Force Vietnam, by General William C. Westmoreland, 19 March.

(d) Presentation of the Meritorious Unit Citation to the 11th Public Information Detachment (Press) by MG W. R. Peers, 20 March.

(e) Presentation of the Distinguished Service Medal to Brigadier General George S. Blanchard by General William C. Westmoreland, 20 March.

(2) Photographic coverage was provided for the visits of numerous distinguished visitors, including:

(a) Admiral Kenneth L. Veth, Chief of Naval Advisory Group Vietnam, visiting the Harbor Defense, 31 March.

(b) LTG Ko Yuan Fen, Commander, Chinese Advisory Group, RVN; Ambassador (GEN, Retired) Lu Lien, Chinese Ambassador to RVN, 11 April.

(c) Representative Donald J. Irwin (D-Conn.) and Representative Charles S. Gusten (D-Cal.), 19 April.

(d) General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, US Army, 20 April.

(3) The following media representatives were granted an interview with the CG and/or a G2/G3 briefing during the period covered by the report:

(a) Mr. Robert Stokes, Newsweek Magazine, 7 February.

(b) Mr. Al Jessen, KOIN TV, CBS, Portland, Oregon, 8 February.

(c) Mr. Bob Kentley, Wall Street Journal, 13 February.

(d) Mr. Jim Wallace, US News and World Report, 20 February.

(e) Mr. Carson Frager, Time Magazine, 4 March.

(f) Mr. John Carroll, Baltimore Sun, 12 March.

(g) Mr. John Thompson, Senior Military Analyst, Chicago Tribune, 18 March.

(h) Mr. Dick Oliver, United Press International, 2 April.

(i) Mr. Donner Day, US News and World Report, 11 April.

(j) Mr. Joseph Alsop, Washington Post, 14 April.

(k) Mr. Robert Jordan, Senior Editorial Writer, National Geographic Magazine, 19 April.

(4) On 7 February LTC Rosson presented a briefing on the Tet offensive to the press in Saigon.

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(5) On 3 April MG Foers was interviewed and photographed by a news team from the Strategic Air Command for a special presentation on the effectiveness of B-52 strikes in II CTZ.

(6) On 17 April a wrap up briefing on the Tet offensive in II CTZ was conducted in Saigon for media representatives.

(7) Command Information Initial Orientation briefings for personnel newly assigned to IFFONCEV were conducted twice monthly.

(8) Command Information troop topics were prepared in support of the corps-wide Zone Coordination program.

(9) The 5th Public Information Detachment, under the supervision of the IO, IFFONCEV, published and distributed its "Morning News" on a daily basis, and published the February, March and April issues of the IFFONCEV magazine, the "Typhoon". On 17 March Major Martin C. Froebel arrived in the command and assumed the duties of Commanding Officer of the 5th PID.

(10) The 11th Public Information Detachment continued to provide transportation, escort, billets and other aid to correspondents and visiting information personnel, handling 717 personnel during the period covered. Further improvements were made on the Pleiku Press Camp enhancing the facilities available to media personnel.

k. (U) Inspector General Activities:

(1) A total of 73 complaints and 25 requests for assistance were received during the period. One half of the complaints were justified but there was no indication of significant problem areas which could result in conditions detrimental to the command.

(2) IFFONCEV Regulation 20-1, Command Inspections, was published on 7 Mar 68. This regulation synthesized earlier directives and established the command program for inspection of all units assigned or attached to the headquarters. The regulation was changed slightly on 16 April to accommodate certain recommendations submitted by USAFV.

(3) Command inspections of the following units were conducted on the dates indicated.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
HHB, 8th Bn, 26th Arty	19 Feb 68
Co E, 20th Inf (INF)	23 Feb 68
167th Sig Co	23 Feb 68
4th Bn, 6th Arty	11 Mar 68
41st Cn Co	22 Mar 68
431 AFU	22 Mar 68
5th Bn, 27th Arty	25 Mar 68
11th PI Det	29 Mar 68
55th MI Det	29 Mar 68
64th Engr Det	29 Mar 68

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HHD, I FFORCEV Arty	5 Apr 68
6th Bn 32d Arty	8 Apr 68
272d MP Co	19 Apr 68

All units inspected were rated satisfactory with the exception of HHD, 6th Bn 32d Arty and it was re-inspected on 29 March with satisfactory results.

(4) During the period two DA Special Subjects for Inspection (SSI) were received, analyzed and command guidance prepared and disseminated to all units. These subjects, Command Surveillance of User Communications Discipline and the ML/Al Rifle were also included as special items for inquiry during Command Inspections.

(5) The Inspector General visited 5 provinces, 10 districts, Headquarters II Corps and the 22d and 23d AAVN Division Advisory Teams in conjunction with a program to develop ways and means of improving the U.S. Government organization and operational relationships obtaining in II CTZ.

1. (U) Staff Judge Advocate Activities:

(1) In the field of military justice, five general court-martial cases were tried during the quarter. Subordinate units under the general court-martial jurisdiction of CG, I FFORCEV, held 79 trials by Special Court-Martial and 33 trials by Summary Court-Martial. Pursuant to paragraph 94, MCM, 1951, and Article 65 (c), UCMJ, the records of trial by Special and Summary Courts-Martial were reviewed in the office of The Staff Judge Advocate for legal sufficiency.

(2) During the quarter 710 persons were punished under the provisions of Article 15.

(3) US personnel presented 70 claims against the government for loss or damage to personal property. Ajudication of these claims was made by the Staff Judge Advocate, I FFORCEV, and a total of \$24,051.50 was paid to the claimants.

(4) During the quarter legal assistance was given to 972 personnel.

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2. SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. (U) PERSONNEL: None.

b. (C) OPERATIONS:

(1) Reduced Static Census Grievance (SCG) Cadre Reporting.

(a) OBSERVATION: VC Tet Offensive attacks on cities in II C12 caused a decrease in the flow of information from hamlet cadres to the Study Centers located at provincial capitals. In practice, District cadre serve as liaison between hamlet cadre, District GVN and US officials, the study Center, and DIOCC's. However, they are generally excluded from the hamlet to province information channel.

(b) EVALUATION: A one week course of instruction, conducted in Saigon should lend necessary emphasis and explain the role of the District Cadre. In the event of future attacks against provincial capitals, SCG information available at District level should be exploited.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That current and future cadre orientation courses emphasize the role of District Cadre in the information channel.

(2) Military Police Use of Small-Unit Tactics.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the Tet Offensive attacks against II CTZ major population areas, US Military Police provided immediate reaction forces which assisted in blunting the initial enemy assault.

(b) EVALUATION: The performance of MP individuals and units, while noteworthy, was marked in some cases by prolonged contact through a failure to employ basic tactics of fire and movement.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That military police units operating in population centers conduct thorough reviews of assault tactics at the small unit level for all assigned personnel.

(3) Use of M-79 Grenade Launcher in Urban Areas.

(a) OBSERVATION: The M-79, 40mm grenade launcher was used extensively throughout the city of Nha Trang during the Tet Offensive. The weapon was employed with telling effect against point targets, e.g., windows and doors of enemy occupied masonry buildings.

(b) EVALUATION: The weapon was effective when armed rounds were aimed accurately and traveled the required distance to become armed. However, many rounds were fired from less than 14-28 meters, the minimum distance the round must travel before it is armed. As a result, these rounds struck buildings but failed to detonate. After the firing ceased an EOD police of the area revealed numerous unexploded, live 40mm rounds.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the scope of training on the M-79 grenade launcher emphasize the importance of observing the minimum arming distance when used in built-up areas.

(4) City Defense Facilities.

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(a) OBSERVATION: After action reports covering the Tet Offensive pointed out that the defense networks of cities experienced considerable confusion as to where to report information.

(b) EVALUATION: Provincial capitals need a combined Tactical Operations Center (TOC) which has the equipment, facilities, and trained personnel to control and monitor the defense of the city, force deployments and air and artillery support. The TOC should be co-located with the Province Interrogation Center (PIC) so that current intelligence and operations can be easily integrated. It should be large enough to accommodate liaison personnel of additional units which may be required to augment local forces in the defense of the cities as well as representatives of all friendly forces permanently located in the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a combined TOC be constructed in Provincial capitals for the efficient control of combat operations.

(5) MK18 Rapid-Fire Grenade Launcher.

(a) OBSERVATION: Installation of the MK18 rapid-fire Grenade Launcher on UH-1D/H provides a capability for employment of helicopters in a suppressive fire role.

(b) EVALUATION: The Navy has a rapid-fire grenade launcher presently used on small boats and helicopters which appears to have great potential. This weapon has been mounted on a UH-1D helicopter on the M4 23 door gun mount. The M60 machine guns were moved forward to the door opening for additional firepower. The effectiveness of the MK18 system has not been fully evaluated; however, it has been used successfully during one infiltration and five exfiltrations of small reconnaissance teams. A total of 1500 rounds have been fired without a malfunction. Utilization of this system would enable a quick change from troop carrier configuration to supplement gunship configuration.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the MK18 system mounted on the UH-1D/H helicopter be tested by the USA Combat Developments Command.

(6) Use of Manpack Personnel Detector in the O-1.

(a) OBSERVATION: Employment of the Manpack Personnel Detector (MPD) in the O-1 aircraft shows operational promise.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of the MPD in the O-1 aircraft is feasible and practicable. The MPD is small enough and light enough to install in the O-1 without modification of the aircraft. The O-1 mounted MPD is excellent for use by VR aviators or artillery observers to verify suspected areas or to check areas in which observation is limited. Targets of opportunity can be engaged by artillery or air upon verification by the MPD. In addition, UH-1 helicopter assets, the primary aircraft for employing the MPD, are released for other missions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That tests be continued using the MPD in the O-1 aircraft.

(7) Heliborne Loudspeaker.

(a) OBSERVATION: By rigging 1000-watt loudspeakers to the UH1B helicopter a desirable increase in range and audio

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characteristics results.

(b) EVALUATION: The 1,000 watt loudspeaker, helicopter mounted gives tactical units and provinces a reliable immediate response capability. It is particularly valuable as a population control device. The equipment was found to operate best at altitudes of 800 to 1200 feet. Below 800 feet, tests showed that the noise of the aircraft engine interfered with reception on the ground.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the helicopter loudspeaker technique be encouraged.

(8) Length of Printed Propaganda

(a) OBSERVATION: NVA surgeon Lo Van Can rallied to the 4th Inf Div in Feb. This Hoi Chanh prepared a lengthy indictment of NVA medical practices which was printed by the 4th PSYOP Gp in Saigon. On 2 March Sr CPT Vu Nhu Y, CO, 9th Bn, 66th NVA Regt rallied in the Dak To area with a copy of Dr Can's statement. In April, two senior NCO's from the 320th NVA Regt also rallied indicating that; allied propaganda had made them aware of the doctor's return.

(b) EVALUATION: This experience demonstrates that the reading habits of literate Vietnamese are different from ours. Lengthy messages with full details and explanation are an acceptable form of communications with the Vietnamese. Short texts may be less effective than they would be with Western audiences.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When appropriate, printed propaganda media should employ lengthy texts with full details to build credibility and appeal to Vietnamese reading habits.

c. (U) TRAINING: None.

d. (U) INTELLIGENCE:

(1) Population Control:

(a) OBSERVATION:

Civilian curfews, while in effect in some cities immediately before the Tet Offensive were suspended for the purpose of Tet celebrations and Church attendance. As a normal practice, civilian curfews have seldom been rigidly enforced in the II CTZ. This lack of an effective curfew had resulted in an attitude of detachment from the war among the people in the urban areas.

(b) EVALUATION:

1. There is a need for effective population control within heavily populated areas. Population control is enhanced by the enforcement of curfews for both military and civilian personnel.

2. There were too few national police patrols and check points available in most cities attacked 30 January. Numerous cities had national police patrols scheduled to be on duty during this period; however, few of these patrols were actually performing their mission. An examination of the routes of approach used by the enemy in entering the cities indicated that patrols were ineffective around the peripheries of the towns and in the back streets. In the cities where check points were used, they tended to remain in fixed locations and were easily by-passed by the enemy.

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3. Efficient national police patrols and checkpoints, both stationary and roving, can monitor the passage of personnel entering and leaving populated areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That large population centers develop and enforce effective population control measures and an efficient system for police patrols and check points.

e. (C) LOGISTICS:

(1) Prestocking barrier materials and ammunition.

(a) OBSERVATION: Insufficient barrier materials and ammunition are located in the provinces to permit ARVN units adequate back-up in cases of emergency such as the Tet offensive.

(b) EVALUATION: The Tet offensive pointed up the shortage of barrier material and certain types of ammunition in the provinces. As a result, these types of supplies became critically short overnight. Through combined GVN-US efforts, such supplies and ammunition were rushed into the provinces to alleviate both the military and civilian situation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That increased reserve stocks of barrier material and ammunition be maintained at province and lower level to insure sustained operational capability.

(2) Analysis of ARVN Logistical System.

(a) OBSERVATION: ARVN Logistical System (ALC) is not responsive to sudden demands of large magnitude such as occurred during the Tet offensive.

(b) EVALUATION: During the Tet offensive the ARVN Logistical system was not as responsive as required due to several factors such as:

1. Lack of trained personnel.
2. Insufficient stocks on hand.
3. Lack of transportation.

As a result of the above, the ALC was seriously handicapped in accomplishing its mission. Through use of US resources, many of the immediate problems were identified and resolved.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a detailed analysis of the ARVN Logistical system be accomplished to identify problem areas and insure improved responsiveness.

(3) Suitable Weapons for RD Cadre Groups.

(a) OBSERVATION: The recent attacks on major cities and the employment of RD groups in a security role proved the issued RD Cadre weapons a poor match for the VC and NVA individual automatic weapons.

(b) EVALUATION: The issued M-3 submachine gun should be replaced with a more accurate, lighter and longer range automatic weapon. The M-2 carbine would be a suitable substitute. The substitution of M-2 carbines for M-3 submachineguns in the RD Cadre standard issue kit is presently being considered at Saigon level.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That MACV encourage GVN to substitute the M-2 carbine for the M-3 submachine gun in RD groups.

(4) Emergency Frequency Modulation (FM) Contact Frequency.

(a) OBSERVATION: An emergency FM contact frequency was needed which could be used by ground and aviation units for emergency aviation support requests.

(b) EVALUATION: There is a requirement for a method whereby aircraft flying in the vicinity of ground units or convoys who may need emergency aviation support can establish communications. There are numerous cases where aircraft on administrative or other missions have seen a ground unit in contact requiring casualty evacuation, artillery or gunship support but contact could not be established. With a common emergency frequency, a ground element requiring help could fire flares to attract the attention of passing aircraft, then initiate contact on the common FM frequency. IFFORCEV has designated 38.9 MHz for this purpose which will net with the new and old family of FM radios as well as AF FM airborne sets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the military specifications for future FM radios include a FM emergency frequency mode which can be monitored at all times in a manner similar to that of the UHF Emergency Channel.

f. (C) ORGANIZATION:

(1) Requirements for Helicopter Gunships.

(a) OBSERVATION: Mission requirements for gunships continue to increase because of missions never envisioned at the time present TOE's were developed.

(b) EVALUATION: Gunships are presently used for convoy cover, installation defense, insertions and extractions of Long Range Patrols, Mobile Strike Forces, combat assaults, escort of CH-54 missions, protection of medical evacuation helicopters, airborne personnel detector helicopters plus myriad other tasks limited only by the imagination of the user. This imaginative use of gunships has resulted in a severe shortage of gunships which were allocated primarily for support of combat assaults and limited aerial fire support.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That TOE's be reviewed to provide gunship authorization to meet increased mission requirements.

(2) Medical Support Activity Coordination.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the Tet offensive, there were many civilian war casualties in Ban Me Thuet and Phan Thiet. Representatives from several medical activities were available and willing to assist; however, there was no central authority designated to coordinate the available medical personnel and assets. Consequently, assistance actually provided or available when the need was most urgent was not as effective as it should have been.

(b) EVALUATION: That medical assets were not utilized as efficiently as they could have been during the critical period. Representatives of Public Health Service, the Surgeon Officer of the Field Force concerned, ARVN Corps Med Advisor, 44th Med Gp, and local tactical units should conduct on-the-spot surveys to develop needs and plans for a maximum coordinated effort.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That post-attack plans include designating a single coordinator for all medical agencies in the areas where mass casualties or disasters may be expected. The Coordinator should be from Public Health Service CORDS.

g. (U) OTHER: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

George S. Blanchard
GEORGE S. BLANCHARD
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

~~14- Incl~~

as Incl 5-8, 10, 12 and 14
Withdrawn, Hq, DA

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AVHGC-DST (15 May 68) 1st Ind (C) CPT Arnold/hga/LBN 4485
 SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters IFFORCEV for Quarterly
 Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 17 JUN 1968

TO: ✓ Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: G:OP-DT,
 APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
 Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons
 Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1968 from Headquarters,
 IFFORCEV.

2. (C) a. Reference item concerning reduced static census grievance
 cadre reporting page 71, paragraph 2b(1). Concur that cadre orientation
 courses should emphasize the role of District Cadre in the information
 channel.

b. Reference item concerning Military Police use of small-unit tac-
 tics, page 71, paragraph 2b(2): Concur. The USARV Provost Marshal re-
 commended to Colonel Lionel E. Scott, USAMPS, a member of the CONARC
 Liaison Team, that additional fire-movement training for military police-
 men be included in MP courses at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Additionally, MP
 unit commanders throughout Vietnam reported to Colonel Scott that unit
 training programs now emphasize small-unit tactics for military policemen.

c. Reference item concerning MK-18, rapid fire grenade launcher, page
 72, paragraph 2b(5). The MK-18 is not an approved armament system for the
 UH-1. This system has not been flight tested nor certified for use on the
 UH-1 aircraft. By separate action, this headquarters will gather all in-
 formation presently available to conduct an initial evaluation. Further,
 it is recommended that use of the MK-18 be suspended until such time as
 proper testing is completed.

d. Reference item concerning use of manpack personnel detector in the
 O-1 aircraft, page 72, paragraph 2b(6): Concur. The manpack personnel
 detector is smaller than the airborne personnel detector. Due to the
 necessity for low level flights in order to derive maximum efficiency from
 the personnel detector, extreme caution should be exercised when flying
 the O-1 aircraft at low altitudes. Significant findings as the result of
 employment of the personnel detector in the O-1 should be forwarded to
 this headquarters for dissemination.

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AVHCC-DST (15 May 68) 1st Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters IFFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

e. Reference item concerning population control, page 73, paragraph 2d(1): Concur. The USARV Provost Marshal has initiated a program to establish closer liaison with National Police throughout Vietnam. The program includes scheduled PM/NP conferences and the placing of liaison officers from the National Police in the offices of Provost Marshals. A National Police major is a member of the staff of the Commanding General, 18th Military Police Brigade. The result of the closer contact will be the improvement of National Police methods and techniques. Combined MP/NP population check points and patrols are established within and outside the large population centers in Vietnam. These patrols will become more efficient as the bonds of friendship, mutual understanding and respect are strengthened through close and continuous combined police operations.

f. Reference item concerning prestocking barrier materials and ammunition, page 74, paragraph 2e(1). Barrier materials are presently being issued direct from the Army Logistical Center (AIC) to Province Admin Logistic (AL) companies bypassing the Division Tactical Areas (DTA). This fact coupled with country wide stock levels and the large volume of due-in level to satisfy emergency requirements such as experienced during the VC/NVA TET Offensive. Ammunition will continue to be stocked and distributed according to the need.

g. Reference item concerning analysis of ARVN logistical system, page 74, paragraph 2e(2): The Country Logistics Improvement Plan (CLIP) is designed to update this system and is presently being done on a semiannual basis.

h. Reference item concerning suitable weapons for RD Cadre groups, page 74, paragraph 2e(3). The modernization program conducted by the GVN is converting approximately 1600 M1 Carbines to the M2 Carbine each month. Also as tactical forces receive the M16 rifle, their M2 Carbines are turned immediately over to the RD groups.

i. Reference item concerning emergency Frequency Modulation (FM) contact frequency, page 75, paragraph 2e(4): Concur. The AN/ARC-114 Receiver-Transmitter which is designed for installation in the OH-6 aircraft initially and subsequently in other Army aircraft, will have a FM communications capability in the 30-75.95MHZ range on 92C channels, plus a guard frequency. This will provide the desired capability for a FM emergency mode on a designated frequency. The date of introduction of this radio in-country is not yet established. Current measures for use of emergency scene-of-action FM frequencies must remain in effect as specified in HQ USARV CEOI Item 67-1.

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AVHCC-DST (15 May 68) 1st Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters IFFORCEV for Quarterly
Period Ending 30 April 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

j. Reference item concerning requirements for helicopter gunships, page 75, paragraph 2f(1): Concur in that portion which states an increase in requirements for gunships. However, it appears that the comment advocates an increase in the number of gunships in nondivisional assault helicopter companies, and, if this is the TOE unit referred to by IFFORCEV this headquarters nonconcur with the increase being reflected in these units. The mix of gunships and slicks in the current Assault Helicopter Companies (MTOE 1-77G) is considered adequate, however, IFFORCEV has not been provided a pure gunship company in the past. The move of the 361st Aviation Company (Escort) TOE 1-157T to II CTZ to be employed under the OPCON of IFFORCEV has just been completed. This will provide a source of gunships for missions of the type indicated and alleviate the gunship shortage in II CTZ. The 361st Aviation Company is a small unit which was originally designed for the Aerial Weapons Companies in the Airmobile Division. This is the only unit of this type that is not organic to a division. It may prove to be a highly versatile organization and ideal for the type missions described in this ORLL. The operations of this company will be closely monitored and compared with the larger armed helicopter companies now employed in III and IV CTZs. If it proves effective, it may be advisable to review the troop structure with regards to optimum size of gunship companies, and the ratio of pure gunship units to those containing a mix of gunships and slicks.

k. Reference item concerning medical support activity coordination page 75, paragraph 2f(2): Concur that a central control should be established for medical activities. Nonconcur that coordinator be from the Public Health Service CORDS. A study is being requested to determine the proper agency for the coordination of these programs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. Nakatsukasa
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:
HQ, I FFORCEV

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GPOP-DT (15 May 68) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, I Fld Force Vietnam for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, USArmy, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 18 JUL 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

(C) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed with additional
comments:

a. Reference 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2j: IFFORCEV states a requirement for additional gunships in the basic ORLL due to an increase in requirements for gunship support, and recommends that TOE's be reviewed with the objective of providing additional gunships. In 1st Indorsement, USARV interprets the review to mean an increase in the number of gunships in non-divisional units. Concur in USARV position that the TOE for non-divisional assault helicopter companies should not be changed. Additional gunships to meet the increased requirements should come from additional armed helicopter companies. The solution presented in paragraph j, 1st Indorsement, will provide a portion of the additional gunship support required. However, other competitive requirements for the services of the 361st Aviation Company are not acknowledged by the USARV indorsement. In fact, these competitive requirements will probably require the total support capabilities of the 361st.

b. The effectiveness of helicopter gunships has been demonstrated over and over in operations in Vietnam. Because of this effectiveness, ground commanders have steadily increased the demands for the services of these aircraft. At the same time, the number of gunships on hand has consistently remained below the number authorized. Hence, the supply has been unable to meet the demand. Future gunship procurement actions should consider the quantitative requirements for gunships as superior or at least equal to qualitative requirements.

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GPOP-DT (15 May 68) 2d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, I Fld Force Vietnam for Period
Ending 30 April 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

c. Reference 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2k: USARV rear area damage control should insure that coordination of medical support is included in each plan and the responsibility, therefore, clearly defined and fixed.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:




C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

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II CTZ MAJOR ROAD NET & AIRFIELDS

5 MARCH 1968

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
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


II CTZ MAJOR ROAD NET & AIRFIELDS

5 MARCH 1968


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
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HEADQUARTERS I FORCEV TASK ORGANIZATION

AS OF 30 APRIL 1968

<u>ASSIGNED UNITS</u>		<u>AUTHORITY</u>	<u>STATUS</u>	<u>AUTHORITY</u>	<u>LOC</u>
Hq Co, IFFORCEV		USARV GO 668, 20 Sep 65		IFFORCEV GO 391, 9 May 67	NHA
HNB, IFFORCEV Arty		USARV GO 1783, 20 Dec 65		IFFORCEV GO 391, 9 Oct 66	NHA
41st Arty Group		USARV GO 2077, 5 May 67	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	IFFORCEV GO 287, 29 Jul 66	PHC
52d Arty Group		USARV GO 57, 5 Jan 67	Attached 52d Arty Group	IFFORCEV GO 391, 9 May 67	PHC
52d Bn (105mm) (SP) 6th Arty		USARV GO 57, 5 Jan 67	Attached 41st Arty Group	IFFORCEV GO 287, 29 Jul 66	PHC
7th Bn (105mm) (T) 14th Arty		USARV GO 6208, 31 Oct 66	Attached 52d Arty Group	IFFORCEV GO 578, 19 Jul 67	PHC
6th Bn (175mm) (SP) 14th Arty		USARV GO 1205, 26 Oct 65	Attached 41st Arty Group	IFFORCEV GO 805, 13 Oct 67	PHC
7th Bn (8 in) (SP) 15th Arty		USARV GO 3467, 9 Jul 67	Attached 41st Arty Group	IFFORCEV GO 30, 20 Jan 68	PHC
2d Bn (105mm) (T) 17th Arty		USARV GO 57, 5 Jan 67	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	IFFORCEV GO 129, 16 Feb 68	PHC
5th Bn (175mm) (SP) 22d Arty		USARV GO 6496, 18 Dec 67	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	USARV GO 952, 1 Mar 68	PHC
5th Bn (105mm) (T) 27th Arty		USARV GO 1762, 30 Nov 65	Attached 1st Cav Div (An)	IFFORCEV GO 129, 16 Feb 68	PHC
1st Bn (155mm) (T) 30th Arty		USARV GO 1868, 12 Dec 65	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	IFFORCEV GO 151, 24 Feb 68	PHC
6th Bn (8 in) (SP) 32d Arty		USARV GO 1417, 29 Mar 67	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	IFFORCEV GO 311, 2 Apr 68	PHC
4th Bn (AW) (SP) 60th Arty		USARV GO 1195, 18 Mar 67	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	IFFORCEV GO 334, 11 Apr 67	PHC
6th Bn (155mm) (T) 84th Arty		USARV GO 1126, 15 Mar 68	Attached 52d Arty Group	IFFORCEV GO 129, 16 Feb 68	PHC
1st Bn (155mm) (T) 92d Arty		USARV GO 1195, 18 Mar 67	Attached IFFORCEV Arty		PHC
*C Bn, 6th Bn (155mm) (T)		USARV GO 1858, 12 Dec 65			PHC
16th Arty					PHC
HNB, 8th Bn (7A) 26th Arty		USARV GO 361, 25 Jan 67	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	IFFORCEV GO 151, 25 Feb 68	PHC
Btry B, 29th Arty (SCHLT)		USARV GO 1205, 26 Oct 65	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	IFFORCEV GO 151, 24 Feb 68	PHC
Btry E (AF), 41st Arty (AD)		USARV GO 1195, 18 Mar 67	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	IFFORCEV GO 151, 24 Feb 68	PHC
77th FA Det (Radar)		USARV GO 1213, 28 Mar 66	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	IFFORCEV GO 129, 16 Feb 68	PHC
237th FA Det (Radar)		USARV GO 1913, 28 Mar 66	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	IFFORCEV GO 129, 16 Feb 68	PHC
241st FA Det (Radar)		USARV GO 5791, 10 Nov 67	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	IFFORCEV GO 1, 5 Jan 68	PHC
242d FA Det (Radar)		USARV GO 5791, 10 Nov 67	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	IFFORCEV GO 1, 5 Jan 68	PHC
243d FA Det (Radar)		USARV GO 5791, 10 Nov 67	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	IFFORCEV GO 1, 5 Jan 68	PHC
244th FA Det (Radar)		USARV GO 5791, 10 Nov 67	Attached Hq IFFORCEV Arty	IFFORCEV GO 1, 5 Jan 68	PHC
2d Armed Sqdn, 1st Cav		USARV GO 5028, 2 Oct 67	Attached 4th Inf Div	USARV GO 5027, 2 Oct 67	PHC
(- 1st Cav Trp E)					PHC

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USARV CO 1503, 4 Apr 68
 USARV CO 5271, 14 Oct 67
 IFFORCEV CO 1148, 22 Feb 68
 IFFORCEV CO 415, 25 Oct 66

USARV CO 147, 22 Feb 68
 IFFORCEV CO 25, 16 Nov 65

Attached 27th Abn Bde (Sep)
 Attached 4th Inf Div
 Attached 173d Abn Bde (Sep)
 Attached 52d CAB

Attached 54th Sig Bn
 Attached 54th Sig Bn

LOC
 NHA
 NHA

AUTHORITY

STATUS

USARV CO 5381, 22 Oct 67
 USARV CO 4916, 26 Sep 67
 USARV CO 3137, 27 May 66
 USARV CO 1515, 28 Mar 66
 USARV CO 640, 12 Feb 68
 USARV CO 640, 12 Feb 68
 USARV CO 526, 5 Feb 68
 USARV CO 5953, 6 Oct 66
 USARV CO 640, 12 Feb 68
 USARV CO 1229, 27 Oct 65
 USARV CO 159, 13 Jan 66
 USARV CO 640, 12 Feb 68
 USARV CO 1590, 15 Nov 65
 USARV CO 640, 12 Feb 68
 USARV CO 5953, 6 Oct 66

NOTE: * Unit is in support of 3d Bde, 8th Abn Div

AUTHORITY

USARV CO 4079, 22 Jun 66
 509th IR Gp CO 9, 8 Jun 66

ATTACHED UNITS

41st CA Co (-)
 313th FR Bn

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HEADQUARTERS 1st Psychological Operations Battalion

OPCON UNITS

4th Inf Div

173d Abn Bde

II Corps US Army Advisory Gp

17th Combat Aviation Gp

7th Armd Sqdn, 17th Air Cav

3d Bn (Abn) 506th Inf (1st Bde, 101st Abn Div)

8th Psyops Bn

Co B, 5th SFG

201st Avn Co

Incl 3

AUT ORLTY

USARV OPLAN 78-66 (OP ROBIN)

MACV msg (S) MACCOC12 05002, 171835Z Feb 68,
Unit Deployment (U)MACV msg (S) MACCOC1116892, 231133Z
May 67, Reinforcement of II CTZ (U)

MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 66 paragraph 5(3)

MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 66 Task Organization

USARV msg (C) AVHGC-O 31527 110846Z Jan 68
Assignment Status of 201st Avn Co (Corps) and
7/17th Air Cav Sqdn (U)MACV msg (S) MACCOC11 01603, 151110Z Jan 68,
Byrd AO (U)MACV ltr (FOUO) MACPD dtd 6 Dec 66, Employment
of the US Army 6th Psyops Battalion (Tactical)MACV LOI 1-66 dtd 29 Mar 66 paragraph 5(4)
MACV msg (S) MACCOC12 02553, 211235Z Jan 67,
OPCON of USASF Team in II CTZ (U)USARV msg (C) AVHGC-O 31527, 110846Z Jan 68,
Assignment Status of 201st Avn Co (Corps)
and 7/17th Air Cav Sqdn (U)LOC

PKU

EGH

PKU

NHA

PKU

PHT

NHA

PKU

NHA

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AVIATION SUPPORT

MACV LETTER MACCOCA DATED 13 JUNE 1967, SUBJECT: ARMY AVIATION ALLOCATION (U) PLACES THE FOLLOWING ALLOCATIONS (CURRENTLY UNDER CONTROL OF THE 17TH AVIATION GROUP) IN SUPPORT OF HEADQUARTERS I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM.

10th Cbt Avn Bn

61st Avn Co (AML)
92d Avn Co (AML)
192d Avn Co (AML)
196th Avn Co (MED HEL)
243d Avn Co (MED HEL)
281st Avn Co (AML)

52d Cbt Avn Bn

57th Avn Co (AML)
119th Avn Co (AML)
155th Avn Co (AML)
170th Avn Co (AML)
179th Avn Co (MED HEL)
189th Avn Co (AML)
355th Avn Co (HEV HEL) (-)

223d Cbt Spt Avn Bn

18th Avn Co (UAC)
183d Avn Co (BAC)
185th Avn Co (BAC)
203d Avn Co (BAC)
219th Avn Co (BAC)
225th Avn Co (SAC)

268th Cbt Avn Bn

48th Avn Co (AML)
129th Avn Co (AML)
134th Avn Co (-) (AML)
180th Avn Co (MED HEL)
335th Avn Co (AML)


Incl 3

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Del 4

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1 Feb 1968 - 30 Apr 1968

As of 30 Apr 1968

UNIT	AUTH	EPDY/AUTH	KIA	WIA	MIA
HQ I FFORCEV (1)	489	94.0	-	-	-
HMB I FFORCEV Arty (2)	2526	104.2	10	48	-
41st Arty Gp (3)	2343	97.8	17	103	-
52d Arty Gp (4)	2307	103.7	3	10	-
54th Sig Bn (5)	1020	101.7	1	-	-
41st CA Co	140	72.9	1	4	-
55th MI Det	83	94.0	-	-	-
272d MP Co	182	123.1	1	-	-
297th TC Co	107	97.2	-	-	-
4th Inf Div (-)	17647	93.2	125	941	7
2d Sqdn 1st Cav	833	94.5	6	41	-
173d Abn Bde (Sep)	5747	94.9	46	200	2
1st Mech Bn, 50th Inf	907	91.8	17	194	2
II Corps	1433	80.7	12	56	2
17th Avn Gp	8035	95.8	27	330	6
CAP ROK Div	14161	96.4	58	81	-
9th ROK Div	13918	100.6	66	83	-
3/506 Abn Inf Bn	809	94.3	21	166	-

- (1) Includes Hq, I FFORCEV, Hq Company I FFORCEV, 64th Engr Det (Terrain), 5th PI Det, 11th PI Det, 13th Military History Det and 43d APU.
- (2) Includes Hq Btry IFFV Arty, 5th Bn, 27th Arty; 6th Bn 32d Arty; 4th Bn, 60th Arty; Btry E, 41st Arty; Btry B, 29th Arty; HMB 8th Bn, 26th Arty and 241st, 242nd, 243rd, 244th, 77th and 237th Radar Dets.
- (3) Includes Hq Btry 41st Arty Gp, 7th Bn, 13th Arty; 7th Bn, 15th Arty; 2d Bn, 17th Arty and 6th Bn, 84th Arty.
- (4) Includes Hq Btry 52d Arty Gp; 3d Bn, 6th Arty; 6th Bn, 14th Arty; 1st Bn, 92d Arty; 5th Bn, 22d Arty.
- (5) Includes 54th Sig Bn, 167th Sig Co and 209th Det.

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PROMOTION ALLOCATIONS

UNIT	FEBRUARY				MARCH				APRIL				TOTAL
	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4	E9	E8	E7	E6	E5	E4	
HQ I FORCEV				5	2								31
HQ Co I FORCEV				2	5								16
5th PID													1
11th PID													2
41st CA Co				1	1								12
43d AFU													1
54th Sig Bn				5	67								245
55th MI Det				1									12
272d MP Co				1	17								31
297th TRANS Co (C/R)				1									3
I FORCEV Arty				1	3	12							39
41st Gp				5	3								28
52d Gp				2	3								48
2d Bn 17th Arty				1	18	35							195
3d Bn 6th Arty				1	12	25							104
1st Bn 30th Arty				2	6	8							17
3d Bn 18th Arty				1	20	26							47
7th Bn 13th Arty				10	28								133
7th Bn 15th Arty				6	25								128
4th Bn 60th Arty				1	15	125							272
8th Bn 26th Arty				16	14								78
5th Bn 22th Arty				5	4								33
5th Bn 27th Arty				2	65	75							224
6th Bn 14th Arty				1	15	35							142
6th Bn 32d Arty				16	29								163
1st Bn 92d Arty				13									114
TOTAL	4	8	243	541			4	2	15	231	522		2119

ENCL 11

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g. Reported Army vehicle accidents resulting in disabling injury or \$50.00 (+) damage.

g. Army vehicle accident rate as compared with established expectancy rate ceiling.

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MILITARY DISABLING INJURIES BY UNIT
For 3d Quarter FY 68

a No of Injuries		b Injury Cost	Unit	No injury cases per 2	
Fatal	Non-Fatal			100,000 man days	
				4.50	
0	0	\$ 0	11th PI Det	00.00	
0	0	0	5th PI Det	00.00	
0	0	0	64th Engr Det	00.00	
0	0	0	43d AFU	00.00	
0	0	0	HHC, I FFORCEV	00.00	
0	0	0	HNB, I FFV Arty	00.00	
0	0	0	HNB, 52d Arty Gp	00.00	
0	0	0	8-26 Arty	00.00	
0	0	0	B-29 Arty	00.00	
0	0	0	297th Trans Co	00.00	
0	0	0	41st CA Co	00.00	
0	0	0	55th MI Det	00.00	
0	1	4284	2724 MP Co	5.15	
0	2	8568	HNB, 41st Arty Gp		13.96
0	1	4284	5-27 Arty	1.98	
0	2	8568	54th Sig Bn	1.99	
0	1	4284	6-32 Arty	2.05	
0	2	8568	1-92 Arty	3.91	
0	2	8568	6-14 Arty	4.30	
1	1	46684	3-6 Arty	4.31	
0	2	8568	7-13 Arty	6.26	
0	8	34272	4-60 Arty	6.27	
1	5	63820	5-22 Arty	10.48	
0	4	17136	2-17 Arty		11.04
0	1	4284	1-30 Arty		11.04
2	19	166196	7-15 Arty		11.50
4	51	388084	I FFV TOTAL	4.63	

a Includes all injuries resulting in death, permanent impairment or disability necessitating hospitalization beyond midnight of the day following accident.

b Based on empirical data contained in DA Cir 385-16. Fatality: \$42,000. Non-Fatal: \$4284.

c Reflects disabling injury rate as compared with established expectancy rate ceiling (4.50).

NOTE: Above data is a compilation of the accident reports and exposure data as reported to this HQ by the units shown.

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The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

* SUBJECT TITLE _____
** FOR OT RD # _____
***PAGE # _____

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page # : That page on which the item of interest is located.

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